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Abstract 
The Tea Party has become a powerful force in American politics. Emerging in early 
2009, the Tea Party has elicited mass support among the public with important 
implications for public policy and electoral politics. However, there remains significant 
debate over the political characteristics and motivations of Tea Party supporters. The 
emergence of the Tea Party has also led to speculation that supporters will form a third 
party. Using survey data collected in 2010 and 2011, this dissertation examines the 
relationship between Tea Party and third party supporters. Evidence is found that 
although Tea Party and third party supporters disapprove of President Obama and hold 
negative views of the economy, the two groups are fundamentally different in terms of 
their partisanship and political attitudes. Tea Party supporters are found to be 
ideologically conservative Republicans, while third party supporters are shown to be 
political independents holding negative opinions of both parties. Using American 
National Election Studies data, this dissertation also explains the motivations behind Tea 
Party support. Evidence is found that Tea Party support is motivated by traditional moral 
values, racial resentment, negative views of President Obama, negative opinions of 
immigrants, and libertarianism. This dissertation also examines the emotional component 
of Tea Party support finding that strong feelings of anger and fear, related to perceptions 
of the state of the country, motivates support. Finally, this dissertation analyzes an 
aggregation of public opinion data measuring opinions of the Tea Party from 2010 to 
2011. Support for the Tea Party is found to have declined from 2010 through the end of 
2011, with the most precipitous decline occurring among its most ardent supporters. 
Ultimately, the findings of this dissertation suggest that the emergence of the Tea Party 
has created a rift within the Republican Party between the moderate and ideologically 
extreme elements, constituting a barrier to legislative compromise. 
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Chapter 1: Reading the Tea Leaves 
 Who supports the Tea Party? Since the emergence of the Tea Party in late 2008, 
early 2009, there has been a high degree of speculation about the motives and political 
beliefs of Tea Party supporters. Tea Party supporters have been described as moderates, 
political independents, and right-wing extremists. Common explanations often contend 
that Tea Party supporters are primarily motivated by beliefs in limited government and 
fiscal conservatism, or by issues of race, economics, moral values, as well as animosity 
towards President Obama. These competing claims highlight the necessity for a more 
definitive explanation of Tea Party support. 
 While questions remain about the motives of supporters, the Tea Party has 
consistently demonstrated a mass appeal among the American public. The Tea Party 
mantra has served as an important organizational rallying cry for a large constituency of 
Americans. Since 2009, support for the Tea Party has sparked the formation of 800 to 
1,400 local Tea Party groups with an estimated 160,0001 active members (Gardner, 2010; 
Skocpol & Williamson, 2012). Tea Party supporters have staged countless rallies and 
protests across the county often drawing large crowds and substantial media attention. 
Among the American public, as many as 1 in 3 American adults have expressed support 
for the Tea Party.2   
 Given this considerable level of support, it is not surprising that Tea Party 
supporters have also become a powerful force in American politics. For instance, the 
United States House of Representatives and Senate now have an official Tea Party 
                                                
1 Skocpol and Williamson (2012) estimates as of the summer of 2011 (p.22).  
2 For instance, an August 2010 USA Today/Gallup poll indicated that 30 percent of the American public supported the 
Tea Party (Jones, 2010). A similar poll, conducted by the same organizations in April of 2011, also found that around 
30 percent of the public supported the Tea Party (O’Brien, 2011). This number is also consistent with the findings of 
Chapter 4 which shows that the average level of support for the Tea Party from 2010 to 2011 was around 30 percent.  
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Caucus to represent the Tea Party constituency (Gervais & Morris, 2012; Roll Call, 
2011). In 2010, the mobilization of Tea Party supporters helped the Republican Party 
regain a majority in the United State House of Representatives (Jacobson, 2011a, 2011b). 
The 63 seats gained by the Republicans in the 2010 midterm elections was the largest 
victory for either party since the 1940s (Barone & McCutcheon, 2011). Highlighting the 
appeal of the Tea Party, The New York Times estimated that 129 House candidates and 9 
Senate candidates had some association with the Tea Party going into the midterm 
elections (Zernike, 2010e).3 Moreover, polling data suggests that Tea Party supporters 
represented 41 percent of the voters in the 2010 midterm elections (Clement & Green, 
2011). 
 Beyond general elections, Tea Party supporters have been credited with 
influencing the outcomes of numerous Republican primary contests leading up to the 
2010 and the 2012 elections (Zelizer, 2012). In many cases, Tea Party supporters helped 
to defeat moderate candidates, supported by the Republican Party establishment, in favor 
of more ideologically conservative candidates (Zernike, 2010d). For instance, in 2010, 
Tea Party supporters helped to defeat moderate candidates in U.S. Senate Republican 
primary contests in Delaware, Alaska, Kentucky, and Colorado (Peoples, 2011).  
 In 2012, similar results occurred in such states as Indiana where six-term 
incumbent Richard Luger was defeated by Tea Party candidate Richard Mourdock 
(Jonsson, 2012).  The 2010 and 2012 defeats of moderate candidates in Republican 
primaries have led to fears among some Republican incumbents of a similar occurrence 
leading up to the 2014 elections. News reports suggest that Republican office holders fear 
                                                
3 The New York Times defined association largely by support from local Tea Party groups (Zernike, 2010e). 
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a primary challenge by a more conservative candidate, if they are seen as compromising 
on their conservative principles (Silva, 2012).  
 Aside from electoral impacts, the Tea Party has also influenced the policies 
pursued and votes cast by lawmakers. For instance, recent research has found that Tea 
Party activism significantly influenced the votes of Republican legislators on such issues 
as the 2011 vote to raise the national debt ceiling (Bailey, Mummolo, & Noel, 2012, p. 
788). This issue was deemed to be important among Tea Party supporters, due to its 
implications for federal spending, leading many Republican legislators to vote against the 
August 1, 2011 measure (Bailey, Mummolo, & Noel, 2012, p. 786).  These findings 
further accent the political impact of Tea Party supporters. 
 To briefly summarize, the many competing explanations of support, the public 
appeal, as well as the electoral and policy implications frame the importance of this 
dissertation examining Tea Party support. As such, this dissertation will address the 
following questions: 
 1.  What are the socio-economic, demographic, and political characteristics  
  of Tea Party supporters?  
 
 2.  What are the factors that motivate Tea Party support? Are Tea   
  Party supporters motivated by traditional moral values,    
  libertarianism, animosity towards President Obama, or racial   
  resentment?  
 
 3.  How has support for the Tea Party, represented by responses to public  
  opinion surveys, changed over time? Has support increased or decreased? 
  How has support changed among the Tea Party’s strongest   
  supporters? 
 
 4. What does mass support for the Tea Party mean for American politics? 
 
To address these questions, several public opinion data sources were examined. For 
instance, in Chapter 2 I analyze USA Today/Gallup polls collected in August 2010 and 
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April 2011. In addition, Chapter 3 examined public opinion data from the 2010 and 2012 
waves of the American National Election Studies 2010-2012 Evaluations of Government 
and Society Study (EGSS). Finally, in Chapter 4 an aggregation of public opinion polls 
from numerous data sources is analyzed to provide a unique illustration of changes in Tea 
Party support over time.  
 This chapter will proceed as follows. It begins with a recounting of the history of 
the Tea Party focusing on its early emergence as well as a discussion of the motivational 
factors that may account for Tea Party support. As the motivational factors of Tea Party 
are discussed, several hypotheses related to support will be proposed. The chapter closes 
with a preview of the proceeding chapters.  
The Tea Party Emerges 
 The widely held catalyst triggering the emergence of the Tea Party as a political 
force came from CNBC commentator Rick Santelli on February 19, 2009 when he 
criticized President Obama’s plan to deal with mortgage debt live on the floor of the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (Bedard, 2010; Lepore, 2010). 4 Santelli remarked  
 The government is promoting bad behavior....How many of you people want to 
 pay for your neighbor's mortgage that has an extra bathroom and can't pay their 
 bills? Raise their hand. President Obama, are you listening?....We're thinking of 
 having a Chicago Tea Party in July. All you  capitalists that want to show up at 
 Lake Michigan, I'm going to start organizing (CNBC.com, 2009). 
                                                
4  It is important to note that there are a variety of explanations accounting for the emergence of the Tea Party. For 
instance, a report by the Institute for Research and Education on Human Rights points to several factors that led to the 
emergence of the Tea Party (Bughart & Zeskind, 2010). Dick Armey and Mike Kibbe, in their 2010 book Give Us 
Liberty A Tea Party Manifesto, contend the Tea Party began after the 2008 House vote on the Troubled House Relief 
Program (TARP). This legislation was defeated on the first vote on September 29, 2008, which Armey and Kibbe 
(2010) argue “in retrospect, September 29 is clearly the day the Tea Party movement was reborn in America” (p.60).   
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Santelli’s remarks received substantial media attention and sporadic Tea Party protests 
began to be reported across the country, with several events taking place on February 29, 
2009 (Berger, 2009; Bughart & Zeskind, 2010). Following these smaller protests across 
the country, support for the Tea Party took on a much larger form with the April 15, 2009 
protests that coincided with the date federal income taxes were due. On this date, 
numerous Tea Party protest rallies were reported across the country with some estimates 
suggesting that that as many as 311,000 people attended events in 346 cities across the 
country (Silver, 2009). Journalist accounts described the themes of these rallies as anti-
tax and opposition to excessive government spending (Fox News, 2009a) as well as 
opposition to health care reform proposals and the economic stimulus (Barone &  
McCutcheon, 2011, p.3-4).  Furthermore, around spring of 2009, reports suggest that 
national Tea Party groups began to take form with the Tea Party Patriots emerging on 
March 10, 2009 and the Tea Party Nation on April 6, 2009 (Bughart & Zeskind, 2010, p. 
17). Local Tea Party groups also began to form around this time as groups continued to 
emerge across the country through the beginning of 2010 (Skocpol & Williamson, 2012, 
p.8). 
 Following the Tax Day rallies in the spring of 2009, Tea Party supporters began 
attending town hall meeting across the country voicing their opposition to health care 
reform (Barone & McCutcheon, 2011, p. 4). Many of these events drew significant media 
attention because of the heated exchanges that took place between lawmakers and 
constituents. Some media outlets ran headlines such as “Town Halls Gone Wild” to 
describe the events (Isenstadt, 2009). Rounding out the year was a September 12, 2009 
rally in Washington, D.C., organized by the advocacy group FreedomWorks, which 
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featured thousands of protestors voicing concerns over the growth in the size of 
government (Fox News, 2009b). The New York Times described the event as a 
“culmination of a summer-long season of protests that began with opposition to a health 
care overhaul and grew into a broader dissatisfaction with government” (Zeleny, 2009). 
By the beginning of 2010, the Tea Party had begun to receive more media attention as 
newspaper and television reports discussing the Tea Party rose substantially from the 
coverage received in 2009 (Boykoff & Laschever, 2011, p.348). According to one 
analysis, coverage of the Tea Party went from 13 stories referencing the Tea Party in 
March of 2009 to 237 in February of 2010 (Boykoff & Laschever, 2011, p.348).5 By the 
early months of 2010, the Tea Party had emerged as an important component of the 
national political dialogue.  
Tea Party Support as a “Movement” 
 It is important to note that some may study the Tea Party as a social movement 
focusing on common characteristics. However, this dissertation takes the view that the 
Tea Party is better understood as an element of the Republican Party rather than a 
standalone social movement.6 Moreover, the history of the Tea Party is still being written 
making a preliminary assessment regarding its correct classification difficult. 
Additionally, problems arise when attempting to classify social movements as nearly 
every group attempting to gain recognition uses the term (Tilly, 2004, p.6).  In the same 
sense that calling a close election a landslide lends the election credibility, instilling the 
title “movement” to a group of like-minded individuals lends it legitimacy (Tilly, 2004, 
                                                
5 Coverage was measured by mentions among the top newspapers in the country according to circulation and five of the 
largest news networks defined as CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, CBS news, and ABC news (Boykoff & Laschever, 2011, 
p.347). 
6 Skocpol and Williamson (2012) conclude in their 2012 book on the Tea Party that “despite endless commentary 
comparing it to assorted movements ranging from Civil Rights to the Ross Perot campaign, the Tea Party is 
fundamentally the latest iteration of long-standing, hard-core conservatism in American politics” (p.82). 
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p.6). As such, this dissertation will refrain from entering into a debate concerning 
whether the Tea Party constitutes a social movement, and will leave decisions on the 
correct classification to future research.7 
 Popular Accounts of Tea Party Support 
 As mentioned earlier, there are numerous explanations accounting for Tea Party 
support. One of the first attempts to explain Tea Party supporters came from pollsters 
Scott Rasmussen and Doug Schoen in a 2010 book. In the book, Rasmussen and Schoen 
(2010) explain that the Tea Party is “avowedly nonpartisan” with a membership 
consisting of political independents, disenfranchised Democrats, Republicans, and 
political newcomers (p. 8-11).8 This theme was also echoed by The Wall Street Journal 
which described the Tea Party as “remarkably broad-based and nonideological” (Taranto, 
2010). Similarly, narratives concerning the bipartisan nature of the Tea Party were 
reflected in headlines from news organizations such as CNN, which ran the headline 
“Disgruntled Democrats Join the Tea Party” in April of 2010 (Travis, 2010).  
 Furthermore, some have defined support for the Tea Party by adherence to 
libertarian small government beliefs (Armey & Kibbe, 2010, p.123). This narrative 
suggests that Tea Party supporters are dissatisfied with the major parties and angry over 
the growth in the size and scope of government (Armey & Kibbe, 2010). This line of 
argument was also frequently stated by Tea Party activists such as Amy Kremer, leader 
of the advocacy group Tea Party Express, who described Tea Party supporters as 
“focused completely on the fiscal aspect of the economy. We're not focused on the social 
                                                
7 As Tilly (2004) notes “no one owns the term “social movements”; analysts, activists, and critics remain free to use the 
phrase as they want” (p.7). 
8 A similar argument is found in other books on the Tea Party such as O’Hara (2010). 
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issues” (CNN.com, 2010). 9  Similarly, constitutional law professor Elizabeth Price Foley 
notes in her 2012 book on the Tea Party that supporters are defined by three principles: 
U.S. sovereignty, constitutional originalism, and limited government (Foley, 2012). She 
notes that “the emphasis of Tea Party conservatism is economic and constitutional, not 
social” (p.224). 
  In contrast to these claims, others connect Tea Party support with support for 
traditional moral values. For instance, some have suggested that a large portion of Tea 
Party supporters are social conservatives or “Teavangelicals” as described by the Chief 
Political Correspondent for the Christian Broadcast Network, David Brody. In his 2012 
book on the Tea Party, Brody argued that a large portion of Tea Party supporters hold 
socially conservative views and that these views did not necessarily contradict views 
related to the size of government (2012, p.42).  
 Some accounts of Tea Party support suggest that it is motivated by race, as well as 
animosity towards President Obama, made evident by controversial posters held up at 
Tea Party rallies and questions concerning President Obama’s birthplace (Burghart & 
Zeskind, 2010). Tea Party supporters dispute claims of racial animosity arguing that those 
who attend rallies with racist signs are shunned and that many leaders within the Tea 
Party are African-American such as former Florida Congressmen Allen West and former 
Republican presidential candidate Herman Cain (Brody, 2012, p.97).  
 These accounts highlight the diverse nature in which Tea Party supporters have 
come to be popularly understood. Specifically, they provide a glimpse into how Tea Party 
leaders, activists as well as journalists explain Tea Party support. Although instructive, 
                                                
9 Amy Kremer was also a founding member of the Tea Party Patriots and in 2010 was described by The Telegraph 
newspaper as the most influential member of the Tea Party (The Telegraph, 2010). The group Kremer heads, the Tea 
Party Express, claims to be the “the nation’s largest Tea Party political action committee” (Tea Party Express, 2013). 
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these accounts often rely on anecdotes or personal opinion rather than social science 
evidence. Thus, a more rigorous examination of Tea Party supporters and their possible 
motivations is warranted.  
Third Party and Tea Party Support 
 As it stands currently, the Tea Party does not represent a third party in itself as the 
American two-party system makes it difficult for such parties to succeed.10 However, it is 
useful to consult the literature on third parties as it details why voters sometimes abandon 
the major parties and exercise alternate political options. It could be that the same factors 
that lead voters to support a third party also account for Tea Party support. Chapter 2 of 
this dissertation will provide a detailed discussion of the predictors of third party support, 
which will not be repeated here. Instead, the focus will remain on the factors most 
relevant to the hypotheses to be tested regarding support for the Tea Party. 
 Previous research suggests that support for a third party occurs most often when 
voters are dissatisfied with the two major parties (Gold, 1995; Rapoport & Stone, 2008; 
Rosenstone, Behhr, & Lazarus, 1996).) In others words, third party support is often the 
product of voter perceptions that the major parties do not represent their interests 
(Rosenstone, Behr, & Lazarus, 1996). Early on in the tenure of the Tea Party, there were 
claims that supporters were dissatisfied with both the Republican and Democratic parties.  
 For instance, in April of 2009 Republican Party Chairman Michael Steele was 
denied a request to speak at a Tea Party event in Chicago (Bedard, 2009). The organizers 
of the event sent out a press release stating “RNC officials are welcome to participate in 
the rally itself, but we prefer to limit stage time to those who are not elected officials, 
both in Government as well as political parties” (DontGo Movement, 2009). 
                                                
10 See Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus (1996) for a discussion of the barriers to third parties. 
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Furthermore, given that early Tea Party protests were centered on opposition to 
healthcare reform and the economic stimulus (Barone & McCutcheon, 2011), it is 
apparent that supporters were also unhappy with the Democratic Party and its legislative 
priorities. In addition, many Tea Party leaders have stated that supporters are angry at 
both political parties (Armey & Kibbe, 2010).  
 However, if Tea Party supporters represented a constituency outside the two 
parties, like traditional third party supporters, then the expectation would be that both 
parties would either be ignoring Tea Party supporters or simultaneously attempting to 
gain their support. Examining the actions of the elites of both parties it is clear that the 
Republican Party embraced Tea Party supporters early on, while the Democratic Party 
largely criticized Tea Party supporters.  
 For instance, Democratic U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi criticized the tax 
protests held on April 15, 2009 remarking “we call it AstroTurf, it's not really a grass-
roots movement. It's AstroTurf by some of the wealthiest people in America to keep the 
focus on tax cuts for the rich instead of for the great middle class” (Bendery, 2009). In 
contrast, news reports described how Republicans such as House Minority leader John 
Boehner were “embracing the concept” and attending Tea Party events (Klein, 2009). 
Thus, the activity of party elites provides evidence that Tea Party supporters are more 
akin to Republican partisans than third party supporters.  
 With the goal of determining the relationship between Tea Party supporters and 
third party supporters, the following hypotheses are tested: 
 Hypothesis 1: Tea Party support is predicted by Republican Party identification  
   and conservative ideology. 
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 Hypothesis 2: Tea Party support is not predicted by dissatisfaction with both  
   parties.  
 
Attitudes Shaping Partisan Identities 
 Rather than a third party effort, some consider Tea Party supporters to be the 
staunchest, most conservative members of the Republican Party (Abramowitz, 2012). 
The Tea Party may have simply been an outlet for conservatives angry about the GOP 
losing control of Congress and the White House in the 2008 elections. As such, the 
literature on partisanship could be helpful in explaining Tea Party support. Chapter 3 of 
this dissertation will provide an examination of this literature, but for now the discussion 
will center on the factors relevant to the hypothesis to be specifically tested.  
 Research on partisan identification suggests that issues of race and moral values 
have become increasingly related to partisanship over the past several decades. One of 
the first scholarly examinations of the linkages between race and partisanship comes from 
Carmines and Stimson (1989). In their book Issue Evolution, these scholars examined the 
movement of white voters into the GOP, explaining it as a response to civil rights policies 
designed to assist African Americans (Carmines & Stimson, 1989). More recent research 
has supported some of these early contentions. For instance, Knuckey (2006) found that 
racial resentment11 has become increasingly associated with conservative ideology across 
the country and Republican Party identification among white southerners. Specifically, he 
finds that racial resentment was a significant predictor of conservative ideology from 
1986 through 1990 as well as 1992 through 2000 (Knuckey, 2006).12 Moreover, the work 
                                                
11 Racial resentment refers to a new conceptualization of racism (similar to symbolic racism) centered on beliefs that 
the problems arising from racial discrimination are over, that the plight of African-Americans are a product of their 
own making, and that government aid to African Americans, as well as complaints from African-Americans concerning 
their disadvantaged status, are without merit (Henry & Sears, 2002, p.254). 
12 Knuckey (2006) was unable to examine the effect of racial resentment in 1996 and 1998 because the questions were 
not asked on the American National Election Studies survey data. 
19 
 
of Valentino and Sears (2005) found similar linkages between issues of race and 
Republican Party identification among southern whites from the 1970s through 2000.  
 Starting in the late 1970s and 1980s the Republican Party began to openly appeal 
to Christian conservatives. Some early signs included President Reagan’s appeals to the 
Moral Majority as well as Reverend Pat Robertson’s campaign for the GOP nomination 
for president in 1988 (Brewer, 2005; Cohen, 2012). The link between social conservatism 
and partisanship has also been a subject of extensive scholarly examination (e.g. Layman, 
2001).This research suggests that social conservatism has become increasingly related to 
high levels of partisanship (Layman & Carsey, 2002). For instance, Knuckey (2006) 
found that support for moral traditionalism was a significant predictor of Republican 
Party identification and conservative ideology among whites from 1992 through 2000.  
 An alternate strain of research suggests that economic issues play an important 
role in explaining partisanship. For instance, Abramowitz (1994) found that changes in 
Republican and Democratic Party identification among whites in the 1980s was related to 
views on the role of government and the size of the welfare state. Debates over economic 
philosophy (free-market versus government intervention) have been the main sources of 
party divisions in the U.S. since the New Deal (Brewer, 2005; Layman & Carsey, 2002). 
For instance, Brewer (2005) found that party identification was significantly related to 
economic attitudes from 1956 through 2000. Specifically, economic attitudes such as 
support for a decreasing role of government in society were related to Republican Party 
identification. Other scholars have noted that income has become an increasingly strong 
predictor of Republican Party identification over the past several decades (Brewer & 
Stonecash, 2001; Nadeau, Niemi, Stanley, & Godbout, 2004). 
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 To briefly summarize, previous research suggests that issues of race, economics, 
and moral traditionalism work together to explain partisan identification and ideology. In 
previous periods of American politics, issues of race or religion acted as cross-cutting 
conflicts that may have divided partisans united on economic issues (Brewer, 2005; 
Layman & Carsey, 2002). However, as time has passed, now economic, moral, and racial 
conservatism work in unison to separate the two parties in the United States (Layman, 
Carsey, & Horowitz, 2006; Layman, Carsey, Green, Herrera, & Cooperman, 2010). The 
two parties are now distinctly separated along issues of race, economics, and moral 
traditionalism. Given that all three of these factors have been shown to predict 
Republican Party identification, they are expected to predict Tea Party support as well. 
However, what does recent research on the Tea Party suggest? 
Tea Party Scholarship  
 Recent scholarship on the Tea Party points to several factors accounting for 
support. This research will be revisited in greater detail in Chapters 2 and 3 and a brief 
summary of the main findings will be provided here. Skocpol and Williamson (2012) use 
survey data and field work to explain the emergence and composition of the Tea Party. 
Tea Party supporters are described as very conservative in their ideology, loyal voting 
Republicans, and politically engaged. The authors make a point to note that Tea Party 
supporters are “best understood as first and foremost conservatives, rather than merely as 
exemplars of demographic or economic categories” (Skocpol & Williamson, 2012, p.32).  
 The authors describe the emergence of the Tea Party as a response to perceptions 
of a changing America both politically and demographically manifesting in the emotions 
of both fear and anger among supporters. They also contend that Tea Party supporters are 
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primarily white, middle class, older Americans with at least half of the membership 
holding socially conservative views.  Supporters are united by their hatred of President 
Obama and aided organizationally by various free market groups, and conservative media 
outlets that have amplified as well as shaped the Tea Party message. Overall, they 
describe the Tea Party as “fundamentally the latest iteration of long-standing, hard-core 
conservatism in American politics” (Skocpol & Williamson, 2012, p.82). 
 One of the most extensive quantitative examinations of Tea Party support comes 
from Abramowitz (2012) through an analysis of American National Election Study 
Evaluations of Government and Society Survey (EGSS) data collected in October 2010. 
Abramowitz (2012) frames the emergence of the Tea Party as a product of a decade’s 
long trend in ideological polarization among the Republican Party’s base. In other words, 
GOP officials and their mass supporters have become increasingly conservative over the 
past few decades. Analyzing American National Election Study data, dating back to 
1968, Abramowitz (2012) shows that Republican identifiers have increasingly viewed 
Democratic presidential candidates in an unfavorable light. In 2010, that trend continued 
with Tea Party supporters giving negative evaluations of President Obama at high levels. 
 Abramowitz (2012) also found that ideological conservatism was the strongest 
predictor of Tea Party support. Furthermore, he also found that higher levels of racial 
resentment, negative feelings toward President Obama, and Republican Party 
identification were all significant, and among the strongest, predictors of Tea Party 
support. Many of the findings of Abramowitz (2012) are echoed in the research of 
Deckman (2012) who found that Tea Party support was predicted by Republican Party 
identification, conservative ideology, and opposition to President Obama.  
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 Furthermore, Ulbig and Macha (2011) examined data from a June 2010 survey 
and found additional support for conservative ideology and Republican Party 
identification as predictors of Tea Party support among the U.S. electorate, along with 
evidence that anti-government views also predicted support. Moreover, in contrast to the 
work of Abramowitz (2012), the authors found little evidence that views related to race 
predicted Tea Party support (Ulbig & Macha, 2011). Similar to the findings of Ulbig and 
Macha (2011), related to anti-government opinions, Perrin, Tepper, Caren, and Morris 
(2011) found that libertarian worldviews were significantly related to Tea Party support. 
Finally, examining original survey data from 2010, Baretto, Cooper, Gonzalez, Parker, 
and Towler (2011) found that Tea Party support among whites is significantly related to 
negative opinions of minorities, homosexuals, and immigrants. 
 Overall, previous research on the Tea Party offers several explanations of Tea 
Party support. These explanations include conservative ideology, Republican Party 
identification, racial resentment, dislike for President Obama, negative views of 
immigrants and minorities, as well as libertarian worldviews. Moreover, research also 
suggests that many who support the Tea Party are also social conservatives (Skocpol & 
Williamson, 2012). The research undertaken in this dissertation will add to previous 
research on the Tea Party in a variety of ways.  
  First, a large portion of the scholarly research on the Tea Party uses support as a 
predictor of specific outcomes such as votes on legislation or opinions on issues. As such, 
a majority of research into Tea Party support focuses on support as an independent 
variable rather than a dependent variable. This dissertation will differ from a large 
segment of previous research by treating Tea Party support as a dependent variable to 
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determine the predictors of support (Chapters 2 and 3). Second, other explanations of Tea 
Party support rely on conclusions largely drawn from interviews and field work (Skocpol 
& Williamson, 2012). As such, these findings lend themselves to further testing 
quantitatively using public opinion data.   
 Finally, prominent explanations of Tea Party support have yet to be tested 
simultaneously (or in some instances quantitatively). This provides a unique opportunity 
to determine the attitudinal predictors of support after controlling for each competing 
explanation. Along with controlling for a variety of explanations, a determination can 
also be made about the relative effect of each factor on support for the Tea Party. Thus, 
this dissertation will improve upon previous research predicting Tea Party support by 
controlling for various explanations of support found in the literature. The following 
hypotheses will be examined in the proceeding chapters: 
 Hypothesis 3:  Tea Party support is predicted by racial resentment. 
 
 Hypothesis 4: Tea Party support is predicted by traditional moral values. 
 
 Hypothesis 5: Tea Party support is predicted by libertarian traditional free- 
   market conservative viewpoints. 
 
One of the most unique contributions of this dissertation will be to examine the emotional 
component of Tea Party support. In general, losing in politics can make people angry and 
fearful, and motivate them to political activism. The work of Skocpol and Williamson 
(2012) suggests that this may have indeed been the case with Tea Party supporters. As 
such, these feelings of fear and anger were likely activated among the staunchest GOP 
supporters due to the big losses the party suffered in 2006 and 2008. Tea Party groups 
then used this emotional energy to organize support. Thus, the following hypothesis was 
constructed to test this assumption: 
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 Hypothesis 6: Tea Party support is predicted by feelings of fear and anger  
   concerning the state of the country. 
 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation will examine Tea Party support over time. As the Tea Party 
has grown, both in its numbers and in awareness among the American public, its overall 
support is expected to decline. This is attributed to the fact that over time the enigmatic 
appeal of the Tea Party disappeared as it became associated with Republican Party elites 
such as Sarah Palin. It can be inferred that the initial broad ranging support for the Tea 
Party was tied to its ambiguity in terms of its platforms and leaders. Thus, as the Tea 
Party gained more traction in the media, as well as in America’s consciousness, it became 
more easily tied to concrete individuals that may have eroded some of its initial wide-
ranging support. This leads to the final hypothesis to be tested in this analysis.  
 Hypothesis 7: Support for the Tea Party will decline from 2010 to 2011. 
Chapter Overview 
 The following chapters will extend the knowledge base concerning Tea Party 
support. Specifically, they will add to our understanding of the characteristics of Tea 
Party supporters, what motivates their support, as well as their past, present, and future 
political impacts. 
Chapter 2: Examining the relationship between Tea Party and third party support  
 
  Are supporters of the Tea Party comparable to supporters of third parties? Do 
traditional predictors of third party support also predict Tea Party support? Using survey 
data from 2010 and 2011, this chapter examines whether predictors of Tea Party support 
also predict third party support. Comparisons are also made between the socioeconomic, 
demographic, and political characteristics of self-identified Tea Party and third party 
supporters. The findings demonstrate that although Tea Party and third party supporters 
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disapprove of President Obama and hold negative views of the economy, the groups are 
fundamentally different in terms of their partisanship and political attitudes. Tea Party 
supporters are best described as ideologically conservative Republicans; third party 
supporters identify as ideologically moderate political independents that hold negative 
opinions of both parties. 
Chapter 3: Exploring the attitudinal predictors of Tea Party support  
 What are the attitudinal predictors of Tea Party support? Using American 
National Elections Studies data from October 2010 and February 2012, this chapter 
explores the main determinants of Tea Party support. After controlling for party 
identification and ideology, evidence is found that Tea Party support is predicted by 
measures of traditional moral values, racial resentment, views of President Obama, 
opinions toward immigrants, and libertarianism. The findings also suggest that Tea Party 
support can be explained by strong feelings of anger and fear related to perceptions of the 
state of the country. Conclusions are also drawn concerning the opinions of Tea Party 
supporters and the degree to which support for the Tea Party constitutes a dividing line 
between the moderate and extreme elements of the Republican Party base.   
Chapter 4: Declining public support for the Tea Party  
 How have opinions regarding the Tea Party changed over time? This chapter 
examines the extent to which public support for the Tea Party has changed since polls 
regarding support have been conducted. Two types of questions are used to plot Tea 
Party opinions over time; those gauging the favorability and the support for the Tea 
Party. Results indicate that support or favorability of the Tea Party, judged by four 
distinct measures, has declined over time, reaching a peak in support around November 
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of 2010. Specific attention is also given to the influence that question wording, or 
question response options, can have on public opinions of the Tea Party. Depending on 
the options given to respondents, support or favorability towards the Tea Party can vary 
significantly. The implications of these results for the Tea Party, and the measurement of 
public opinion given, are also explored. 
Chapter 5: Implications of the Tea Party for American politics. 
 This chapter will review the findings from each of the preceding chapters and 
explore their implications for American politics. This chapter will also discuss the future 
influence of the Tea Party in terms of partisan polarization, partisan gridlock, and 
legislative compromise. Overall, the findings of the dissertation suggest that the 
emergence of the Tea Party has created a rift within the Republican Party with important 
implications for the ability of legislators to forge meaningful compromise. 
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Chapter 2: Examining the relationship between Tea Party and third party support 
 How similar, or dissimilar, are supporters of the Tea Party to those who have 
supported third parties in the past? Do traditional predictors of third party support also 
predict Tea Party support? Examining Tea Party support in relation to support for third 
parties permits a more in-depth understanding of the motivations behind supporters of 
both groups. Specifically, it speaks to our understanding of who Tea Party supporters are, 
what motivates their support, and their impact on the American two-party system.  
 Previous scholarly research on the Tea Party has largely neglected to study 
supporters in the context of a third party. Instead, the focus has remained predominately 
on connections between Tea Party supporters and the Republican Party13 (Abramowitz, 
2012; Williamson, Skocpol, & Coggin, 2011). In doing so, an important opportunity to 
compare the contributing factors of past third party movements to the Tea Party has so far 
been missed. Building on this neglect, the following chapter will offer an examination of 
the Tea Party through the eyes of third party supporters of the past. 
 This chapter will proceed as follows. First, a case is made for a comparison 
between Tea Party supporters and third party supporters. An argument is made that while 
supporters of the Tea Party have yet to coalesce into an official third party, the specter of 
a third party driven by its supporters remains a definite possibility. Second, the chapter 
moves to a discussion of past American third parties focusing on their influence on the 
major parties. Third, the chapter discusses relevant literature focusing on past predictors 
of third party support. Fourth, the chapter provides a comparison of Tea Party and third 
party supporters using survey data from 2010 and 2011 followed by an analysis of Tea 
                                                
13 For a small exception see Hugick and Starace (2012) who compare Tea Party supporters and Ross Perot supporters. 
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Party and third party support incorporating measures previously shown to predict support 
for both groups. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the main findings and 
their ramifications for our understanding of the Tea Party.    
The Specter of the Tea Party as a Third Party 
 Early on in the tenure of the Tea Party as a political force, questions were raised 
about the relationship between its supporters and supporters of third parties. These 
questions were not surprising given the extent to which members of the media, as well as 
political elites, predicted the emergence of a third party inspired by the Tea Party. As 
early as April of 2009, an opinion piece featured in The Wall Street Journal authored by 
Glenn Reynolds, noted that the Tea Party “may lead to a new third party that may replace 
the GOP, just as the GOP replaced the fractured and hapless Whigs” (Reynolds, 2009). In 
May of that same year, former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich in an opinion piece 
featured in The Washington Post echoed a similar theme. Gingrich opined that “elites 
ridiculed or ignored the first harbinger of rebellion, the recent tea parties” going on to 
note that “In the great tradition of political movements rising against arrogant, corrupt 
elites, there will soon be a party of people rooting out the party of government” 
suggesting that the party could come in the form of a third party (Gingrich, 2009). 
 Soon these third party prophecies began to take the form of direct threats to the 
two-party establishment. Former governor of Alaska Sarah Palin, a favorite among Tea 
Party supporters, as well the keynote speaker at the 2010 Tea Party national convention 
(Zernike, 2010a, 2010b), suggested that the formation of a third party, inspired by the Tea 
Party, was a definite possibility. In a direct warning to the Republican Party, Governor 
Palin is quoted as stating that “If they start straying, then why not a third party” (O’Brien, 
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2010a). A similar theme was also echoed by South Dakota Republican Senator Jon Thune 
in 2010. Thune warned the Republican Party that “If we don't govern accordingly, I think 
you're going to see a third party in this country.” Senator Thune theorized that the third 
party could be driven by Tea Party supporters (O’Brien, 2010b). More recently, Tea Party 
favorite and former CEO of Godfather’s Pizza Herman Cain called for the formation of a 
third party following the election loss of Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney 
in 2012. Herman Cain remarked that “We need a third party to save this country” and that 
“This country is in trouble and it is clear that neither party — is going to fix the problems 
we face” (Starnes, 2012).14 
 Beyond the words spoken by Tea Party elites, supporters also took concrete steps 
toward the establishment of a third party. For instance, in 2010 Scott Ashjian ran as a 
third party candidate for the U.S. Senate in Nevada representing the Tea Party of Nevada 
(“General Election Results,” 2010). In 2011, Jack Davis ran for Congress representing a 
Tea Party inspired third party in the race for New York’s 26th congressional district 
(Hernandez, 2011a, 2011b). As early as November of 2009, the Tea Party was registered 
as an official party in Florida (Smith, 2009). In November of 2010, Randy Wilkinson 
represented the Florida Tea Party in a race for Florida’s 12th congressional district 
(Brower, 2010).  
 The Tea Party also exhibited characteristics of a third party by holding its own 
national convention and offering its own response to the president’s State of the Union 
address. In February of 2010, a national Tea Party convention was held in Nashville, 
                                                
14 It should be noted that Herman Cain was not explicitly stating that the third party would be driven solely by the Tea 
Party and he also stated that the third party could be comprised of disgruntled Democrats. However given Mr. Cain’s 
prominence among Tea Party supporters, and the context from which the statements were made during a discussion of 
how the Republican Party’s presidential candidate had not been conservative enough, it can be inferred that his 
sentiments spoke largely to disagreements between the Tea Party and the Republican Party.  
30 
 
Tennessee. It was estimated that the conference was attended by 600 Tea Party activists 
(Zernike, 2010c). In 2011 the first Tea Party rebuttal was offered by Republican House 
member Michele Bachmann, the founder of the House Tea Party Caucus. Representative 
Bachmann’s rebuttal was broadcast on a major cable news channel, CNN, following the 
president’s address and the GOP response (Sonmez, 2011). The trend continued in the 
following years with former Republican presidential candidate Herman Cain delivering 
the response in 2012 and Kentucky Senator Rand Paul delivering the response in 2013. It 
is important to note that these responses were delivered in light of the fact that the 
Republican Party also offered its own spokespersons to respond to the president’s 
address.   
 The divide between the major parties and supporters of the Tea Party has also 
been institutionalized within the federal government. For instance, in the summer of 2010 
Representative Michele Bachmann, a Republican from Minnesota, officially formed the 
Tea Party Caucus in the United States House of Representatives (Gervais & Morris, 
2012, p. 245).  Upon its formation, the House Tea Party Caucus boasted some 52 
Republican House members (Gervais & Morris, 2012, p. 245). 15 16  In terms of the Tea 
Party, the House Tea Party Caucus represents the “only true institutional representation 
of the Tea Party movement in the federal government” (Gervais & Morris, 2012, p.249). 
Although the Tea Party House Caucus does not represent a third party caucus in itself, the 
perceived necessity for forming such a caucus may suggest a growing divide between the 
Republican Party and the Tea Party. 
                                                
15 The idea of forming a Tea Party legislative caucus, to represent the values of Tea Party supporters, also filtered down 
to the state level. In 2010, Texas state legislators formed their own Tea Party Caucus boasting an initial membership of 
48 state legislators (Grissom, 2010; As cited in Gervais & Morris, 2012, p. 245). 
16 As of February 21, 2013, the House Tea Party Caucus website listed 47 current members (House Tea Party Caucus 
Website, 2013). 
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The Tea Party as a Response to Major Party Failures 
 Some prominent supporters of the Tea Party claim that both of the major parties 
have let government spending and debt get out of control. This line of argument suggests 
that the Tea Party is a product of the failure of the major parties to adequately address 
policies deemed relevant to the public. In their 2010 book Give Us Liberty: A Tea Party 
Manifesto, Dick Armey, former chairman of Freedom Works (a libertarian group that 
helped to organize the Tea Party early on) and the group’s current CEO Matt Kibbe argue 
that the Tea Party was born out of public anger directed at Republicans and Democrats 
alike. 
 Specifically, the authors argue that the Tea Party came about as a response to the 
public’s opposition to the passage of the Wall Street bailout which occurred under 
Republican President George W. Bush and the Democrat Party controlled Congress 
(Armey & Kibbe, 2010, p.37-38).  They argue that excessive spending by the “Bush 
administration, aided and abetted by many Republicans in the House and Senate, virtually 
erased any practical or philosophical distraction between the two parties” (p.49). They 
also criticize the Obama administration over government spending in relation to the 
stimulus package and health care reform (p.49). To Armey and Kibbe (2010), the “Tea 
Party does not buy into the traditional Left vs. Right debate. It is better framed as “big vs. 
small.” They go on to state that “It is a fundamental debate about the size and scope of 
government” (p.89). In short, Armey and Kibbe (2010) contend that the Tea Party is a 
response to the failures of both parties to hold true to the principals that they argue are 
central to the foundation of the United States: “individual freedom, free markets, and 
constitutionally constrained government” (p.166). 
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 Still yet, Armey and Kibbe (2010) contend that their goal, and by proxy the Tea 
Party’s goal, is not to form a third party (p.126-132).  Instead, they argue that their goal is 
a “hostile takeover” of the Republican Party (p.135-136). However, the argument for a 
“hostile takeover” of the Republican Party is prefaced by their assertion that they do not 
seek to “join the Republican Party” (p. 136). Armey and Kibbe (2010) make it clear that 
the decision to take over the Republican Party is based largely on practicality, noting that 
by taking over the Republican Party the Tea Party can spend it’s time “focused on ideas 
and use the party infrastructure that has been built over the past 156 years” noting that 
between the major parties the “Republicans have at least been on the side of fiscal 
restraint and already have some of us in their ranks” (p.135). In other words, they contend 
that the ideology of the Tea Party is at odds with much of the Republican establishment, 
as well as the Democratic Party, but realize that the Tea Party is much more likely to 
achieve its policy goals if it pursues change within the Republican Party. 
 While the work of Armey and Kibbe (2010) offers a more philosophical and 
anecdotal take on the motivations and emergence of the Tea Party, one of the first in-
depth, and more empirically grounded, examinations of the Tea Party comes from 
pollster Scott Rasmussen and his co-author Doug Schoen in their 2010 book Mad as 
Hell: How the Tea Party Movement is Fundamentally Remaking our Two-Party System.  
Rasmussen and Schoen (2010) contend that the Tea Party is a product of voter 
dissatisfaction with the two-party system and they reject claims that it is simply an 
“adjunct of the Republican Party” (p.6) describing it as “avowedly nonpartisan” (p.8).  
The authors contend that the Tea Party is built on the ideals of limited government, 
opposition to health care reform, decreasing the deficit, and a “return to constitutional 
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principles” arguing that the Tea Party is a response to “dissatisfaction in the electorate 
with the established political order” (p.7). 
 As mentioned previously, the work of Armey and Kibbe (2010) suggests that the 
Tea Party is centered on arguments about the size of the government. Rasmussen and 
Schoen (2010) frame the debate differently, arguing that the Tea Party is not about 
“Democrat versus Republican” but rather “insiders in Washington versus outsiders in 
Middle America” (p.33). In other words, the Tea Party is a product of resentment among 
ordinary Americans who perceive that elites in government believe that they know better 
than them. Simply put, they argue that the Tea Party is driven by “strong anti-
Washington, anti-incumbent” views (p.297). Overall, Rasmussen and Schoen (2010) 
define the Tea Party as a response to the failures of the two major parties, speculating that 
that in the 2012 presidential race “the meeting of a charismatic leader with the Tea Party 
movement could prove to be a very powerful force in the Republican primaries or in an 
Independent candidacy movement” (p.279). 
 This theme that the Tea Party represents voter dissatisfaction with the major 
parties, specifically as it pertains to government spending and debt, was put forth most 
recently and publically in the Tea Party’s response to the February 2013 State of the 
Union address. Senator Rand Paul was selected to give the Tea Party’s response, using 
the opportunity to criticize both Republicans and Democrats for excessive government 
spending. In his remarks, Senator Paul stated  
It is often said that there is not enough bipartisanship up here. That is not true. In 
fact, there is plenty. Both parties have been guilty of spending too much, of 
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protecting their sacred cows, of backroom deals in which everyone up here wins, 
but every taxpayer loses17 (Rosenthal, 2013).  
These statements exemplify the fact that the Tea Party may speak to a constituency 
outside of the Republican and Democratic parties. 
  Criticisms of the Republican and Democratic parties have also emerged from Tea 
Party elites that operate outside of political office. For instance, the Tea Party Express has 
been described as a powerful political force credited with driving the early momentum of 
the Tea Party.18 This same group has also sponsored all of the Tea Party responses to the 
Presidential State of the Union addresses. In 2013, when asked about Senator Rand 
Paul’s Tea Party response, as well as the state of the Tea Party overall, the chairwoman of 
the Tea Party Express stated “The Republican Party doesn’t represent everybody in the 
Tea Party movement, and they certainly don’t speak for us” (Conroy, 2013). 
 Some legal scholars have also offered explanations for the rise of the Tea Party, 
framing it in constitutional and philosophical terms. For instance, Florida International 
University College of Law Professor Elizabeth Foley, in her 2012 book The Tea Party 
Three Principles explains that the Tea Party is not “motivated by politics, hatred of 
President Obama, or racism” (p.xii), but rather is “primarily” motivated and unified by 
three constitutional principles: “(1) limited government, (2) unapologetic U.S. 
                                                
17 It is important to note, that Senator Paul did not run away from the Republican Party in his speech, noting “Our party 
is the party of growth, jobs and prosperity, and we will boldly lead on these issues.” Still yet, his views echo a popular 
sentiment that the Republican and Democratic parties are both to blame for failing to address issues deemed important 
to the Tea Party (For a transcript of Senator Paul’s entire response, see Rayfield, 2013). 
18 The Tea Party Express has been described as an influential political organization contributing to some of the early 
successes of the Tea Party, supporting candidates such as Christine O’Donnell who upset the Republican Party favorite 
in the Delaware primary for U.S. Senator as well as Sharron Angle in Nevada, among others (Lorber & Lipton, 2010). 
In 2011, the Tea Party Express joined with the cable news channel CNN, or the Cable News Network, to host a Tea 
Party themed debate during the Republican presidential primary season (Cable News Network, 2011).  
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sovereignty, and (3) constitutional originalism” and their desire to see them preserved 
(Foley, 2012, p. xiv).19 
 Framing support for the Tea Party around these unified beliefs concerning the 
U.S. Constitution, Foley (2012) contends that supporters of the Tea Party “ardently 
believe” that “if Congress doesn’t have the power to pass a law – no matter how 
important or well intentioned the law may be – the law should be ruled unconstitutional” 
(p.24). Thus, she argues that the Tea Party’s opposition to health care reform is based on 
constitutional questions related to how the law infringes on the principle of limited 
government and has little to do with other common explanations such as a pure 
partisanship, racism or hatred of the president, or allegiances to the Republican Party. In 
short, Tea Party opposition to health care reform is not politically motivated, but rather is 
a response to the perceived threat the law posses to their shared constitutional beliefs and 
principles (Foley, 2012, p.75). 
 According to Foley (2012), Tea Party supporters are also united in their support of 
an “unapologetic defense of U.S. sovereignty” which is based on opposition to 
globalization, as well many of the goals of the United Nations (e.g. treaties), and support 
for strict efforts to curb illegal immigration (e.g. support for Arizona’s Immigration law, 
and opposition to birthright citizenship), among other issues (p.76-166). Finally, Tea 
Party supporters are also argued to be in agreement on how the constitution needs to be 
interpreted, chiefly “when faced with constitutional language subject to varying 
interpretations- such as “due process” or “equal protection” – the best interpretation is 
                                                
19 Foley (2012) elaborates on these principles in the following manner: “(1) limited government-protecting and 
defending the idea that the federal government possesses only those powers enumerated in the Constitution; (2) 
unapologetic U.S. sovereignty- protecting and defending America’s borders and independent position in the world; and 
(3) constitutional originalism- interpreting the Constitution in a manner consistent with the meaning ascribed by those 
who wrote and ratified the text” (p.19). 
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that which most closely matches the meaning ascribed by those Americans who 
originally ratified the relevant language” (Foley, 2012, p.169).   
 Overall, Foley (2012) describes the Tea Party as an “anti-party” or “a loose 
conglomeration of individuals coalescing around certain principles, challenging existing 
political parties to embrace them” (p.218). In this light, Tea Party support is described as 
a product of common agreement on three core principles (limited government, U.S. 
sovereignty, and constitutional originalism) derived from the U.S. Constitution and an 
elevation of these principles above partisanship and party labels (p.222-223). Taken as a 
whole, the work of Foley (2012) offers a characterization of a distinct worldview of Tea 
Party supporters which implies that the Tea Party represents something separate from the 
two parties.  
 In summary, a case can be made that, at least at the elite-level, supporters of the 
Tea Party have exhibited behaviors reminiscent of past third parties. Political leaders at 
the forefront of the Tea Party have voiced the necessity of a third party option and 
criticized both parties for their failure to adequately address issues deemed important to 
the Tea Party. Moreover, political candidates have seized the Tea Party mantle running as 
third party candidates representing its ideals. Structurally, the Tea Party has behaved like 
a third party by organizing its own national convention and offering its own rebuttal to 
the President’s annual State of the Union address despite a long held monopoly on the 
trajectory of public policy offered by the Republican and Democratic parties stemming 
from the event.  
 Finally, the Tea Party has institutionalized itself within the federal government by 
forming a congressional caucus outside the purview of the major parties. Furthermore, a 
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case can be made that supporters of the Tea Party hold philosophical beliefs which 
separate them from the two parties. At the elite-level of the Tea Party, support for a third 
party seems present. However, what about the views of those at the grassroots level?    
Do Tea Party Supporters Desire a Third Party Option? 
 Do Tea Party supporters desire a third party option? According to recent public 
opinion polls, the majority of Tea Party supporters do express interest in a third party 
option. For instance, an August 2010 USA Today/Gallup poll asked respondents “In your 
view, do the Republican and Democratic parties do an adequate job of representing the 
American people, or do they do such a poor job that a third major party is needed” 
(Jones, 2010). Among Tea Party supporters, 62 percent indicated that a third major party 
was needed. Furthermore, 58 percent of the American electorate in the same poll agreed 
that a third party was needed (Jones, 2010). According to Gallup, the 58 percent support 
for a third party, among the American public, was as high as support had been in the 
seven years since the organization began asking the question (Jones, 2010). 20 
 More recently, an April 2011 USA Today/Gallup poll asked the same question 
about the necessity of a third party, finding that 60 percent of Tea Party supporters 
believed that a third party was needed (O’Brien, 2011).  Interestingly, the same poll also 
showed high levels of support for a third party among Republican identifiers. Among 
Republicans identifiers, 52 percent expressed a need for a third party option. The 52 
percent support represented an all time high for Gallup, and the first time that a majority 
of Republicans had expressed the need for a third party, dating back to 2003 when the 
                                                
20 The 58 percent support for a third party tied the previous high of 58 percent that was found in 2007. More recently, a 
September 2012 Gallup poll showed that 46 percent of the public stated that a third major party was needed (Newport, 
2012). 
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issue first began to be examined. The poll also found wide support among the American 
public with 52 percent agreeing that a third party was needed (O’Brien, 2011).   
 Given the behavior exhibited by Tea Party elites, who often suggest that the 
formation of a Tea Party inspired third party is a possibility, in conjunction with polling 
data among Tea Party supporters showing support for a third party, a case has been made 
that Tea Party supporters and supporters of third parties share similarities. With these 
surface similarities in mind, the discussion will now focus on the influence that third 
parties have had in recent American history.   
Brief History of the Influence of Third Parties in America 
 Since the early days of the United States, the American public has occasionally 
expressed some support for an alternative to the two major parties. As Gilbert, Peterson, 
Johnson, and Djupe (1999) point out, third parties are not a rare occurrence in American 
political history, noting that “in a system dominated by two major political parties, 
scholars agree that minor candidates are a logical consequence of the system” (p.4). V.O. 
Key described minor parties, or third parties, as “safety valves” permitting an outlet for 
voter grievances against the major parties (1948, 235-246 as cited in Gilbert, Peterson, 
Johnson, & Djupe, 1999, p.12). Thus, it is not surprising that over the past 100 years 
American third party candidates have enjoyed a reasonable amount of success.  
 For instance, Theodore Roosevelt received 27.4 percent of the popular vote as a 
representative of the Progressive Party, or Bull Moose, during his run for the presidency 
in 1912 (Gilbert, Peterson, Johnson, & Djupe, 1999, p.54). Additionally, George 
Wallace’s 1968 run for president, as an independent candidate, garnered 10 million 
popular votes or 13.5 percent of the voting electorate (Gilbert, Peterson, Johnson, & 
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Djupe, 1999, p.63). More recently, Ross Perot received 19 percent of the popular vote in 
1992 running as a third party candidate for president (Gilbert, Peterson, Johnson, & 
Djupe, 1999, p.66-67). In 1996, Ross Perot represented the Reform Party garnering 8.4 
percent of the popular vote (Rapoport & Stone, 2005, p. 4).  Although this brief historical 
recount does not provide a complete historical breakdown of third parties in American 
history, it does show that third parties have often garnered substantial support among the 
electorate. This support is often driven by third party platforms and candidacies that 
stress new or neglected policy ideas, which often force the major parties to take note. 
The Impact of Third Parties on the Major Parties  
 Third parties have often paved the way for the institution of new public policies. 
For instance, polices such as “Women’s suffrage, the graduated income tax, and the 
direct election of senators” (Rosenstone, Behr, & Lazarus, 1996, p. 8) began as early 
reforms pushed by third parties.  Furthermore, concerns over economic issues and the 
role of government prompted Ross Perot, a billionaire Texan, to mount a third party 
candidacy for president in 1992 and 1996. Although Perot was not successful in winning 
the office, he did garner significant political support solidifying a third party movement 
focused on deficit reduction and balanced budgets. More importantly, the success of the 
Perot third party candidacies influenced the campaigns of Republican candidates for 
office, leading them to alter their rhetoric and platforms to appeal to this third party 
constituency (Rapoport & Stone, 2008, chap.11). 
 In the context of the Tea Party, the successful third party candidacies of Ross 
Perot are noteworthy because many parallels can be found between his espoused policy 
reforms and those of the modern day Tea Party (i.e. balanced budgets and deficit 
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reduction). Thus, the transformative nature of the Ross Perot candidacies on the 
Republican Party could foreshadow a similar transformation initiated by the Tea Party. 
However, such change does not occur over night. And, if such an important change is 
occurring, what are the signs?   
The Dynamic of Third Parties 
 Building on the 1992 and 1996 presidential candidacies of Ross Perot, Rapoport 
and Stone (2008) provide a theory of the impact of third party movements known as the 
dynamic of third parties. 21  Rapoport and Stone (2008) explain the dynamic of third 
parties as a three step process. The first component is that the third party must first have a 
large and identifiable issue constituency. In other words, it must have specific issues that 
resonate with a large minority or majority of voters (Rapoport & Stone, 2008, p.11). 
Secondly, the two major parties, after an election that saw the emergence of the third 
party, must make an effort to appeal to this third party issue constituency. Lastly, third 
party voters must respond to the appeal by the major party(s) and vote for the party that is 
appealing for their support (Rapoport & Stone, 2008, p. 12-13).   
 Rapoport and Stone (2008) demonstrate that following Ross Perot’s failed 1992 
presidential run, Republican leaders made a concerted effort to appeal to his supporters. 
This appeal came in a variety of different forms, most notably the Contract with America. 
The Contract with America was a Republican platform of reforms similar to the key 
issues outlined in Ross Perot’s book United We Stand (Rapoport & Stone, 2008, p. 151). 
Accenting the Republican Party’s efforts to appeal to Perot supports was the scant focus 
on moral and social issues as compared to the Republican platform of the 1992 
                                                
21 Although third party changes to the two-party system have been detailed by many scholars over the years, Rapoport 
and Stone (2008) are the first scholars to formally give this process a title, which they call “the dynamic of third 
parties” (p.6). 
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presidential election (Rapoport & Stone, 2008, p.151-152).  Instead, the contract focused 
extensively on reform issues believed to be important to Perot supporters, such as term 
limits and a balanced budget amendment (Rapoport & Stone, 2008, p. 153). Overall, 
Rapoport and Stone (2008) contend that the 1994 Republican take-over of the House was 
largely a product of the Republican Party’s push to gain and achieve the support of Perot 
supporters (p.185). The work of Rapoport and Stone (2008) provides a unique lens from 
which to understand the policy implications of the emergence of the Tea Party and its 
possible influence on the major parties. 
 In summary, the previous paragraphs have argued that third parties are not unique 
to American politics. Moreover, the public is often attracted to the prospect of a third 
party option and third party movements can play an important role in shaping the policies 
pursued by the major parties. As was briefly argued earlier, linking the Tea Party to past 
third party movements allows us to better understand the motivations behind Tea Party 
supporters. This point is explored in greater detail in the following sections. 
Examining the Tea Party in the Context of a Third Party  
 History has taught us that the emergence of third parties can have important 
ramifications for the future of the two major parties. As Rapoport and Stone (2008) note 
“enduring shifts in the coalitional makeup of the two parties are among the most 
important events in U.S. politics and that the appearance of a popular third party often 
signals notable change in the two-party system” (p.5). Thus, the extent to which the Tea 
Party resembles past third party movements has important ramifications for the future 
shape of the two major parties and the extent to which policy change among the parties is 
on the horizon. 
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 Comparing Tea Party supporters to third party supporters will also provide 
answers to popular assertions about the Tea Party. For instance, rather than a third party 
effort, Abramowitz (2012) contends that the Tea Party is a representation of the polarized 
component of the Republican Party (p. 196). Backed up with survey data from the first 
wave of the American National Election Survey’s American National Election Study 
Evaluation of Government and Society Survey (EGSS), it is his contention that the Tea 
Party embodies the most conservative elements of the Republican Party base (p.205). 
This narrative frames the Tea Party as an insurgent movement within the Republican 
Party.  
 However, the work of Abramowitz (2012) does not examine the relationship 
between Tea Party supporters and third party supporters. As such, if a comparison 
between Tea Party supporters and third party supporters shows that the two cohorts are 
fundamentally different, a stronger case can be made that the Tea Party is a 
representation of the most Republican of Republicans.  
 If Tea Party supporters and third party supporters are shown to share many 
commonalities, then it would suggest that the Tea Party represents a constituency outside 
of the purview of the two parties. It would also support a narrative of the Tea Party as a 
unique political phenomenon that has grown out of voter dissatisfaction with the two 
major parties. Thus, understanding the extent to which supporters of the Tea Party are 
comparable to third party supporters will provide a clearer picture of whether supporters 
are driven by dissatisfaction with the major parties, by more politically independent-
minded voters, or by Republican partisans exhibiting the latest trend in partisan 
polarization.  
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 To determine the extent to which Tea Party supporters are similar to third party 
supporters, it is imperative that we consult the third party literature. The literature on 
third parties provides many explanations for why voters sometimes abandon the major 
parties and exercise alternate political options. We now turn to a discussion of the 
predictors of third party support.  
Predictors of Third Party Support  
 A relative consensus exists in the literature regarding the determinants of third 
party support. It is widely held that dissatisfaction with both of the major parties remains 
the primary motivation for third party support (see Gilbert, Peterson, Johnson, & Djupe, 
1999; Rosenstone, Behr, & Lazarus, 1996). For instance, following the work of 
Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus (1984), Chressanthis and Shaffer (1993) examined the 
influence of voter perceptions of party performance on vote for third party candidates. 
These scholars found that Democratic and Republican Party neglect of issues deemed 
important to voters greatly contributed to support for third parties (p.273).  
 Furthermore, political independence and faith in government are also factors that 
have been shown to influence third party support. For instance, Rosenstone, Behr, and 
Lazarus (1996) provide significant evidence that distrust in the government plays a role 
in support for third parties; although they maintain that a loss of faith in the major parties 
is still central to third party support (p.181).  In a study of third party support of the 
presidential candidacies of George Wallace in 1968, John Anderson in 1980, and Ross 
Perot in 1992, Peterson and Wrighton (1998) found that independent voters, and those 
voters who show limited loyalties to the parties, were also significantly more likely to 
support third party candidates. In addition, voters highly interested in the election results 
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were also most likely to support a third party candidate in all three elections (Peterson & 
Wrighton, 1998). 
 Gold (1995), also drawing on the third party presidential candidacies of Ross 
Perot, John Anderson, and George Wallace, provides a detailed account of the conditions 
that best explain third party success. He points to “low levels of partisanship, 
dissatisfaction with the major party candidates, issue alienation, economic discontent, and 
distrust towards government” as the significant predictors of third party success (p. 751).  
 Another powerful predictor of third party support is associations with religious 
institutions. No more is this point driven home than in the work of Gilbert, Peterson, 
Johnson, and Djupe (1999). These scholars provide extensive evidence that a major factor 
explaining third party failures over the 20th century has been their detachment and, 
perhaps more importantly, the two major parties’ attachment to religious institutions 
(Gilbert, Peterson, Johnson, & Djupe, 1999). Religious institutions, through their 
organizations and networks, can provide valuable resources to political parties providing 
a gateway to well-organized interests and access to a large number of voters (Gilbert, 
Peterson, Johnson, & Djupe, 1999). Thus, it is not surprising that the two major political 
parties and religious institutions are often intertwined, creating a significant disadvantage 
to minor party candidates (p.119). 
 Gilbert et al. (1999), through an extensive analysis of seven presidential elections 
starting in 1912 through 1996, as well as other state election results, provide significant 
evidence that third party support can be traced to issues of religiosity. Specifically, 
Gilbert et al. (1999) found that third party candidates receive less electoral support in 
counties with high numbers of religious individuals (in terms of adherence, strength of 
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belief, etc.) (p.139). The authors also find that, at the state-level, individuals who are 
most likely to support third party candidates are independents and individuals with low 
trust in the Democratic and Republican parties (Gilbert, Peterson, Johnson, & Djupe, 
1999). Overall, the work of Gilbert et al. (1999) suggests that religious adherence among 
voters is an important factor to consider when attempting to explain third party support.  
A General Theory of Third Party Voting 
 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus (1996) provide a theory of third party voting that 
outlines the distinct conditions in which such voting is likely to occur. These conditions 
include the breakdown of confidence in the major parties, the presence of an appealing 
third party candidate, or established loyalty towards a particular third party (Rosenstone, 
Behr, & Lazarus, 1996). Of particular importance to this analysis, and a chief indicator of 
third party support outlined by Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus (1996), is confidence in 
the major parties.  
 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus (1996) explain that third party support is a 
response to a perceived weakness in the two major parties. They contend that third party 
support is not as much support for the third party, as it is a lack of support for both of the 
major parties. More specifically, it is a response generated from a lack of faith in the 
major parties to represent the voter’s interests. A major component of a voter’s loss of 
confidence is a sense that the parties do not represent, or have failed to pay proper 
attention, to the issues salient to voters (Rosenstone, Behr, & Lazarus, 1996).  
 Based on the work of Downs (1957), Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus (1996) 
suggest that as the gulf between voter preferences and party preferences increases, so 
does the propensity for third party support. Moreover, this incongruence between the 
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major parties’ policy preferences and the voter’s preferences often leads to the emergence 
of third party candidates who will capitalize on these issues. Overall, the authors theorize 
that “the greater the distance between the positions of the voters and major party 
candidates, and the greater salience of the issue, the higher the probability of third party 
voting” (Rosenstone, Behr, & Lazarus, 1996, p.129).  
 Aside from issue incongruence between the major parties and voters, Rosenstone, 
Behr, and Lazarus (1996) also argue that support for third parties often results when 
issues important to voters are ignored by the major parties. When the major parties do not 
address an issue that is deemed important to the American public, then support for third 
parties as a remedy for this neglect is expected (Rosenstone, Behr, & Lazarus, 1996, 
p.132-133). Moreover, as the salience of this ignored issue increases so does the 
propensity for third party support (Rosenstone, Behr, & Lazarus, 1996).  
 Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus (1996) also provide evidence (although somewhat 
mixed) suggesting that economic performance is a determinant of third party support with 
a decline in the economy prompting more voters to reduce their support for the major 
parties. Furthermore, they also suggest that a perception among voters that the two parties 
are unable to address the ailing economy also prompts voters to turn to third parties. This 
suggests that support for third parties may increase during times of economic distress 
(Rosenstone, Behr, & Lazarus, 1996, p.134). Since the Tea Party emerged as a political 
force during the economic recession of 2008 and 2009, this evidence suggests that the 
Tea Party may resemble a typical third party movement.  
 Taken as a whole, the work of Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus (1996) provides an 
interesting framework to help understand third party support, which can be applied to 
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understanding support for other political entities such as the Tea Party. Rosenstone, Behr, 
and Lazarus (1996) explain that third parties are “a weapon citizens can use to force the 
major parties to be more accountable” (p.222). It may well be that the Tea Party is 
serving as similar role. 
Comparing Tea Party and Third Party Support 
  Are Tea Party supporters similar to third party supporters? To answer this 
question, data are examined from two USA Today/Gallup polls conducted in August of 
2010 and April of 2011 during a period when the Tea Party was prominent (USA 
Today/Gallup Poll, 2010, 2011).22 Both of these polls included questions related to 
support for the Tea Party, which asked “Do you consider yourself to be, A supporter of 
the Tea Party movement, An opponent of the Tea Party movement, or neither?” 
Moreover, both surveys included questions about third party support that asked “In your 
view, do the Republican and Democratic parties do an adequate job of representing the 
American people, or do they do such a poor job that a third major party is needed?” 
Because both of these surveys asked about support for a third party and support for the 
Tea Party, it is possible to make comparisons between the two groups.  
 Among the American public, 30 percent identified themselves as Tea Party 
supporters in both the 2010 and 2011 surveys. Support for a third party was also high in 
both surveys with 58 percent of the American public stating the need for a third party in 
2010 and 52 percent echoing the same sentiments in 2011. According to the Gallup 
organization, the 58 percent support for a third party in 2010 tied the highest value 
recorded for this question since the organization began asking the question starting in 
                                                
22 The August 2010 data (USAIPOUSA2010-12) and the April 2011 data (USAIPOUSA2011-07) were obtained from 
the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research data archive. 
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2003 (Jones, 2010). Among Tea Party supporters, support for a third party was also high 
with 62 percent supporting a third party in 2010 and 60 percent supporting a third party in 
2011.  
Socio-Economic and Demographic Characteristics 
 In the 2010 and 2011 surveys, a large majority of Tea Party supporters responded 
that a third party was needed. These findings could be interpreted as verification that 
third party supporters and Tea Party supporters are one in the same. However, a closer 
examination of the two groups highlights key differences.  For instance, Gallup survey 
data from August of 2010 and April 2011 indicates that Tea Party supporters and third 
party supporters differ slightly in terms of socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics. Although the differences are not huge, Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 indicate 
that Tea Party supporters were more likely to be married, white, male, over the age of 50, 
earning more than $75,000 a year, and weekly church goers.  
 Compared to third party supporters, Tea Party supporters were less likely to be 
female, identify with a race other than white, currently married, earning over $75,000 a 
year, and attending church weekly. The largest and most consistent demographic 
differences between the two groups are related to church attendance and marital status as 
Tea Party supporters reported being currently married and attending church weekly at 
higher rates than their third party counterparts.   
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Political Attitudes 
 While Tea Party and third party supporters differ slightly in terms of their socio-
economic and demographic characteristics, larger differences were found when political 
attitudes were considered. For instance, Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 show that Tea Party 
supporters are more partisan and ideologically conservative than third party supporters. 
Compared to third party supporters, Tea Party supporters were more likely to identify as 
a Republican and ideologically conservative and less likely to identify as an ideological 
moderate or as a political independent. In 2010, 51 percent of Tea Party supporters 
identified themselves as Republican and 74 percent identified as conservatives. Among 
third party identifiers, only 23 percent identified themselves as Republicans and only 40 
percent said they were conservative. The same patterns were also found in the 2011 data. 
  Tea Party supporters were also more likely to believe that the Republican Party 
represented their values and their attitudes about the role of government and less likely to 
believe that the Democratic Party represented their values and their attitudes about the 
role of government. Highlighting the connection between the Tea Party and the 
Republican Party were the high levels of support for possible Republican Party 
presidential candidates. Tea Party supporters were more likely, than third party 
supporters, to state that they would definitely vote for Sarah Palin, Mike Huckabee, 
Donald Trump, and Mitt Romney for president as well as to believe that Ron Paul and 
Michelle Bachmann would make great or good presidents (Table 2.2). 
 Differences between the two groups were also apparent when it came to views of 
the economy and opinions related to President Obama with Tea Party supporters taking a 
more pessimistic view of the economy and a more negative view of President Obama and 
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his policies. For instance, Tea Party supporters were more likely than their third party 
counterparts to disapprove of the way President Obama is handling his job and less likely 
to view the economy as improving. Tea Party supporters also placed more of the blame 
on the current state of the economy on President Obama, while third party supporters 
were more likely to blame former President Bush for the current state of the economy. 
 Furthermore, compared to third party supporters, Tea Party supporters were more 
likely to vote for a candidate for Congress who opposes President Obama and to 
disapprove of legislation that was passed by the Democratic Party controlled Congress, 
and supported by President Obama, such as the stimulus package, health care reform, 
increased government regulation of the banks and major financial institutions, 
government aid to the banks and major financial institutions, and government aid to the 
U.S. auto industry (see Table 2.1). Tea Party supporters were also more likely to believe 
that President Obama was definitely or probably born in another country with almost half 
(47 percent) expressing that view. In contrast, only 28 percent of third party supporters 
responded that President Obama was definitely or probably born in another country (see 
Table 2.2). 
 In terms of federal spending, Tea Party supporters placed more importance on the 
issue as it pertained to their vote for Congress in 2010. For instance, 95 percent of Tea 
Party supporters said that federal spending would be extremely or very important to their 
vote for Congress in 2010, while only 81 percent of third party supporters responded in a 
similar manner (see Table 2.1). Tea Party supporters were also more likely to support 
reducing the federal budget deficit through spending cuts alone, while third party 
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supporters were more likely to state that the federal budget deficit should be reduced 
equally with tax increases and spending cuts (see Table 2.2). 
 Taken as a whole, the data from August 2010 and April 2011 provide evidence 
that Tea Party supporters and third party supporters differ substantially. Third party 
supporters were more likely to identify as politically moderate and as independents. 
Moreover, third party supporters were more likely to take a balanced approach to 
reducing the federal budget deficit and less likely to view President Obama and his 
policies in a negative light. In contrast, Tea Party supporters were more likely to identify 
as Republican conservatives, to believe that the Republican Party represents their values, 
to view the economy and President Obama unfavorably, and to believe that the President 
was not born in the United States. Although the evidence suggests that supporters of the 
Tea Party differ greatly from third party supporters on a whole host of factors, further 
analysis is needed to determine the extent to which these differences contribute to support 
for the Tea Party or for the foundation of a third party. 
[Insert Table 2.1] 
[Insert Table 2.2] 
Method 
 To examine the extent to which Tea Party supporters and third party supporters 
are related, six regression models were estimated to predict both Tea Party and third party 
support. Models 1 through 4 are based on data from a USA Today/Gallup Poll conducted 
in August of 2010, while Model 5 and 6 incorporate data collected from the same 
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organizations in April of 2011.23 Tables 2.8 and 2.9 at the end of the chapter provide 
details related to the coding of each variable.   
 Both surveys included questions concerning support for the Tea Party as well as 
questions about support for a third party.24 The third party and Tea Party support 
questions served as the dependent variables for the models. Measures of third party 
support and Tea Party support were not included as independent variables in Table 2.3 
given that the variables were not substantively or statistically correlated (r = .05).25  
These findings provide early evidence that Tea Party and third party supporters represent 
different constituencies.  
 The six models were estimated using logistical regression permitting a greater 
understanding of the extent to which predictors of third party support could also predict 
Tea Party support and vice versa. If Tea Party supporters and third party supporters share 
many common predictors then a case can be made that the groups represent similar 
popular sentiments. If the groups are shown to be significantly different, then a case can 
be made that third party supporters are fundamentally different from Tea Party supporters 
and that the two groups likely seek fundamentally different policy goals.  
 Third party supporters are typically understood to be political independents that 
are dissatisfied with the two major parties. Thus, if supporters of the Tea Party are at the 
right edge of the GOP, as some have suggested, then predictors of support for the two 
groups should be very different.  
                                                
23 The August 2010 data (USAIPOUSA2010-12) and the April 2011 data (USAIPOUSA2011-07) were obtained, and 
can be downloaded, from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research data archive.  
24 Both of these polls included questions related to support for the Tea Party, which asked “Do you consider yourself to 
be, A supporter of the Tea Party movement, An opponent of the Tea Party movement, or neither?” Moreover, both 
surveys included questions about third party support that asked “In your view, do the Republican and Democratic 
parties do an adequate job of representing the American people, or do they do such a poor job that a third major party is 
needed?” Also, both surveys were conducted via landline and cellular telephone.  
25Also, neither third party support nor Tea Party support were found to be significant when used as independent 
variables in all of the models examined in this analysis. 
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Third Party Predictors 
 Previous literature suggests that third party support is a product of voter 
dissatisfaction with the two major parties (Gilbert, Peterson, Johnson, & Djupe, 1999; 
Rosenstone, Behr, & Lazarus, 1996). Thus, Models 1-4 utilize a dummy variable 
indicating whether the respondent disapproves of the manner in which both congressional 
Republicans and congressional Democrats are handing their jobs. A similar dummy 
variable, based on unfavorable ratings of both the Democratic and Republican parties in 
general, were used for Models 5 and 6. Dissatisfaction with the two parties is expected to 
predict support for a third party. Due to the manner in which the variable was coded, 
dissatisfaction with the two parties should be negatively correlated with third party 
support. 
 As was mentioned previously, the emergence of a third party can often be 
explained by the failure of the two major parties to address an issue deemed important by 
the American public (Rosenstone, Behr, & Lazarus, 1996). A case can be made that the 
issue of federal spending has been neglected by the major parties, specifically given its 
resonance among the Tea Party.  The issue of federal spending has been a major issue 
championed by the Tea Party since its inception and has often been a source of criticism 
of both the Republican and Democratic parties (Rosenthal, 2013). Thus, the issue of 
federal spending is expected to predict both third party and Tea Party support. 
 To account for voter preferences related to federal spending, Models 1-4 use a 
measure of federal spending based on responses to a question asking respondents to rank 
the importance of federal spending on their vote for Congress in 2010.26 The variable 
                                                
26 The question asks “How important will each of the following issues be to your vote for Congress this year.” 
Respondents could respond extremely important, very important, moderately important, or not that important. Along 
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ranged from 1 to 5 with higher values indicating greater importance placed on the issue. 
For Models 5 and 6, concern for federal spending is measured by asking respondents 
their preference for reducing the federal budget deficit.27 Respondents were asked for 
their preference for reducing the federal budget deficit and were given five options which 
ranged from reducing the budget only with spending cuts, to equally with spending cuts 
and tax increases, and only with tax increases. The variable was coded from 0 to 1 with 
higher values indicating more support for spending cuts.  
 Another predictor of third party support is identification as a political 
independent. Independent voters, and those with limited loyalties to the major parties, 
have been shown to be likely supporters of a third party candidate (Peterson & Wrighton, 
1998, p.21). Thus, Models 1-6 all incorporate a dummy variable measuring whether a 
respondent identified as a political independent or not. Identification as a political 
independent is expected to predict support for a third party.28 
 Economic discontent has also been shown to predict third party support (Gold, 
1995, p.751) with economic declines resulting in increased support for third party 
candidates for the presidency (Rosenstone, Behr, & Lazarus, 1996, p. 134). Thus, a 
measure of voter economic perceptions is incorporated into Models 1-6. Models 1-4 
utilize a measure of economic discontent based on opinions of the current state of the 
economy. In August of 2010, respondents were asked about their opinions of the current 
state of the economy and given five response options ranging from the economy is 
                                                                                                                                            
with federal spending respondents were also asked about eight other issues. The questions are taken from the August 
2010 survey. 
27 “As you may know, Congress can reduce the federal budget deficit by cutting spending, raising taxes, or a 
combination of the two. Ideally, how would you prefer to see Congress attempt to reduce the federal budget 
deficit -- Only with spending cuts, Mostly with spending cuts, (or) Equally with spending cuts and tax increases, 
Mostly with tax increases, (or) Only with tax increases.” This question is taken from the April 2011 survey. 
28 Political independents were coded to also include respondents who responded “other party.”  See Table 2.8 and Table 
2.9 for more details on the coding of variables. 
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getting a lot better to the economy is getting a lot worse.29 For Models 5 and 6 a slightly 
different measure of economic discontent was incorporated. This measure is based on 
opinions of the current state of the economy giving respondents the option to evaluate the 
economy as growing, slowing down, in a recession, or in an economic depression.30 Both 
economic discontent measures used in the models were recoded into a range of 0-1 where 
higher values indicate more optimism about the growth of the economy. Thus, the 
measure should be negatively correlated with third party support. 
Tea Party Predictors 
 Previous research on the Tea Party suggests that, compared to non-supporters 
among the general public, supporters are more likely to be older, male, educated, married, 
white, and wealthier (Abramowitz, 2012). Moreover, previous research also suggests that 
Tea Party members are more ideologically conservative than the general public, more 
likely to identify as a Republican, and more likely to identify as religious (Abramowitz, 
2012). Thus, age, race, sex, education, marital status, income, Republican Party 
identification, and church attendance were included as predictors in all of the models and 
are expected to predict Tea Party support in a manner consistent with previous findings 
(Abramowitz, 2012).  This set of predictors also would set Tea Party supporters apart 
from typical third party supporters.   
 Tea Party supporters have also been shown to hold more negative views of the 
president than the general public and to hold more ideologically conservative views on 
public policy (Abramowitz, 2012). Measures of presidential job approval were included 
                                                
29 “Regardless of whether you think the economy is currently in a recession, do you think the U.S. economy is— 
Getting a lot better, Getting a little better, (or) Staying the same, Getting a little worse, (or) Getting a lot worse.” This 
question is taken from the August 2010 survey. 
30 “Right now, do you think the U.S. economy is growing, slowing down, in a recession, or in an economic 
depression.” This variable was coded into a range of 0 to 1. Zero included the responses of “Thinks the U.S. Economy 
is slowing down, in a recession, or an economic depression.” This question is taken from the April 2011 survey.	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in all models with the expectation that negative views of the president’s job performance 
would predict Tea Party support. The data collected in August of 2010 (included in 
Models 1, 2, 3, and 4) asked questions about whether respondents  approved or 
disapproved of five pieces of legislation that had been passed by President Obama and 
the Democratic Party controlled Congress in the previous two years. The legislation that 
was inquired about included the economic stimulus, health care reform, increased 
government regulation of the banks and financial institutions, government aid to the 
banks and major financial institutions, and government aid to the U.S. automakers.31 A 
scale was created that combined the responses to all five of these pieces of legislation. 
Since all of these pieces of legislation were supported by President Obama the scale is 
treated as a measure of support for the president’s agenda. The agenda scale ranged from 
0 to 1 with higher values indicating higher support for the pieces of legislation. The 
agenda scale is expected to be negatively related to Tea Party support. 
 Finally, as was reported in Table 2.2, supporters of the Tea Party are more likely 
than the general public to believe that the president was born in another country (see also 
Abramowitz, 2012, p. 203).  The availability of such a question in the April 2011 survey 
allows for the inclusion of this measure in Models 5 and 6.32 The variable was coded 
from 0 to 1 with higher values representing more support for the view that President 
Obama was not born in the U.S. 
 
                                                
31 “Now, thinking back on some of the major pieces of legislation Congress has passed in the last two years, 
would you say you approve or disapprove of The economic stimulus package, The healthcare overhaul, Increased 
government regulation of banks and major financial institutions, Government aid to banks and major financial 
institutions that were in danger of failing, and Government aid to U.S. automakers that were in danger of going 
bankrupt.” This question is taken from the August 2010 survey. 
32 “Do you think Barack Obama was definitely born in the United States, probably born in the United States, probably 
born in another country, definitely born in another country, or don’t you know enough to say?” This question is taken 
from the April 2011 survey. 
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Results 
Model 1  
 Table 2.3 reports the results from four logistical regression models, where support 
for the Tea Party and support for a third party are predicted by taking into account the 
impact of several socio-economic and demographical characteristics along with relevant 
measures of political attitudes thought to predict both Tea Party and third party support.  
The results in Table 2.3 generally indicate that the predictors of Tea Party support are 
different from predictors of third party support.   
 In terms of Model 1, the results show that education, marital status, ideology, 
Republican identification, view of the economy, importance of the issues of federal 
spending to congressional vote, and opinions related to President Obama’s agenda were 
all significant predictors of Tea Party support. The strongest predictors of Tea Party 
support were ideology, Republican identification, and opinions of Present Obama’s 
legislative agenda.  
 The change in probabilities column represents the percent change in support for 
the Tea Party or third party when going from the minimum to the maximum value of the 
measure. For instance, the strongest predictor of support for the Tea Party in Model 1 was 
ideology, where going from very liberal ideology to very conservative ideology results in 
a 38 percentage point increase in the probability of support for the Tea Party. Moreover, 
Tea Party support was also significantly related to views on the five pieces of legislation 
passed by Congress in the past two years (stimulus, health care reform, regulation of 
banks, bank bailout, and auto bailout). Negative views of the five pieces of legislation 
were significantly related to support for the Tea Party. Also, Republican identification 
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was significantly related to Tea Party support with a change in partisan identification 
from a Democrat to a Republican resulting in a 23 percentage point increase in Tea Party 
support.  
 Overall, Model 1 predicts that Tea Party support is significantly related to being 
currently married, lower levels of education, higher levels of conservative ideology, 
Republican Party identification, a pessimistic view of the current state of the economy, 
placing a higher importance on the issue of federal spending, and opposition to President 
Obama’s legislative agenda.  
Model 2 
 
 Model 2 predicts third party support utilizing the same variables used to predict 
Tea Party support in Model 1. The results of Model 2 show that gender, age, race, church 
attendance, ideology, identification as an independent, identification as a Republican, 
disapproval of both parties, view of the economy, and the measure of President Obama’s 
agenda were all statistically significant predictors of third party support. The strongest 
predictors of third party support, in order of their strength, were opposition to President 
Obama’s legislative agenda, negative view of the economy, disapproval of both parties, 
and liberal ideology.  
 In substantive terms, going from approval of at least one congressional party to 
disapproval of both congressional parties results in a 26 percentage point increase in the 
probability of support for a third party. Overall, third party support is significantly related 
to being white, male, under the age of 50, attending church less frequently, liberal 
ideology, identification as a political independent, not identifying as Republican, 
disapproving of the job that both congressional Democrats and Republicans are doing, 
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viewing the economy negatively, and disapproving of President Obama’s legislative 
agenda.  
  The results of Model 1 and Model 2 highlight important differences between Tea 
Party and third party supporters. Among the strongest predictors of Tea Party support are 
conservative ideology and Republican Party identification. In contrast, some of the 
strongest predictors of third party support are identification as a political independent and 
disapproval of both parties. Thus, this evidence suggests that these two groups represent 
constituencies with two dramatically different political points of view. 
Model 3  
 Models 3 and 4 estimate support incorporating the same measures used in the 
previous models, but replace the measure of support for President Obama’s agenda with a 
measure of presidential approval.33 The results of Model 3, presented in Table 2.3, show 
that education, marital status, ideology, Republican Party identification, view of the 
economy, and importance of federal spending are all significant predictors of Tea Party 
support. The strongest predictors of Tea Party support were conservative ideology, 
Republican identification, negative views of the economy, and the importance of federal 
spending.   
 Speaking to the partisan nature of Tea Party support, moving from a non-
Republican Party identifier to a Republican Party identifier increases the probability of 
supporting the Tea Party by 25 percentage points. Overall, Model 3 predicts that Tea 
Party membership is significantly related to lower levels of education, being married, 
conservative ideology, identifying as a Republican, viewing the current state of the 
                                                
33 Presidential approval was used in place of the agenda variable as it provides a more direct measure of attitudes 
toward President Obama. In theory, the measure of support for President Obama’s agenda could reflect policy 
preferences unrelated to the President. 
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economy in a negative light, and placing greater importance on the issue of federal 
spending.  
Model 4 
 Model 4 estimates support for a third party taking in account the same variables 
incorporated in Model 3. The results of Model 4 show that third party support is 
statistically related to sex, age, church attendance, identification as a political 
independent, disapproval of both parties, view of the economy, and presidential job 
approval. The strongest predictors of third party support include views of the economy, 
disapproval of both parties, identification as a political independent, and presidential job 
approval. Substantively speaking, going from a Democrat to a political independent is 
estimated to increase the probability of support for a third party by 18 percentage points.  
Overall, the results of Model 4 show that third party support is best predicted by 
identification as a male, being under the age of 50, not attending church weekly, 
identification as a political independent, having a negative view of both parties, viewing 
the economy negatively, and disapproval of the manner in which the president is handling 
his job.  
 Similar to the findings of Models 1 and 2, Models 3 and 4 provide evidence that 
Tea Party and third party supporters differ significantly in terms of their political 
attitudes. Specifically, the two groups diverge on core measures of partisanship such as 
ideology and party identification. Tea Party support is shown to be largely a product of 
conservative ideology and Republican Party identification, while third party support is 
driven by disapproval of both parties and political independence. 
[Insert Table 2.3] 
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Model 5 and Model 6 
 
 Model 5 and Model 6 predict Tea Party and third party support by taking into 
account many of the same measures included in Models 1, 2, 3, and 4. These include 
measures of sex, age, race, income, education, marital status, church attendance, 
ideology, Republican identification, identification as a political independent, and 
presidential job approval. However, Models 5 and 6 include slightly different measures of 
disapproval of the Democratic and Republican parties, views on the economy, and 
position on federal spending.34 In addition, Models 5 and 6 include a measure of beliefs 
about the president’s birthplace.   
 The results of Model 5, presented in Table 2.4, use a logistical regression model 
to estimate Tea Party support based on the above mentioned measures utilizing data 
collected in April of 2011. The data from 2011, presented in Table 2.4, provides further 
evidence that Tea Party supporters differs from third party supporters. In terms of Model 
5, Tea Party support is shown to be statistically related to sex, income, ideology, 
identification as a political independent, identification as a Republican, unfavorable 
views of the parties, presidential job approval, views of the economy, and beliefs about 
President Obama’s birthplace.  
 The strongest predictors of Tea Party support are conservative ideology, 
Republican Party identification, and views concerning the president’s birthplace. 
Changing a respondent’s view on whether the president was born in the United States 
from probably or definitely born in the U.S. to probably or definitely not born in the U.S. 
raises the probability of support for the Tea Party by 17 percentage points. This effect is 
present despite controlling for GOP identity and conservative ideology, suggesting that 
                                                
34 See variables descriptions in Table 2.9 for more details. 
62 
 
Tea Party support is partially driven by personal animosity towards President Obama. 
Overall, Model 5 estimates that Tea Party support is predicted by identification as a male, 
earning over $75,000 a year, conservative ideology, identifying as a Republican, viewing 
both parties as unfavorable (although the variable has a positive sign), identifying as a 
political independent, and having a negative view of the economy as well as the job 
President Obama’s is doing in office.  
 Model 6 estimates third party support, incorporating the same variables included 
in Model 5, finding that race, income, church attendance, identification as a political 
independent, unfavorable views of both parties, and presidential job approval are all 
significant predictors of third party support. The strongest predictor of third party support 
is identification as a political independent. Overall, Model 6 estimates that third party 
support is predicted by identification as white, earning $75,000 or more a year, not 
attending church weekly, identifying as a political independent, viewing both parties 
unfavorably, and disapproving of President Obama’s handling of his job.. 
[Insert Table 2.4] 
 
Discussion 
 
 The results presented in Table 2.3 and 2.4 provide strong evidence that Tea Party 
supporters and third party supporters are different. These findings support the hypotheses 
proposed in Chapter 1:  
 Hypothesis 1: Tea Party support is predicted by Republican Party identification  
   and conservative ideology. 
 
 Hypothesis 2: Tea Party support is not predicted by dissatisfaction with both   
   parties.  
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The findings from this chapter support the contentions made in each hypotheses as Tea 
Party support is predicted by Republican Party identification and conservative ideology. 
In addition, Tea Party support is not predicted by dissatisfaction with both parties. The 
findings related to Tea Party support are consistent with previous research findings 
related to the strong relationship between conservative ideology and Tea Party support 
(Abramowitz, 2012, p. 207). Results from all six models provide strong and consistent 
evidence that Tea Party support is best explained by Republican Party identification and 
conservative ideology.  
 The results from the models estimating third party support are also consistent with 
the third party literature, which links third party support with dissatisfaction with the 
major parties (Gilbert, Peterson, Johnson, & Djupe, 1999; Rosenstone, Behr, & Lazarus, 
1996) and political independence (Peterson & Wrighton, 1998).  In other words, Tea 
Party supporters are best explained as ideologically conservative Republicans where third 
party supporters are best explained as political independents who are dissatisfied with 
both parties and the current state of the economy. Aside from unhappiness with the 
economy, and views of President Obama’s agenda, there is little overlap in predictors of 
Tea Party and third party support.35 
 Table 2.5 presents a breakdown of the ideological makeup among Tea Party 
supporters, third party supporters, Republican Party identifiers, and the American 
electorate. The data presented in the table shows that supporters of the Tea Party identify 
                                                
35 In Table 2.4, Tea Party and third party support were both significantly related to unfavorable views of both parties 
and identification as a political independent. However, the measure of unfavorable views toward both parties had a 
positive coefficient in the model predicting Tea Party support and a negative coefficient in the model predicting third 
party support. In other words, having a favorable view of at least one of the two parties increased the probability of Tea 
Party support and decreased the probability of third party support. Moreover, the effect of political independence on 
Tea Party support was much weaker than the effect of independence on third party support. In Model 5, conservative 
ideology and Republican Party identification had substantially larger effects on Tea Party support than political 
independence (independence had the weakest effect on support among all of the significant variables in the model). 
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as ideologically conservative at a much higher rate than third party supporters, the 
American electorate, and even Republican identifiers. Moreover, data from Table 2.6 also 
indicates that Tea Party supporters expressed much higher levels of motivation to vote in 
2010 when compared to those same groups. Taken as a whole, these ideological and 
motivational differences speak to the notion that Tea Party represents the most 
conservative elements of the Republican Party (Abramowitz, 2012).  
[Insert Table 2.5] 
[Insert Table 2.6] 
 
 The results of this analysis also show that Tea Party and third party supporters 
share some commonalities. For instance, the evidence presented in Table 2.3 indicates 
that Tea Party support and third party support are both predicted by negative views of the 
economy. Moreover, Tables 2.3 and 2.4 indicate that support for both groups is 
significantly related to disapproval of President Obama’s legislative agenda and the job 
that he has done as president.36  However, the two groups diverge regarding who they 
blame for the state of the economy. Tea Party supporters are more likely to blame 
President Obama a great deal for the current state of the economy, while third party 
supporters are more likely to blame former President Bush a great deal for the current 
state of the economy (see Table 2.1 and Table 2.2). 37  
 While these findings suggest that support for the two groups can be partly 
explained by negative views of the economy and negative views of the president, the data 
also suggests that the two groups support very different solutions to remedy their 
negative opinions. For instance, a large majority of Tea Party supporters opposed the 
                                                
36 One exception is presidential approval which did not significantly predict Tea Party support in Model 3.  
37 Blaming Obama a great deal for the current state of the economy is a significant predictor of Tea Party support when 
used in place of President’s Obama’s agenda in Model 1.	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stimulus, health care reform, government regulation and aid to the banks and financial 
institutions, and aid to the U.S. auto industry. While third party supporters disapprove of 
these policies as well, they do so in much smaller percentages, comparatively speaking 
(see Table 2.1). Moreover, a majority of Tea Party supporters favored keeping all of the 
Bush tax cuts, while only a minority of third party supporters supported this proposition 
(Table 2.1).  
 Still yet, going into the 2012 presidential elections Tea Party supporters polled 
very similar to Republican identifiers when asked about possible Republican presidential 
candidates. Table 2.7 shows that Tea Party supporters were more likely, albeit only 
slightly, to state that they would definitely vote for Sarah Palin and Mitt Romney for 
president in 2012. In contrast, third party supporters polled considerably lower in terms 
of their support for each of these candidates. This data suggests, that compared to third 
party supporters, Tea Party supporters were more supportive of a conservative 
administration in the White House following the 2012 elections.  
[Insert Table 2.7] 
 Overall, these findings suggest that the Tea Party supporters do not fit the 
traditional model of third party supporters. Third party support appears to be a product of 
genuine support for an alternative to the major parties, while Tea Party supporters are 
Republican identifiers who hold ideological views more conservative than the Republican 
Party and the American electorate at large. 
Conclusions and Ramifications 
 The goal of this chapter has been to determine the degree to which Tea Party and 
third party supporters are comparable. An analysis of survey data from 2010 and 2011, 
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during a time period when the Tea Party was prominent, which also explicitly asked 
questions about Tea Party and third party support, reveals that the groups diverge greatly 
when it comes to issues of partisanship and ideology. Several multivariate analyses reveal 
that the largest and most consistent factors contributing to Tea Party support are 
conservative ideology and Republican Party identification. In contrast, views of the 
economy, identification as a political independent, disapproval of both parties, and 
assessments of President Obama’s handling of his job, along with opinions concerning 
his legislative agenda, were the largest contributors to third party support. Overall, these 
findings provide important evidence that Tea Party supporters and third party supporters, 
at their cores, remain distinctly different.  
 The onset of this chapter also raised the question of whether traditional predictors 
of third party support could also predict Tea Party support. The results of this analysis 
provide a mixed bag, but most evidence answers in the negative. For instance, the 
evidence suggests that common predictors of third party support such as dissatisfaction 
with major parties and identification as a political independent have little to no effect on 
Tea Party support. Furthermore, traditional predictors of third party support such as 
economic discontent showed mixed results predicting support for the Tea Party in 2010, 
but not in 2011. Moreover, this chapter provided conflicting evidence that the Tea Party 
is drawing support from an issue that has been perceived to be neglected by the major 
parties, namely the issue of federal spending. The issue of federal spending had a 
significant effect on Tea Party support in 2010, but not in 2011(although that could be 
due to the change in question wording). Although the issue of federal spending was not 
one of the top three issues predicting Tea Party support in any of the models, its presence 
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as a significant predictor in 2010 suggests that the issue does resonate with a segment of 
supporters.  
 The findings of this chapter suggest that Tea Party supporters and third party 
supporters differ significantly and substantially in the factors that predict their support. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the groups do share some common predictors. For 
instance, the data shows that Tea Party support and third party support are both motivated 
by assessments of the economy (2010 data found in Table 2.3) as well as measures of 
President Obama’s job approval (2011 data found in Table 2.4). This suggests that both 
groups serve as outlets for voters who are upset with the current state of the economy and 
the job the president is doing. In other words, voters may be using the Tea Party and the 
possibility of a third party as conduits from which to express their dissatisfaction with the 
status quo. 
 Still yet, these findings do not suggest that support for a third party is akin to 
support for the Tea Party. The fact remains that third party and Tea Party supporters have 
very different political attitudes and beliefs. Although the data shows that both groups 
share similar concerns related to the economy and the president’s job performance, they 
diverge greatly in terms of ideology and partisanship. Tea Party supporter’s voice support 
for a more conservative track in public policy achieved presumably within the 
Republican Party. For instance, Table 2.5 shows that Tea Party supporters identify as 
very conservative at higher rates than Republican identifiers and the American public at 
large. In contrast, third party supporters are very similar to the overall American 
electorate in terms of their ideology. Furthermore, support for a third party is predicted by 
dissatisfaction with the major parties and political independence suggesting that third 
68 
 
party supporters desire a more ideologically balanced road to change that is 
fundamentally different than supporters of the Tea Party.  
 Overall, this analysis has shown that supporters of both groups are upset with the 
status quo, but remain deeply divided on the path to remedy their discontent. Third Party 
supporter express opinions consistent with a middle of the road ideology which lies 
between the two major parties. In contrast, supporters of the Tea Party appear to have 
turned to the Republican Party in great force to remedy their concerns. These findings 
provide further evidence that the Tea Party is more aptly characterized as a rebellion 
within the Republican Party than as a legitimate third party alternative to the two major 
parties.   
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Table 2.1: Tea Party Supporters vs. Third Party Supporters (August 2010) 
Social Characteristics and Attitudes 
 
Tea Party  
Supporters 
Third Party 
Supporters 
Race: White 93 % 86 % 
Gender: Male 56 % 54 % 
Age: 50 and Over 52 % 45 % 
Married 64 % 48 % 
Education: College graduate 30 % 33 % 
Income: $75,000K and above 38 % 35 % 
Church attendance: Attend weekly 35 % 24 % 
Political Attitudes    
Political party: Republican 51% 23% 
Political party: Independent* 41% 52% 
Political party: Democrat 7% 24% 
Ideology: Conservative  74% 40% 
Ideology:  Moderate** 21% 37% 
Currently view the U.S. economy as getting a lot or little better 20% 30% 
Economy: Extremely/very important to vote for Congress  97% 92% 
Federal Spending: Extremely/very important to vote for Congress 95% 81% 
Jobs: Extremely/very important to vote for Congress 95% 91% 
Disapprove stimulus  82% 59% 
Disapprove healthcare reform 88% 62% 
Disapprove  of increased  government regulation of banks and major financial 
institutions 
60% 38% 
Disapprove  of government aid to banks and major financial institutions that were in 
danger of failing 
79% 66% 
Disapprove  government aid to auto industry that were in danger of going bankrupt 75% 60% 
Disapprove of job the president is doing 87% 61% 
Support keeping all of Bush tax cuts  62% 37% 
Extremely or very motivated to vote 86% 67% 
Better if most members of congress  replaced with new members 94% 79% 
Blame Obama a great deal for current U.S. economic problems 50% 24% 
Blame George W. Bush a great deal for current U.S. economic problems 14% 39% 
More likely to vote for a candidate for Congress who opposes Obama 67% 36% 
Better for country to have  a divided government 42% 32% 
Republican Party: Represents values very well 22% 9% 
Republican Party: Represents attitude about the role of government very well 23% 10% 
Democratic Party: Represents values very well 4% 11% 
Democratic Party: Represents attitude about the role of government very well 3% 8% 
Support a third party 62%   
Support the Tea Party  32% 
 
Source: USA Today/Gallup Poll: August Wave 1, August 27-30, 2010, National adult 
The cell number indicates the percentage of the Tea Party or third party supporters who hold those characteristics or attitudes 
listed in the first column. *Other party responses included as independents. **Don’t know responses coded as moderates 
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Table 2.2: Tea Party Supporters vs. Third Party Supporters (April 2011) 
Social Characteristics and Attitudes Tea Party 
Supporters 
Third Party 
Supporters 
Race: White 89% 84% 
Gender: Male 61% 53% 
Age: 50 and over 46% 41% 
Married 66% 55% 
Education: College graduate 28% 32% 
Income: $75,000K  and above 41% 37% 
Church attendance: Attend weekly 35% 25% 
Political Attitudes    
Political Party: Republican 56% 31% 
Political Party: Independent* 35% 47% 
Political Party: Democrat 9% 20% 
Ideology: Conservative 73% 40% 
Ideology:  Moderate** 19% 38% 
Currently view the U.S. economy as growing 13% 21% 
Disapprove of job the president is doing 81% 60% 
View the Democratic Party favorably 15% 33% 
View the Republican Party favorably 74% 45% 
View President Obama unfavorably 82% 57% 
Blame Obama a great deal for current U.S. economic problems 41% 22% 
Blame George W. Bush a great deal for current U.S. economic problems 18% 36% 
Preference for reducing federal budget deficit: Only spending cuts 36% 27% 
Preference for reducing federal budget deficit: Only/mostly with spending cuts 73% 54% 
Preference for reducing federal budget deficit: Equally with spending cuts and tax 
increases*** 
23% 36% 
President Obama definitely or probably not born  in USA 47% 28% 
Definitely vote for Barack Obama for president in 2012 7% 19% 
Definitely vote for Mitt Romney for president in 2012 14% 7% 
Definitely vote for Sarah Palin for president in 2012 19% 8% 
Definitely vote for Mike Huckabee for president in 2012 15% 6% 
Definitely vote for Donald Trump for president in 2012 13% 8% 
Believes Ron Paul would make a great or good president 36% 26% 
Believes Michelle Bachmann would make a great or good president 28% 15% 
Favorable Opinion of the Tea Party 83% 39% 
Support a Third Party 60%  
Support the Tea Party - 34% 
 
Source: USA Today/Gallup Poll: April Wave, April 20-23, 2011, National adult 
Note: The cell number indicates the percentage of the Tea Party or third party supporters who hold those characteristics or 
attitudes listed in the first column.  
*Other party responses included as independents. **Don’t know responses coded as moderates.  ***Don’t know and other 
responses were coded into this category (Excluding them from the category only changes Tea Party support by around 1 
percentage point and third party support by around 3 percentage points). 
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Table 2.3: Predictors of Tea Party and Third Party Support (August 2010) 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Model 1:  
DV=Tea 
Party  
Change in1 
Probability  
Model:2 
DV=Third 
Party  
Change in 
Probability 
Model 3: 
DV=Tea 
Party 
Change in 
Probability 
Model 4: 
DV=Third 
Party 
Change in 
Probability 
Gender: Male 0.01  (.24) .00 
0.45* 
(.19) .11 
0.02 
(.24) .00 
0.37* 
(.19) .09 
Age: Over 50 -0.18 (.23) -.03 
-0.49** 
(.18) -.12 
-0.11 
(.22) -.02 
-0.48** 
(.18) -.11 
Race: White 0.71 (.41) .09 
0.54* 
(.25) .13 
0.62 
(.41) .09 
0.36 
(.27) .09 
Income: Over 
75,000 
0.19 
(.26) .03 
0.34 
(.21) .08 
0.09 
(.25) .01 
0.26 
(.21) .06 
Education: 
College 
Graduate 
-0.47* 
(.22) -.07 
0.02 
(.18) .00 
-0.44* 
(.21) -.07 
0.02 
(.18) .003 
Married 0.71** (.25) .11 
-0.10 
(.20) -.02 
0.70** 
(.25) .11 
-0.02 
(.20) -.00 
Church 
Attendance: 
Attend Weekly 
-0.06 
(.27) 
 
-.00 
-0.52* 
(.22) -.13 
-0.10 
(.28) -.02 
-0.55* 
(.22) -.13 
Ideology 2.70*** (.63) .38 
-0.90* 
(.45) -.21 
2.95*** 
(.64) .43 
-0.75 
(.46) -.18 
Independent  0.31 (.23) .05 
0.76*** 
(.19) .18 
0.25 
(.22) .04 
0.75*** 
(.19) .18 
Republican 1.46*** (.28) .23 
-0.49* 
(.24) -.12 
1.54*** 
(.30) .25 
-0.55 
(.28) -.13 
Disapprove of 
Both Parties 
0.12 
(.22) .02 
-1.15*** 
(.20) -.26 
0.16 
(.22) .03 
-1.09*** 
(.20) -.25 
View of 
Economy 
-0.93* 
(.43) -.14 
-1.24*** 
(.37) -.29 
-1.38*** 
(.40) -.22 
-1.47*** 
(.36) -.34 
Importance of  
Federal 
Spending 
-0.39* 
(.16) -.18 
0.08 
(.11) .07 
-0.45** 
(.17) -.21 
0.07 
(.11) .07 
Obama Agenda -1.82*** (.44) -.28 
-1.37*** 
(.35) -.32 - - - - 
Obama Job 
Approval - - - - 
-0.40 
(.31) -.07 
-0.75* 
(.30) -.18 
Constant -2.68*** (.70) - 
2.36*** 
(.52) - 
-3.07*** 
(.69) - 
2.26*** 
(.55) - 
Number of 
Cases 881 - 881 - 873 - 873 - 
Pseudo R2 .37 - .18 - .35 - .18 - 
 
Source: USA Today/Gallup Poll: August Wave 1, August 27-30, 2010, Sample: National adult 
Dependent variables (DV) are Tea Party support and third party support. 
1: The change in probabilities column represents the percent change in support for the Tea Party or third party when going from the minimum 
to the maximum value of the independent variable and holding all other predictors constant at their means. 
 Cell entries are logit coefficients (standard errors in parentheses).  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 	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Table 2.4: Predictors of Tea Party and Third Party Support (April 2011) 
 
Independent Variables Model 5: DV=Tea Party 
Change in 
Probability1 
Model 6: 
DV=Third Party 
 
Change in 
Probability 
 
Gender: Male 0.81***  (.24) .13 
0.30  
(.18) .08 
Age: Over 50 0.09  (.22) .01 
-0.15  
(.18) -.04 
Race: White -0.01  (.40) -.00 
0.60*  
(.26) .15 
Income: Over 75,000 0.53*  (.25) .09 
0.42* 
(.20) .10 
Education: College Graduate -0.23  (.25) -.04 
0.13  
(.20) .03 
Married -0.26 (.17) -.19 
.03  
(.15)  .06 
Church Attendance: Attend Weekly 0.39 (.26) .07 
-0.46*  
(.22) -.12 
Ideology 2.61***  (.59) .40 
-0.46  
(.43) -.11 
Independent  0.48*  (.24) .08 
0.95*** 
(.20) .23 
Republican 1.30***  (.31) .22 
-0.06  
(.27) -.02 
Unfavorable view of Both Parties 0.62*  (.28) .09 
-0.52*  
(.23) -.13 
View of Economy -0.60* (.31) -.09 
-0.36  
(.21) -.09 
Position on Reducing Budget Deficit 0.24  (.63) .04 
0.11  
(.45) .03 
Obama Job Approval -0.78*  (.39) -.13 
-0.86**  
(.30) -.21 
Believe that President Obama Born in U.S. 0.95**  (.30) .17 
0.07  
(.25) .02 
Constant -4.40***  (.99) - 
0.38  
(.63) 
 
- 
Number of Cases 856 
 
- 
 
856 - 
Pseudo R2 .35 - .12 - 
 
Source: USA Today/Gallup Poll: April Wave, April 20-23, 2011, Sample:  National adult 
Dependent variables (DV) are Tea Party support and third party support. 
1: The change in probabilities column represents the percent change in support for the Tea Party or third party when going from the minimum 
to the maximum value of the independent variable and holding all other predictors constant at their means. 
Cell entries are logit coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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Table 2.5: Ideology among Tea Party, Third Party, Republicans and Electorate 
 
How would you describe your 
political views? 
Tea Party 
Supporter 
 
Republican 
Identifiers 
 
Third Party 
Supporter 
American 
Electorate 
Very conservative 23% 18% 9% 10% 
Conservative 52% 51% 32% 32% 
Moderate* 21% 25% 37% 35% 
Liberal 3% 5% 16% 15% 
Very liberal 1% >1% 6% 5% 
Refused >1% >1% 2% 2% 
 
Source: USA Today/Gallup Poll: August Wave 1, August 27-30, 2010, Sample: National adult 
Note: The cell number indicates the percentage within each group (column) who hold those characteristics or attitudes listed in the first 
column. Cell percentages do not equal 100 percent due to rounding. 
*Includes don’t know responses 	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Table 2.6: Motivation to Vote among Tea Party, Third Party, Republicans and Electorate 
 
How motivated do you feel to get 
out and vote this year? 
Tea Party 
Supporter 
Republican 
Identifiers  
 
Third Party 
Supporter 
American 
Electorate 
Extremely motivated 75% 62% 50% 50% 
Very motivated 11% 17% 17% 19% 
Somewhat motivated 9% 12% 16% 18% 
Not too motivated 3% 3% 7% 5% 
Not at all motivated 1% 6% 10% 8% 
Don’t know or refused >1% >1% 1% 1% 
 
Source: USA Today/Gallup Poll: August Wave 1, August 27-30, 2010, Sample: National adult 
Note: The cell number indicates the percentage within each group who hold those characteristics or attitudes 
listed in the first column. Cell percentages do not equal 100 percent due to rounding. 
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Table 2.7: Support for Political Figures among Tea Party, Third Party, Republicans and 
Electorate 
 
“For each one, please tell me whether you will 
definitely vote for that person, whether you 
might consider voting for that person, or 
whether you will definitely not vote for that 
person.” 
Tea Party 
Supporter 
 
Republican 
Identifiers 
 
Third Party 
Supporter 
American 
Electorate 
Sarah Palin     
Will definitely vote for Sarah Palin 19% 16% 8% 8% 
Might consider voting for Sarah Palin  46% 45% 30% 28% 
Will definitely not vote for Sarah Palin 35% 37% 61% 62% 
Don’t know or refused Sarah Palin >1% 2% 2% 2% 
Donald Trump     
Will definitely vote for Donald Trump 13% 10% 8% 6% 
Might consider voting for Donald Trump 44% 41% 32% 27% 
Will definitely not vote for Donald Trump 41% 47% 57% 63% 
Don’t know or refused Donald Trump 3% 3% 3% 3% 
Mitt Romney     
Will definitely vote for Mitt Romney 14% 13% 7% 7% 
Might consider voting for Mitt Romney 55% 55% 45% 41% 
Will definitely not vote for Mitt Romney 25% 25% 42% 45% 
Don’t know or refused Mitt Romney 7% 7% 6% 8% 
Barack Obama     
Will definitely vote for Barack Obama 8% 4% 19% 30% 
Might consider voting for Barack Obama 11% 15% 24% 24% 
Will definitely not vote for Barack Obama 81% 82% 56% 46% 
Don’t know or refused Barack Obama >1% >1% 1% 1% 
 
Source: USA Today/Gallup Poll: April Wave, April 20-23, 2011, National adult 
Note: The cell number indicates the percentage within each group who hold those characteristics or attitudes listed in the first 
column. Cell percentages do not equal 100 percent due to rounding. 
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Table 2.8: Variable Coding August 2010 Data 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Tea Party Support 
 
Support for Tea Party 
 
0= Not a Tea Party supporter (Indicated that they were not a Tea Party 
supporter; Includes neither, don’t know, and refused responses) 
 
1= Tea Party supporter  (Indicated that they were a Tea Party Supporter) 
 
Gallup variable: teaparty 
 
Third Party Support 
 
Support for a third party 
 
0= Not a third party supporter (Indicated that the Republican and 
Democratic parties do an adequate job of representing the American people; 
Includes neither, don’t know, and refused responses) 
 
1= Third party supporter (Indicated that a Third Party is Needed) 
 
Gallup variable: Q12 
 
Gender 
 
Sex of respondent 
 
0= Female 
1= Male 
 
Gallup variable: D1 
 
Age 
 
Age of respondent 
 
0= Age 18 to 49 
1=Age 50 to 65+  
 
*Don’t know responses and refused responses coded as missing 
 
Gallup variable: ager  
 
Race 
 
Race of respondent  
 
0= Did not identify as white (Includes don’t know and refused responses) 
1= Identified as white 
 
Gallup variable: D5A 
 
Income 
 
Income of respondent 
 
0= Income less than $75,000 
1= Income of $75,000 or more 
 
*Don’t know and refused responses coded as missing 
77 
 
Gallup variable: INC3 
 
Education: College 
Graduate  
 
Education of respondent 
 
0= Did not graduate from a college/university (Includes don’t know and 
refused responses) 
1= College/university graduate 
 
Gallup variable: collgrad 
 
Marital Status 
 
Marital Status of respondent 
 
0= Respondent is not currently married (Includes living with a partner, 
widowed, divorced, separated, never married, don’t know, and refused) 
1= Respondent is currently married 
 
Gallup variable: D15 
 
Church Attendance  
 
Church attendance of respondent 
 
0= Does not attend weekly (Includes those who seldom attend church and 
those who never attend church) 
.5= Nearly weekly/Monthly (Includes those who attend church almost every 
week or once a month)  
1= Weekly (Attends church once a week) 
 
*Don’t know and refused responses coded as missing 
 
Gallup variable: churchat 
 
Ideology 
 
Political ideology of respondent 
 
0=Very liberal 
.25=Liberal 
.5=Moderate   (Includes don’t know responses) 
.75=Conservative 
1=Very Conservative 
 
*Refused responses coded as missing 
 
Gallup variable: D10 
 
Independent 
 
Whether respondent considers themselves to be an independent or not 
 
0= Not an independent (Includes those who indicated Republican, 
Democrat, don’t know, and refused)  
1=Independent (Includes those who indicated independent and other party) 
 
Gallup variable: D9 
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Republican 
 
Whether respondent considers themselves to be a Republican or not 
 
0= Not a Republican (Includes those who indicated independent, lean 
Democrat, Democrat, refused, and don’t know) 
1= Republican (Includes lean Republican identifiers)  
 
Gallup variable: party 
 
Disapprove of Both 
Congressional Parties  
Whether the respondent disapproves of the job both congressional 
Republicans and congressional Democrats are handing their job 
 
0= Disapprove of the way both congressional Republicans and 
congressional Democrats are handing their job 
1= Approve of either congressional Republicans or congressional 
Democrats  handing of their job (Includes don’t know or refused responses) 
 
Gallup variables: Q2A, Q2B 
 
View of Economy  Respondents opinion of current state of the U.S. economy 
 
1= Economy getting a lot better 
.75= Economy getting a little better 
.5= Economy staying the same (Includes don’t know responses) 
.25= Economy getting a little worse 
0= Economy getting a lot worse 
 
*Refused responses coded as missing 
 
Gallup variable: Q18 
 
Federal Spending  Respondents view on the importance of federal spending on their vote for 
Congress this year (2010); Lower values indicate greater levels of 
importance on the issue of federal spending 
 
Importance of Federal Spending on Congress Vote 
 
1=Extremely important 
2=Very important 
3=Moderately important 
4=Not that important 
5=Don’t know 
 
*Refused responses coded as missing 
 
Gallup variable: Q10I 
 
Obama Agenda  Respondents approval or disapproval of five major pieces of legislation 
passed by Congress 
 
Scale of approval or disapproval of Obama’s agenda. Higher values on the 
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scale indicate greater support for the five pieces of legislation included in 
the scale. 
 
The scale is based on five questions related to legislation passed in 
Congress. The legislation included in the scale were respondent opinions on 
the economic stimulus package, healthcare overhaul, increased government 
regulation of the banks and major financial institutions, government aid to 
banks and major financial institutions that were in danger of failing, and 
government aid to U.S. automakers that were in favor of going bankrupt.  
 
The questions related to each piece of legislation were recoded to a 0-1 
range and then averaged together. The measure was reliable (⍺=.78). Don’t 
know responses were coded into a middle category between approve and 
disapprove. Refused responses were coded as missing.  
 
Gallup variables: Q21A, Q21B, Q21C, Q21D, Q21E 
Presidential Approval 
 
Respondents approval or disapproval of the job the president is doing 
 
0= Disapproval of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as president 
.5=  Don’t know responses 
1= Approval of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as president 
 
*Refused responses were recoded as missing 
 
Gallup variable: Q1 	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Table 2.9: Variable Coding April 2011 Data 
 
Tea Party Support 
 
Support for Tea Party 
 
0= Not a Tea Party supporter (Indicated that they were not a Tea Party 
supporter; Includes neither, don’t know, and refused responses) 
 
1= Tea Party supporter  (Indicated that they were a Tea Party Supporter) 
 
Gallup variable: Q29 
 
Third Party Support 
 
Support for a third party 
 
0= Not a third party supporter (Indicated that the Republican and 
Democratic parties do an adequate job of representing the American people; 
Includes neither, don’t know, and refused responses) 
 
1= Third party supporter (Indicated that a Third Party is Needed) 
 
Gallup variable: Q12 
 
Gender 
 
Sex of respondent 
 
0= Female 
1= Male 
 
Gallup variable: D1 
 
Age 
 
Age of respondent 
 
0= Age 18 to 49 
1=Age 50 to 65+  
 
*Don’t know responses and refused responses coded as missing 
 
Gallup variable: ager 
 
Race 
 
Race of respondent  
 
0= Did not identify as white (Includes don’t know and refused responses) 
1= Identified as white 
 
Gallup variable: D5A 
 
Income 
 
Income of respondent 
 
0= Income less than $75,000 
1= Income of $75,000 or more 
 
*Don’t know and refused responses coded as missing 
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Gallup variable: INC3 
 
Education: College 
Graduate  
 
Education of respondent 
 
0= Did not graduate from a college/university (Includes don’t know and 
refused responses) 
1= College/university graduate 
 
Gallup variable: collgrad 
 
Marital Status 
 
Marital Status of respondent 
 
0= Respondent is not currently married (Includes living with a partner, 
widowed, divorced, separated, never married, don’t know, and refused) 
1= Respondent is currently married 
 
Gallup variable: D15 
 
Church Attendance  
 
Church attendance of respondent 
 
0= Does not attend weekly (Includes those who seldom attend church and 
those who never attend church) 
.5= Nearly weekly/Monthly (Includes those who attend church almost every 
week or once a month)  
1= Weekly (Attends church once a week) 
 
*Don’t know and refused responses coded as missing 
 
Gallup variable: churchat 
 
Ideology 
 
Political ideology of respondent 
 
0=Very liberal 
.25=Liberal 
.5=Moderate   (Includes don’t know responses) 
.75=Conservative 
1=Very Conservative 
 
*Refused responses coded as missing 
 
Gallup variable: D10 
 
Independent 
 
Whether respondent considers themselves to be an independent or not 
 
0= Not an independent (Includes those who indicated Republican, 
Democrat, don’t know, and refused)  
1=Independent (Includes those who indicated independent and other party) 
 
Gallup variable: D9 
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Republican 
 
Whether respondent considers themselves to be a Republican or not 
 
0= Not a Republican (Includes those who indicated independent, lean 
Democrat, Democrat, refused, and don’t know) 
1= Republican (Includes lean Republican identifiers)  
 
Gallup variable: party 
 
Unfavorable View of 
Both Parties  
Whether the respondent has unfavorable view of the Democratic and 
Republican parties or not 
 
0= Unfavorable view of both the Democratic and Republican parties 
1= Favorable opinion of either the Republican or Democratic parties 
(Includes don’t know or refused responses) 
 
Gallup variables: Q4D, Q4E 
View of Economy  Respondents opinion of current state of the U.S. economy 
 
0= Thinks the U.S. Economy is slowing down, in a recession, or an 
economic depression 
.5= Don’t know responses 
1= Thinks the Economy is growing 
 
*Refused responses were coded as missing 
 
Gallup variable: Q13 
 
Budget Deficit 
 
Respondents preference for reducing federal budget deficit 
 
 0=Only with tax increase 
.25=Mostly with tax increases 
.5= Equally with spending cuts and tax increases (Includes the responses of 
don’t know and other)  
.75=Mostly with spending cuts 
1= Only with spending cuts 
 
*Refused response were coded as missing 
 
Gallup variable: Q20 
 
Presidential Approval 
 
Respondents approval or disapproval of the job the president is doing 
 
0= Disapproval of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as president 
.5=  Don’t know responses 
1= Approval of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as president 
 
*Refused responses were recoded as missing 
 
Gallup variable: Q1 
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President Birthplace 
 
Respondents view of whether President Obama was born in the U.S. 
 
0= President Obama Probably/ Definitely born in U.S. 
.5= Don’t know enough to say  
1= President Obama Probably/ Definitely NOT born in U.S 
 
*Refused values coded as missing 
 
Gallup variable: Q28A 
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Chapter 3: Exploring the attitudinal predictors of Tea Party support 
 Support for the Tea Party has often been framed by political pundits and Tea 
Party leaders as a group focused primarily on limited government and libertarian 
principles. For instance, Michael Barone, writing in the 2012 edition of the Almanac of 
American Politics, noted that the Tea Party resulted in the “inrush into political activity 
of a multitude of previously uninvolved citizens” motivated “to enter into political 
activity because of their strong beliefs, not on the peripheral issues, but on the most 
serious public policy questions of the day…the size and scope of government” (Barone & 
McCutcheon, 2011, p.4).  Moreover, leaders of the Tea Party such as Dick Armey and 
Mike Kibbe, in their 2010 book Give Us Liberty: A Tea Party Manifesto, noted that the 
“principles of individual freedom, fiscal responsibility, and constitutionally limited 
government are what define the Tea Party ethos” (p.123).   
 These common characterizations of the Tea Party are not limited to these 
individuals and symbolize the conventional wisdom held by many about the Tea Party. 
While the conventional wisdom suggests that support for the Tea Party is primarily 
motivated by support for limited government, and adherence to libertarian philosophies 
concerning the role of government, to what extent do these common characterizations 
hold merit?  To put it more specifically, what are the attitudinal predictors of Tea Party 
support? 
 This question is raised in an environment where an extensive amount of polling 
data has been collected concerning supporters of the Tea Party.38 This data has produced 
a relatively consistent image of the basic demographic, socio-economic, and political 
                                                
38 For instance, for 2010 alone, it has been estimated that polls asked around 300 questions about the Tea Party 
(Skocpol & Williamson, 2012, p. 143). 
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characteristics of Tea Party supporters.39 Although this information is instructive, it offers 
little in the way of explaining the motivations behind support for the Tea Party. In 
addition, the scholarly research that has examined the attitudinal predictors of Tea Party 
support has not adequately controlled for the many divergent components that motivate 
support.  
 Examining data collected from the first and fourth wave of the American National 
Election Studies 2010-2012 Evaluations of Government and Society Study (EGSS), this 
chapter explains support for the Tea Party at two different points in its brief history.40 The 
benefits of this approach are two-fold. First, it will shed light on the attitudinal and 
motivational predictors of Tea Party support. In addition, this data allows us to observe 
whether some predictors of Tea Party support have changed over time. The data from the 
first wave of the survey were collected in October of 2010 at a point when the Tea Party 
was prominent (see Chapter 4), while the data from the fourth wave were collected in 
February of 2012 at a time when support for the Tea Party had faded. In other words, 
these two data points permit an examination of attitudinal predictors of Tea Party support 
at arguably the peak of its popularity as well as at a time when its support among the 
American public had faded considerably. 
 After controlling for party identification and ideology, evidence is found that Tea 
Party support is predicted by measures of traditional moral values, racial resentment, 
views of President Obama, views of immigrants, and libertarianism. Moreover, Tea Party 
support can also be explained by strong feelings of anger and fear related to perceptions 
                                                
39 For instance, the data suggests that the typical Tea Party supporter is Caucasian, age 50 or above, a Republican 
identifier, educated (attended at least some college), religiously observant, and financially stable (Skocpol & 
Williamson, 2012, p. 23). 
40  I submitted questions concerning the Tea Party to the ANES and succeeded in having a form of one of my questions 
placed on the survey (see DeBell, Wilson, Segura, Jackman, & Hutchings, 2011, p. 6).	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of the state of the country. These findings suggest that popular characterizations of Tea 
Party supporters as concerned primarily with small government and libertarian free-
market philosophies (e.g. Armey and Kibbe, 2010), fail to tell the whole story of Tea 
Party support.  
 Furthermore, public opinion data reveals that Tea Party supporters represent the 
most conservative and active elements of the Republican Party. Tea Party supporters are 
found to embody full-throttled support for all of the GOP’s major policy platform and 
grievances.  Support or opposition to the Tea Party serves as an important distinction 
representing the dividing line between the more moderate and ideologically extreme 
elements of the Republican Party. 
 This chapter will proceed as follows. To provide greater context for our 
understanding of the attitudinal predictors of Tea Party support, this analysis begins with 
a brief examination of some common explanations of partisanship. This discussion is 
followed by a survey of recent literature on the Tea Party with a focus on the attitudinal 
predictors of support. Next, Tea Party supporters are examined in greater detail 
concentrating on their socio-economic and demographic characteristics as well as their 
political attitudes and beliefs. This chapter closes with an analysis of the attitudinal 
predictors of Tea Party support and a discussion of the implications of these findings on 
our understanding of Tea Party support. 
Shaping Partisan Attitudes 
 As the previous chapter demonstrated, a major predictor of Tea Party support is 
Republican Party identification. Some consider the Tea Party to be the staunchest, most 
conservative segment of the Republican Party. As such, it makes sense to lay the 
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foundation for an examination of the attitudinal predictors of Tea Party support by first 
reviewing some of the factors that commonly account for political partisanship. While 
there is certainly no shortage of explanations concerning this subject, this analysis will 
begin with a discussion of partisan change in the South. The literature explaining 
southern realignment serves as a particularly useful starting point because it speaks to 
some of the common theoretical components of partisanship and will lead to a broader 
discussion of the possible determinants of Tea Party support. 
 Previous research suggests that issues of race, economics, and moral values can 
be used to explain the dramatic and steady increase, over the past several decades, in 
Republican Party identification among southern whites (Kimball, Owings, & Artime, 
2010; Knuckey, 2006). For instance, Valentino and Sears (2005), examined National 
Election Studies data between 1972 to 2000 (1972, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, and 
2000), providing evidence that attitudes related to race increasingly shaped partisan 
identification among southern whites over these time periods (p. 675). Specifically, 
Valentino and Sears (2005) used the concept of racial resentment41, or symbolic racism, 
to show that race is a key component to understanding Republican Party identification 
among white southerners (p. 681). Moreover, using American National Election Studies 
data from 1992, 1994, and 2000, Knuckey (2006) also found that racial resentment is a 
significant predictor of party identification among white southerners (p.63).  
 Given the linkages between racial resentment and Republican Party identification, 
it seems logical that the concept could also serve as a potential predictor of Tea Party 
support. Racial resentment measures a form of racism which is more covert. Specifically, 
                                                
41 Valentino and Sears (2005) define racial resentment (similar to modern racism or symbolic racism) as “blending 
racial animus with perceptions that blacks violate traditional American values, such as individualism (Sears and Henry, 
2003)” (p.674). 
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it measures a form of racism that is based on beliefs that “blacks violate such traditional 
American values as individualism and self-reliance” (Kinder & Sears, 1981, p.416). 
Given that Tea Party supporters often use the rhetoric of limited government and 
individualism as well as opposition to government spending to rally support to their 
cause, it could be that racial undertones, measured through the concept of racial 
resentment, serve as an important attitudinal predictor of Tea Party support.42  
 Aside from race, economic issues have also been used to explain changes in 
partisan identity. For instance, Nadeau, Niemi, Stanley, and Godbout (2004) examined 
fifty years of American National Election Studies data, from 1950 to 2000, to show that 
Republican Party identification, especially among white southerners, has been 
increasingly related (positively) to income. Brewer and Stonecash (2001) found similar 
results suggesting that income, especially high income, has been increasingly correlated 
with Republican Party support among white southerners from the 1970s through the 
1990s.   
 Abramowitz (1994) suggests that changes in partisan identification among whites, 
from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party, in the 1980s can be partially 
explained by views on the role of government and the size of the welfare state. Finally, 
Brewer (2005) examined National Elections Studies data from 1956 through 2000 
demonstrating that party identification is significantly related to economic attitudes. 
Brewer (2005) measured economic attitudes through views related to the government’s 
role in providing health insurance and guaranteeing jobs and a standard of living. Overall, 
                                                
42 Also, the Tea Party has been accused by some, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, of containing racially insensitive elements within its ranks (National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, n.d.). 
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he found that these economic views are significant predictors of party identification for a 
majority of the years examined. 
 This research suggests that economic views related to income (and tangentially 
one’s social class) as well as libertarian views of the role of government have been 
important predictors of party identification, particularly Republican Party identification. 
Given that the Tea Party has stressed a libertarian approach to government, and draws its 
support from income earners who tend to be middle to high income, it could be that 
economic factors also motivate Tea Party support.  
 Race and economics are not the only factors shown to influence partisan identity, 
as religious and cultural factors have also played an increasingly important role. For 
instance, issues of abortion and views related to moral traditionalism have been shown to 
impact partisan identification in the South (Knuckey, 2006). For instance, Knuckey 
(2006) examined the influence of race, economics, cultural and moral issues, and 
ideology on partisan identification among southern and non-southern whites during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s using American National Election Studies data (p.61).  
 Knuckey (2006) found that opposition to abortion and support for traditional 
moral values predicted Republican Party identification among southern whites from 1992 
through 2000 (p.63).  Among non-southern whites, Knuckey (2006) found that moral 
traditionalism also predicted partisan identification (p. 64). Although Knuckey (2006) 
concluded that ideology remained the strongest predictor of party identification among 
southern whites for these time periods, his research suggests that the role of moral values 
cannot be discounted when attempting to explain partisan identities (p.62). 
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 Even though the Tea Party, to a large extent, has argued that moral issues are not 
central to their cause, recent scholarship suggests a substantial portion of Tea Party 
supporters hold conservative views on social and cultural issues (Ekins, 2011). These 
findings, in light of previous research related to the role of moral values in explaining 
recent changes in partisanship, suggest that moral issues must be accounted for when 
explaining Tea Party support.  
 In summary, issues of race, economics, and moral values have been commonly 
associated with partisanship. While not the only determinants, these factors provide some 
of the major explanations of partisanship and will help frame our understanding of 
support for the Tea Party.  With these connections in mind, the focus will now shift to 
recent scholarship on the Tea Party paying close attention to specific predictors of Tea 
Party support.  
Examining the Tea Party: The Big Picture 
 Although there is no shortage of explanations related to support for the Tea Party, 
this analysis starts with the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of Tea Party support 
offered by the Harvard scholars Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson. Skocpol and 
Williamson (2012) offer the most wide-ranging examination of support for the Tea Party, 
using survey data and field work consisting of interviews and observations. While a 
common narrative of the history of the Tea Party is that it was born out of anger towards 
the greed on Wall Street, Skocpol and Williamson (2012) contend that the opposite is 
true as Tea Party supporters blame government for the economic downturn in late 2008. 
 Moreover, their explanation of the Tea Party’s emergence is couched mainly in 
terms of fear. This fear emerged from the election of a president that supporters of the 
91 
 
Tea Party could not identify with. Contributing to this fear was the large share of support 
President Obama received from young and minority voters in 2008.  To the Tea Party’s 
activist base, the president’s priorities were dramatically different from their own and 
focused on redistributing wealth and benefits from hard working and deserving 
Americans, through programs such as Social Security and Medicare, and giving it to 
“undeserving” young people and minorities in the form of welfare, Pell grants, and health 
care (p.59). These views were only confirmed and compounded with the passage of 
healthcare reform. Thus, all of these circumstances produced a fearful worldview among 
Tea Party supporters that the America they used to know was quickly changing (Skocpol 
& Williamson, 2012).  
  Skocpol and Williamson (2012) describe Tea Party supporters, and more 
specifically activists, as primarily white Americans over the age of 45 who hold views 
that have always been conservative.  Specifically, supporters are typically “Republican, 
white, male, married, and older than 45” (CBS/New York Times poll, April 5-12, 2010 as 
cited in Skocpol & Williamson, 2012, p. 23). Compared to the general public, Tea Party 
supporters are more likely to have higher incomes, more education, and to identify as 
evangelical Protestants (Skocpol & Williamson, 2012, p. 23).  Tea Party supporters are 
described as very conservative in their ideology and loyal voting Republicans who harbor 
great distain for President Obama (p.26.-28). For these scholars, Tea Party supporters are 
“best understood as first and foremost conservatives, rather than merely as exemplars of 
demographic or economic categories” (Skocpol & Williamson, 2012, p.32).   
92 
 
 At its core, supporters of the Tea Party are well-informed citizens well versed in 
the procedures related to the legislative process.43 Moreover, Tea Party supporters are 
also characterized as regular voters. Although civically engaged, the authors argue that 
many supporters of the Tea Party hold factually incorrect views, relying to a large degree 
on Fox News for their sources of news, and are dramatically opposed to differing 
viewpoints. Moreover, Tea Party supporters have reservations about foreigners and are 
deeply suspicious of immigrants, perceiving many of them as illegal (Skocpol & 
Williamson, 2012, p.11). 
 Overall, the work of Skocpol and Williamson (2012) offers a persuasive profile 
and explanation of support for the Tea Party drawn primarily through participant 
observation, interviews, and the citation of poll numbers. As such, many of the findings 
of Skocpol and Williamson (2012) lend themselves to a more in-depth quantitative 
approach. Thus, using recently available American National Elections Studies (ANES) 
survey data, and regression analysis, this chapter will examine some common 
conclusions concerning Tea Party support.44  Still yet, the work of Skocpol and 
Williamson (2012) is not the only scholarly examination of the Tea Party, as the 
discussion will turn to other research with a focus on the attitudinal predictors of support. 
Predictors of Tea Party Support 
 The altitudinal predictors of support are vital to understanding the Tea Party given 
that many of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of its supporters also 
mirror Republican Party supporters and conservatives more generally (Skocpol & 
                                                
43 The authors note that at many Tea Party meetings legislation was often referred to by its corresponding numbers 
(Skocpol & Williamson, 2012, p.53). 
44As King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) note good scientific research “can be quantitative or qualitative in style” (p.7).  
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Williamson, 2012, p.26). Recent scholarship has demonstrated that Tea Party supporters 
overlap largely with the Republican Party and its base in terms of their demographics. 
But, what does the literature tell us about the attitudinal predictors of Tea Party support? 
 Previous research on the Tea Party finds that several factors lend themselves to 
predicting support. For example, Abramowitz (2012), used data from the October 2010 
wave of the American National Election Studies 2010-2012 Evaluations of Government 
and Society Study (EGSS), and found that age, sex, education, income, party 
identification, ideology, dislike of President Obama, and measures of racial resentment 
all significantly45 predicted support for the Tea Party (p.207). Among these predictors, 
ideology was shown to be the strongest with greater levels of ideological conservatism 
predicting higher support for the Tea Party.46 Furthermore, racial resentment and dislike 
for Obama were also shown to be strong predictors of Tea Party support. More 
specifically, higher levels of racial resentment as well as negative views of President 
Obama both contributed to higher levels of support for the Tea Party (Abramowitz, 2012, 
p. 206-208). 
 Other research has found that Tea Party support is predicted by economic 
concerns, anti-government views, concerns related to illegal immigration, male gender, 
income, marital status, conservative ideology, and Republican Party identification (Ulbig 
& Macha, 2011, p. 26). Contrary to previous research, Ulbig and Macha (2011) found 
little evidence that traditional moral values or issues of race predicted Tea Party support 
                                                
45 If not otherwise mentioned, predictors mentioned in the “predictors of tea party support” section are statistically 
significant at.10 level or lower. 
46 The ideology scale used by Abramowitz (2012) consisted of a  nine items measuring respondent opinions on eight 
pieces of legislation (Don’t ask don’t tell, the stimulus, health care reform, State Children’s Health Insurance Program, 
the American Clean Energy and Security Act, the Restoring American Financial Stability Act, the Stem Cell Research 
Enhancement Act, increasing taxes on incomes of $250,000 or more, as well as ideological identification (p.207).	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(p.26). Interestingly, the authors found that support for traditional values was negatively 
related to support for the Tea Party (p.9). 
 Recent examinations of the Tea Party by sociologists have focused on a more 
basic understanding of Tea Party support centered on the cultural dimensions of support. 
Perrin, Tepper, Caren, and Morris (2011) analyzed original survey data and classified Tea 
Party supporters in terms of four cultural dispositions. Specifically, the authors found that 
support for the Tea Party is associated with cultural worldviews centered on 
authoritarianism (children should be obedient rather than creative), fear of change 
(concerns over rapid changes in society), libertarianism (beliefs concerning government 
regulation of society), and nativism (unfavorable views of immigrants) (p.3-4).  The 
authors also examined the cultural components of Republican Party support, concluding 
that Tea Party supporters differ from Republican Party supporters in terms of their 
libertarian and authoritarian worldviews. Overall, these findings speak to the unique 
nature of Tea Party support and the role that cultural worldviews may play in explaining 
support. 
 In line with explanations of Tea Party support centered on fears of change and 
nativism, support has also been explained as a response to demographic and sociological 
changes that have occurred in the United States over the past several years.  Baretto, 
Cooper, Gonzalez, Parker, and Towler (2011), used content analysis of group websites, 
interviews with supporters, and an analysis of survey data, to make an argument that the 
Tea Party can be best understood as a right-wing extremist movement whose support is 
related to negative views of African-Americans, immigrants, and homosexuals (p.2).  As 
such, the authors present an argument that the Tea Party is not simply the most 
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conservative portion of the Republican Party, driven primarily by conservative ideology.  
Instead, the Tea Party represents something separate from the traditional Republican 
Party in the sense that its supporters are not motivated primarily by ideology but rather by 
fears of a changing America ushered in by minority groups and an African-American 
president (p.24-25).   
 Analyzing survey data collected in early 2010, the authors found that support for 
the Tea Party among whites is a significant predictor of negative attitudes toward 
African-Americans, immigrants, and homosexuals, even after controlling for several 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics, partisanship, and ideology, among 
others.47 Moreover, incorporating the same controls, the authors also found that Tea Party 
support among whites predicted support for the government’s ability to detain individuals 
without a trial (Baretto, Cooper, Gonzalez, Parker, & Towler, 2011, p.26).  Thus, these 
findings suggest that support for the Tea Party may not be easily explained away by 
pointing to conservative ideology and that issues related to race and views of minority 
groups should also be considered as motivators of support. 
 Recent research on the Tea Party has also examined support based on gender. 
This research finds common predictors of Tea Party support among men and women, 
specifically Republican Party identification, conservative ideology, and opposition to 
President Obama (Deckman, 2012, p.184). Among men, these measures were the only 
predictors of Tea Party support.48 Among women, age, education, income, church 
attendance, and views on scriptural interpretation also predicted Tea Party support. 
                                                
47 Baretto, Cooper, Gonzalez, Parker, and Towler (2011) estimate ordered logit regression models controlling for “Tea 
Party approval, age, education, income, gender, partisanship, ideology, federal government thermometer, religiosity, 
authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, and state and region controls” (p.29). The Tea Party support measure was significant 
at the .10 level or lower in all of the models estimated (p.26). 
48 The model also included controls for age, education, income, church attendance, beliefs on scriptural interpretation, 
and whether a respondent was a born-again Christian (p.184). 
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Deckman (2012) concludes that “men support the Tea Party movement for largely 
political reasons whereas women’s support is also conditioned by their socioeconomic 
status and their religious behavior and beliefs” (p.184). Although women supporters of 
the Tea Party remain a minority, these findings highlight the complex nature of Tea Party 
support.  
 In summary, the most prominent and consistent explanations of Tea Party support 
are conservative ideology (Abramowitz, 2012; Deckman, 2012; Perrin, Tepper, Caren, & 
Morris, 2011), identification with the Republican Party (Abramowitz, 2012; Deckman, 
2012), negative views of President Obama (Abramowitz, 2012), negative views of 
minority groups and immigrants (Baretto, Cooper, Gonzalez, Parker, & Towler, 2011), as 
well as cultural worldviews related to authoritarianism and libertarianism (Perrin, Tepper, 
Caren, & Morris, 2011).  Interestingly, these findings contrast with some (including Tea 
Party leaders) who define the Tea Party exclusively in terms of a small government 
libertarian philosophy (e.g. Armey & Kibbe, 2010). Furthermore, while research on the 
Tea Party offers many determinants of Tea Party support, a comprehensive examination 
of Tea Party support controlling for all these factors and assessing their relative 
contributions has yet to be undertaken. As such, the following analysis will remedy this 
neglect.   
Tea Party Support: A Preliminary Look  
 This analysis relies on data taken from the ANES 2010-2012 Evaluations of 
Government and Society Study (EGSS), October 2010 (American National Election 
Studies, 2011) and February 2012 (American National Election Studies, 2012) survey 
waves. These two waves were selected because of the distance in time between their 
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administrations. The two year time difference provided an opportunity to examine how 
support for the Tea Party had changed from early on in its existence until more recently. 
 To provide a brief background of the study, the EGSS surveys were conducted via 
the internet and included a sample of United States citizens over the age of 18.49 The 
EGSS surveys were cross sectional in nature, employing representative samples of United 
States citizens to gauge public opinions on a variety of issues preceding the 2010 and 
2012 elections.  
 The EGSS data reveals that in October of 2010 support for the Tea Party among 
the electorate hovered around 22 percent with around 12 percent expressing a “great 
deal” of support. As Chapter 4 will demonstrate, this level of support represents a high 
mark for the Tea Party as shortly following the November 2010 midterm elections the 
Tea Party would see its support slowly decline. Data from the February 2012 wave of the 
EGSS is consistent with these findings as the later wave found that around 17 percent of 
the electorate expressed support for the Tea Party. Among this 17 percent, 8 percent 
voiced a great deal of support, a substantial decline from the double digit marks enjoyed 
close to two years earlier. Although it is true that the Tea Party witnessed a decline in 
support between these two waves of the ANES, a substantial amount of supporters still 
remain. Comparing data from both of these waves, the following can be said about Tea 
Party supporters and their views.  
 Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide a detailed account of the characteristics and views of 
Tea Party supporters as well as their relation to non-Tea Party supporting Republicans 
and the American electorate as a whole. Demographically, Tea Party supporters are 
predominately white, over the age of 45, male, and married. Tea Party supporters, 
                                                
49 For more details on survey design and methodology see DeBell, Wilson, Segura, Jackman, and Hutchings (2011). 
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compared to the two other groups, are more religious in terms of church attendance and 
literal interpretations of religious texts. They are also more supportive of the government 
promoting traditional values and basing American laws on Christian values. Tea Party 
supporters are more ideologically conservative than non-Tea Party supporting 
Republicans as well as the American electorate. Supporters also hold more negative 
views of the Democratic and Republican parties as well as President Obama and are more 
likely than the other two groups to place a large portion of the blame for the economic 
recession on President Obama. Alternatively, Tea Party supporters are less likely to 
blame President Bush for the economic downturn. Tea Party supporters are also more 
likely to believe that President Obama was not born in the United States. Moreover, they 
are also less supportive of compromise and are more likely to state that elected officials 
should stick to their principals no matter what. 
 In regards to perceptions of minority groups, Tea Party supporters are more likely 
to hold negative views concerning immigrants and to support stricter immigration 
policies. Additionally, Tea Party supporters are also more likely to believe that African-
Americans would be as successful as whites if they exhibited more effort. Finally, Tea 
Partiers are more likely to admit that they would be less likely to vote for a presidential 
candidate if he or she were a Muslim or a homosexual.  
 In terms of policy, Tea Party supporters oppose a great deal of the legislation 
proposed or passed since 2008 including the stimulus, health care reform, financial 
reform, the State Children’s Insurance Program, and cap and trade. Philosophically, Tea 
Party supporters are supportive of the government doing less and a large majority 
believes that little or no government regulation of business is good for society. Tea Party 
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supporters also oppose federal funding for stem cell research and allowing homosexuals 
to serve openly in the military. Overall, these views are shared by the Tea Party at much 
higher levels than is seen among non-Tea Party Republicans as well as the American 
public. 
 Finally, Tea Party supporters are more likely than non-Tea Party Republicans, or 
the electorate at large, to state that they are extremely or very worried, fearful, angry, or 
outraged about the way things are going in the country. In terms of media consumption, a 
majority of Tea Party supporters have watched Fox News at least once a month and 
almost one-fifth state that they listen to the Glenn Beck program at least once a month. 
A Republican Party Divided 
 The information presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 paint a picture of a Republican 
Party that is deeply divided. On nearly all issues, such as ideology, views of the 
Democratic Party and President Obama, opposition to legislation supported by 
Democrats, views related to the economy, and views toward minority groups, Tea Party 
supporters differ greatly from Republican Party identifiers not supportive of the Tea 
Party. These findings are important given that Tea Party supporters made up nearly half 
of all Republican Party identifiers in the 2010 survey and one-third of identifiers in the 
2012 survey. The dramatic differences between Tea Party supporters and Republican 
non-Tea Party supporters on nearly every issue, and the extent to which Tea Party 
supporters oppose Democratic policies to a much higher degree, presents a substantial 
problem for the GOP as it attempts to cater to the demands of a party base that is split 
between its moderate and more ideologically extreme elements. 
[Insert Table 3.1] 
[Insert Table 3.2] 
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Methodology 
 The first and fourth waves of the American National Election Studies 2010-2012 
Evaluations of Government and Society Study (EGSS) asked questions concerning the 
levels of support (or opposition) for the Tea Party. This analysis will take advantage of 
the unique opportunity presented by the question form estimating two ordered logit 
models predicting Tea Party support. Given that the questions concerning the Tea Party 
measured intensity of support, employing an ordered logit model will allow for 
inferences to be made concerning support for the Tea Party at a variety of levels.  
Measuring Tea Party Support 
 Tea Party support is measured by levels of intensity ranging from 7, which 
captures the opinions of those who support the Tea Party a great deal, to 1 which captures 
opinions of respondents who oppose the Tea Party a great deal. In the first and fourth 
wave of the EGSS, respondents were asked the following questions “Do you support, 
oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Tea Party movement?” This question was 
followed up with additional questions related to the intensity of support or opposition that 
asked “Do you (support/oppose) the Tea Party movement (a great deal, a moderate 
amount, or a little / a little, a moderate amount, or a great deal)?” The responses to these 
questions were coded into a measure of Tea Party support that ranged from 1 to 7 where 
higher values represented greater levels of support.  
Predicting Tea Party Support 
 Although both of the models presented in this analysis use identical measures of 
Tea Party support, the variety of questions posed on the October 2010 and the February 
2012 EGSS waves permitted an examination of Tea Party support based on a variety of 
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different factors. These factors included partisan affiliation, ideology, race, immigration, 
views on the role and scope of government powers, opinions of President Obama, views 
on legislative issues, traditional moral values, levels of emotional stress, as well as 
demographic controls. Tables 3.11 and 3.12 at the end of this chapter provide a detailed 
account of the numerous predictors incorporated in this analysis, with a discussion of 
how each measure was coded.  For those interested in a more concise explanation of the 
variables utilized in this analysis, the following paragraphs will provide a brief thumbnail 
sketch beginning with the measures incorporated in Model 1 examining data collected in 
October of 2010. 
Predicting Tea Party Support: October 2010 
 Previous research has found that Tea Party support is a product of conservative 
ideology, Republican Party identification, dislike of President Obama, and racial 
resentment (Abramowitz, 2012). As such, each factor was included in the analyses 
presented in Model 1 and were coded as follows. Conservative ideology was measured by 
combining a respondent’s ideology with opinions on six policy issues. These issues 
included support or opposition to the stimulus, the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program, cap and trade, health care reform, financial reform, and raising taxes on those 
earning over $250,000 a year. 50 The variables were recoded and combined into a scale 
variable with a Cronbach’s Alpha of .84 indicating a high level of internal consistency. 
The variable was recoded so that higher values indicated more conservative ideology. 
Thus, Tea Party support is expected to be positively correlated with conservative 
ideology. Party identification was measured on a seven point scale with higher values 
                                                
50 Again, see Tables 3.11 and 3.12 for a detailed description of the variable coding procedures. 
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indicating more support for the Republican Party and is expected to be positively 
correlated with Tea Party support.  
 Opinions concerning President Obama were measured through responses to a 
question asking respondents about the degree to which they liked or disliked President 
Obama.51 Respondents could provide an answer that ranged from 1 to 7 where the 
endpoints indicated dislike or like “a great deal.”  The variable was coded so that higher 
values indicated the presence of more negative feelings towards the president.  The 
variable is expected to be positively correlated with Tea Party support.  
 To measure opinions related to race, a racial resentment scale was created 
combing four questions related to opinions of African-Americans. Racial resentment is a 
concept that differs from traditional forms of racism such as “Jim Crow” racism, which 
refers to “beliefs in biological inferiority of blacks, and support for formal discrimination 
and segregation” (Henry & Sears, 2002, p.254). First defined by Kinder and Sanders 
(1996), racial resentment refers to a new conceptualization of racism (similar to symbolic 
racism52) centered on beliefs that the problems arising from racial discrimination are 
over, that the plight of African-Americans are a product of their own making, and that 
government aid to African Americans, as well as complaints from African-Americans 
concerning their disadvantaged status, are without merit (Henry & Sears, 2002, p.254). 
As Kinder and Sanders (1996) put it, racial resentment is the belief that “blacks do not try 
hard enough to overcome the difficulties they face and that they take what they have not 
earned” noting that prejudice “is expressed in the language of American individualism” 
                                                
51 “How much do you like or dislike each group or person?”  This question was taken from the EGSS October 2010 
wave. 
52 Symbolic racism, modern racism, and racial resentment are often used interchangeably and essential refer to the 
same form of racism with only marginal differences (Sears & Henry, 2003, p.259).  
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(p.106). 53 For the purpose of clarity, higher levels of racial resentment are indicative of 
more animosity towards African-Americans. 
 The questions included in the racial resentment scale used in this analysis are 
similar to the questions used by Kinder and Sanders (1996) in their original racial 
resentment measure and mirror exactly the use by other scholars (Knuckey, 2006; 
Valentino & Sears, 2005). The questions used for the racial resentment scale were 
recoded and averaged so that higher values were indicative of higher levels of racial 
resentment (⍺=.83). Higher levels of racial resentment are expected to be positively 
correlated with Tea Party support.  
 In a recent book by the Chief Political Correspondent of the Christian Broadcast 
Network, a network founded by former conservative presidential candidate Pat 
Robertson, an argument is made that many within the Tea Party are best described as 
“Teavangelicals.” This term is used as shorthand for describing Tea Party supporters who 
are religiously devout and concerned about moral issues. To examine the extent that the 
Tea Party is inhabited by Teavangelicals, Model 1 incorporates a measure related to 
moral and religious values. This measure included questions related to church attendance, 
interpretation of scripture, opposition to gays serving openly in the military, as well as 
opposition to federal funding of stem cell research. Each variable was recoded and 
combined so that higher values indicated more support for religiously conservative 
positions (⍺=.70). The morality measure is expected to be positively correlated with 
support for the Tea Party. 
                                                
53 Henry and Sears (2002) find that measures of symbolic racism, or racial resentment, relate specifically to “anti-black 
prejudice” and that the presence of racial resentment cannot be explained as simply a product of adherence to a 
politically conservative point of view (p.272; See also Tarman & Sears, 2005, p.754). 
104 
 
 Previous research has also suggested that Tea Party support is related to 
opposition to minority groups such as immigrants (Baretto, Cooper, Gonzalez, Parker, & 
Towler, 2011). To account for this factor, a measure of opinions concerning immigrants 
was included in Model 1. In Model 1, the measure was created from responses to a 
question asking whether immigrants strengthened the country or if they acted as a burden 
on housing, healthcare, and jobs. The variable ranged from 0 to 1 and was coded so that 
higher values indicate the presence of negative feelings toward immigrants. The variable 
is expected to be positively correlated with Tea Party support. 
 Recent scholarly accounts of the Tea Party have suggested that supporters are 
motivated by fear and uncertainty towards the future and anger concerning the current 
state of affairs in the country (Skocpol & Williamson, 2012, p.13). To account for this 
important factor, a measure of emotional stress was included in Model 1. The measure is 
the average of four questions asking respondents how they feel “about the way things are 
going in the country these days” inquiring about levels of fear, worry, anger, and outrage. 
Respondents could answer from 1 to 5, with 5 indicating extreme feelings and 1 
representing the absence of the feeling. The questions were recoded and averaged 
together, so that higher values indicate higher levels of fear or worry (⍺=.89). The 
variable is expected to be positively correlated with Tea Party support. 
 The Tea Party has often proclaimed to support limited government and a 
libertarian approach to government. Moreover, recent research finds that libertarianism is 
related to Tea Party support (Perrin, Tepper, Caren, & Morris, 2011, p.13). To account 
for libertarian attitudes, a question was included asking respondents whether they support 
the Federal Intelligence and Security Act, which permits government wiretapping without 
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a warrant. Although not an ideal measure of libertarianism, given that the survey 
explanation neglected to explain the program in detail, the work of Skocpol and 
Williamson (2012) found that Tea Party supporters possess a high level of political 
knowledge concerning legislation which may correct for these shortcomings. Tea Party 
supporters are expected to be opposed to this piece of legislation and the variable was 
coded in a manner that opposition to the legislation and support for the Tea Party should 
be positively correlated. The variable is referred to as civil liberties in Table 3.1. Model 1 
also controls for the demographic characteristics of age and gender. 
Predicting Tea Party Support: February 2012 
 Model 2 predicts Tea Party support using data collected in February of 2012. This 
model controls for ideology which is also measured on a seven-point scale where higher 
values indicate more conservative ideology.  Along with ideology, Model 2 also controls 
for partisan identification using a measure nearly identical to the one used in Model 1. 
The variable ranges from 1 to 7 with higher values indicating more identification with the 
Republican Party. The February 2012 survey also included the same series of questions 
related to racial resentment which permitted an examination of the predictability of this 
measure at two points in time. All of these factors are expected to be positively correlated 
with Tea Party support. 
 To account for opinions concerning President Obama, Model 2 includes a 
measure of opinions based on responses to a feeling thermometer question.54 The feeling 
thermometer question asks respondents to rate their views of President Obama ranging 
from 0, indicating a very unfavorable feeling, to 100, indicating a very favorable rating. 
                                                
54 The fourth wave of the EGSS did not include the same question used to measure opinions of President Obama in 
Model 1.  
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The variable is expected to be negatively correlated with support for the Tea Party with 
lower values corresponding with higher levels of support for the Tea Party. Additionally, 
like Model 1, Model 2 also controls for both age and gender.  
 Model 2 also incorporates a measure of moral values which includes four 
questions related to a traditional moral worldview. These questions asked about church 
attendance, whether the government should promote traditional values, or whether U.S. 
law should be based on Christian values. The measure also includes opinions concerning 
whether religious institutions should be required to cover birth control in their insurance 
plans. These questions were combined and averaged into a measure of traditional moral 
values (⍺=.70). The variable was coded so that higher values were indicative of a 
traditional moral worldview and is expected to be positively correlated with Tea Party 
support.  
 While Models 1 and 2 share several common predictors, such as party affiliation, 
ideology, views of President Obama, racial resentment, traditional moral values, as well 
as the demographic characteristics of gender and age55, Model 2 provides a more in-depth 
examination of the relationship between attitudes towards immigration and Tea Party 
support. The responses to four questions concerning immigration were recoded so that 
higher values were indicative of opposition or negative views concerning immigrants or 
immigration. These questions measure opinions of legal immigration inquiring whether 
immigration is good for the country and whether the number of people allowed in the 
country should increase or decrease. Additional questions included in the measure inquire 
about approaches to dealing with the presence of unauthorized immigrants in the United 
                                                
55 It should be noted, that the questions used to measure emotional stress in Model 1 were not included in the fourth 
wave of the EGSS. As such, a measure of emotional stress could not be included in Model 2. 
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States and whether the government should grant citizenship to the children of 
unauthorized immigrants. These questions were added together and averaged to provide a 
measure of opinions concerning immigration and is expected to be positively correlated 
with Tea Party support (⍺=.70).  
 Finally, Model 2 also includes a measure of libertarian views concerning the role 
of government in society. Two questions were included in this measure which asked 
respondents’ about their opinions concerning the adequate level of government regulation 
of business as well as views concerning whether government should be doing more or 
less functions. These two questions were added together and averaged to provide a 
measure of libertarian and limited government views of respondents (⍺=.52). The 
variable was coded so that higher values indicate more support for limited government 
and more libertarian approaches to government. The measure is expected to be positively 
correlated with Tea Party support.  
Results  
 The results from Model 1 examining the predictors of Tea Party support using 
data collected in October of 2010 are presented in Table 3.3. The results highlight the 
complexity of Tea Party support as all of the predictors included in the model, outside of 
the demographic controls, significantly predict Tea Party support56. Even after controlling 
for Republican Party identification and a multifaceted measure of conservative ideology, 
support for the Tea Party is found to be a function of traditional moral values, emotional 
                                                
56 A measure of authoritarianism was included in the original model and was not found to be significant. The measure 
is not included in the presentation of the results. In addition, the impact of race was also controlled for in both models, 
but was not included in the results. A vast majority of Tea Party supporters identify as white and excluding the variable 
does not change the substantive significance of any of the variables included in the models. 
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stress, dislike of President Obama, racial resentment, negative opinions toward 
immigrants, and civil liberties.  
  In terms of their level of influence (measured by the average change in 
support/opposition holding all other variables constant and at their means), the strongest 
contributors to support for the Tea Party, in order of influence, are conservative ideology, 
traditional moral values, negative views of President Obama, high levels of racial 
resentment, party identification, high levels of emotional stress, support for the 
government eavesdropping on terrorist suspects without a court order, and negative views 
toward immigrants. The substantive impact of each of these factors will be described as 
follows. 
 The results suggest that a portion of Tea Party support is motivated by a 
traditional moral worldview.  For instance, moving from the lowest score on the 
traditional values measure to the highest value increases the odds of supporting the Tea 
Party by 5 percentage points on average, holding all other factors constant and at their 
means. Moreover, moral issues appear to be a driving force behind high to moderate 
levels of Tea Party support as moving from the lowest score on the measure to the highest 
value increases the odds of moderate support by 8 percentage points as well as the odds 
of voicing a great deal of support by 5 percentage points, holding all other factors 
constant and at their means. 
 Negative opinions of President Obama are also found to be significant predictors 
of Tea Party support. More specifically, higher levels of dislike for President Obama are 
associated with more support for the Tea Party. These findings suggest that one of the 
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main motivators of support for the Tea Party is animosity, or opposition, towards 
President Obama specifically. 
 Tea Party support also appears to have a racial component as higher levels of 
racial resentment are correlated with higher levels of support for the Tea Party. This 
suggests that dramatic differences in support for the Tea Party are seen between 
respondents with the highest levels of racial resentment. For instance, increasing racial 
resentment scores from the lowest level to the highest level increases the odds that 
someone will support the Tea Party a great deal by 3 percentage points and a moderate 
amount by 4 percentage points holding other factors constant and at their means.  
 The opposite can be said for opposition to the Tea Party as the same change in 
racial resentment levels results in a 5 percentage point increase in the odds of opposing 
the Tea Party a great deal. In addition, although not as profound as the impact of racial 
resentment, negative views of immigrants are also positively correlated with higher levels 
of support for the Tea Party.  In other words, believing that immigrants are a burden on 
society significantly increases the odds of voicing support for the Tea Party.  
 In terms of civil liberties, support for the Federal Intelligence and Security Act 
(FISA) was negatively related to support for the Tea Party. In other words, support for 
the FISA law, or the government’s use of wiretaps without a court order, was a 
significant predictor of Tea Party support. This finding is surprising given the extent to 
which the rhetoric surrounding the Tea Party has voiced support for a smaller and more 
limited government. One possible explanation for these counterintuitive findings could be 
that question on the EGSS first wave framed the use of warrantless wiretapping in terms 
of “overseas terrorist suspects” and not specifically in terms of their use on American 
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citizens. Still yet, Skocpol and Williamson (2012) argue that Tea Party supporter possess 
a high degree of political knowledge, especially concerning legislation, which would 
suggest that supporters should be aware of the controversies, and the implications for 
civil liberties, related to the legislation. Whatever the cause, the significant and negative 
relationship between Tea Party support and opposition to the Federal Intelligence and 
Security Act casts doubts on claims concerning the Tea Party’s level of devotion to 
libertarian principals and limited government. 
 Finally, emotional stress significantly predicts support for the Tea Party as high 
levels of fear and anger increase the odds of Tea Party support. These results are 
consistent with the work of Skocpol and Williamson (2012) as well as Baretto, Cooper, 
Gonzalez, Parker, and Towler (2011) who suggest that fear and anger partially explain 
the emergence of the Tea Party as well as its base of support. These findings suggest that 
support for the Tea Party is partially explained by deep emotional fears and uncertainty 
concerning the state of the country.  
  The significant findings regarding emotional stress and Tea Party support provide 
an opportunity to explore a common argument among pundits regarding the Tea Party. 
Some pundits explain support for the Tea Party as a response to the economic recession 
and a growth in populist sentiments among the American public stemming from a decline 
in their personal financial status (Rasmussen & Schoen, 2010, p.25). This line of 
argument would suggest that high levels of emotional stress as well as support for the Tea 
Party are related to unemployment and low-income levels, a byproduct of a poor 
economy. If this is indeed the case, then we would expect the measures of Tea Party 
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support and emotional stress to be significantly correlated with a respondent’s income 
level or employment status.  
 However, this is not found to be the case as support for the Tea Party is not 
significantly correlated (at least at the .05 level) with employment status (r =.03) or 
income (r =.02).57 Furthermore, emotional stress is not significantly correlated (at the .05 
level) with employment status (r =.04) or income (r =.01) either. Thus, personal 
economic factors do not account for high levels of emotional stress or Tea Party support. 
One possible explanation for these results is that the high levels of emotional stress 
expressed by Tea Party supporters is a product of the negative feelings and personal 
animosity they feel towards President Obama. This explanation would be consistent with 
the work of Skocpol and Williamson (2012) who argue that Tea Party supporters feel 
hatred towards President Obama (p.163).  
[Insert Table 3.3] 
 Table 3.4 presents the results of Model 2, which like Model 1 estimates support 
for the Tea Party using an ordered logit model, analyzing data collected in February of 
2012. The results indicate that Tea Party support is a product of a traditional moral 
worldview, negative views of President Obama, racial resentment, libertarian approaches 
to the role of government, as well as Republican Party identification, and conservative 
ideology. Interestingly, traditional values and racial resentment were stronger predictors 
of support for the Tea Party than Republican Party identification and conservative 
ideology. 
                                                
57 Employment was coded so that higher values were indicative of being unemployed. Income was coded so that higher 
values were indicative of a higher income.  
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 Compared to 2010, traditional moral values played a more important role in 
explaining Tea Party support as the average impact of the issues on support for the Tea 
Party almost doubled from 2010 to 2012.  Moving from the lowest level, of the moral 
values measure, to the highest level increases support for the Tea Party, in 2012, by an 
average of 9 percentage points, holding all other predictors constant and at their means. 
Along with moral values, racial resentment continued to factor into support for the Tea 
Party exerting a higher effect in 2012 than was seen in 2010. This provides additional 
evidence that racial animosity is motivating support for the Tea Party. Moreover, 
consistent with the findings of Model 1, negative views toward President Obama were 
also significantly related to support for the Tea Party. These findings suggest that a 
primary motivator and unifier of Tea Party support is open hostility towards President 
Obama. 
 Support for the Tea Party can also be explained by adherence to libertarian 
approaches to government. Support for a reduction in the functions of government, and 
less government regulation of business, were significantly and positively related to 
support for the Tea Party. As a consequence, contentions that the Tea Party represents 
libertarian values do hold some merit. Although, a more apt characterization of the Tea 
Party would be that devotion to libertarian principles and limited government is one 
component, among many, which motivates Tea Party support.   
 Another interesting finding from Model 2 is that traditional moral values, racial 
resentment, negative evaluations of President Obama, and views on the role of 
government have a greater effect on the highest degree of opposition to the Tea Party, 
than they do predicting the highest degree of support for the Tea Party. While the 
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findings of Model 1 suggested a more even handed impact of many of these same factors 
on the highest level of support and opposition to the Tea Party, Model 2, which polled 
respondents much later in the tenure of the Tea Party, showed that predictors of Tea Party 
support exhibited a much larger effect on negative views of the Tea Party.  
 These differences could be partially explained by the decline in Tea Party support 
that occurred from the end of 2010 through the beginning of 2012 (explored in greater 
detail in Chapter 4) and the negative hit to the Tea Party image resulting from its 
injection into the debt ceiling debate in the summer of 2011 (Saad, 2011).58 Whatever the 
cause, between 2010 and 2012 the issues that predict support for the Tea Party had 
become more polarized to the extent that they exerted a substantial effect on the highest 
level of opposition to the Tea Party.  
 Furthermore, the degree to which many of these factors are positively and 
substantially correlated to neutral opinions of the Tea Party, displayed in Model 2, 
suggests that many individuals who may have supported the Tea Party in October of 2010 
had become disenfranchised by February of 2012 and no longer voiced support. For 
instance, traditional values had only slight impacts on neutral views in 2010, but by 2012 
its influence had increased.   
 Overall, the findings of Model 1 and Model 2 support the hypotheses presented in 
Chapter 1. These hypotheses proposed that:  
 Hypothesis 3:  Tea Party support is predicted by racial resentment. 
 
 Hypothesis 4: Tea Party support is predicted by traditional moral values. 
 
                                                
58  In the summer of 2011, Tea Party supporters expressed opposition to increasing the federal government’s borrowing 
limit. If the national debt ceiling had not been raised, the federal government would have been forced to default 
(Bailey, Mummolo, & Noel, 2012). Shortly after the August 2011 vote to raise the national debt ceiling, a Gallup poll 
found that support for the Tea Party had reached its lowest level since Gallup had begun asking about support for the 
Tea Party (Saad, 2011). 
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 Hypothesis 5: Tea Party support is predicted by libertarian traditional free- 
   market conservative viewpoints. 
 
 Hypothesis 6: Tea Party support is predicted by feelings of fear and anger  
   concerning the state of the country. 
 
Taken altogether, support for the Tea Party is best explained by support for traditional 
moral values, negative views of immigrants,59 and President Obama, high levels of racial 
resentment, anger and fear, as well as libertarian approaches to the role of government.   
Most importantly, these predictors are found to have a significant impact on Tea Party 
support even after controlling for the impact of conservative ideology and Republican 
Party identification. These findings highlight the unique qualities of Tea Party supporters 
and the degree to which supporters hold views that separate them from the typical major 
party supporter. Finally, these results challenge the claims by many who define the Tea 
Party exclusively in terms of small government and libertarian philosophies.  
[Insert Table 3.4] 
Tea Party Support and Views of President Obama and the Democrats 
 Opposition to legislation supported by Democrats and negative views related to 
President Obama help to explain support for the Tea Party.  Examined more closely, 
these findings are not surprising given the nature in which Tea Party supporters view the 
Democratic Party and President Obama ideologically. The first wave and fourth waves of 
the EGSS surveys asked respondents to place the Democratic Party as well as President 
Obama on a seven point ideological scale ranging from very liberal to very conservative.  
The results from these questions are presented in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 revealing the 
                                                
59 Although the findings related to immigration are only significant for Model 1, the positive sign on the coefficient for 
the immigration measure in Model 2 suggests that negative views related to immigrants, and opposition to immigration, 
are positively related to Tea Party support.    
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ideological placement of the Democratic Party and President Obama by Tea Party 
supporters, non-Tea Party supporting Republicans, as well as the American electorate as 
whole.   
 In 2010 and 2012, less than half of Republican non-Tea Party supporters describe 
the Democratic Party and President Obama as very liberal. In contrast, a large majority of 
Tea Party supporters view President Obama and the Democrats as very liberal. These 
findings highlight the stark differences between ordinary Republicans and Republicans 
who support the Tea Party. Tea Party supporters view the president and the Democratic 
Party in ideologically extreme terms, which may explain both their dislike of the 
president and their opposition to a large majority of policies pursued by the Democratic 
Party.   
[Insert Table 3.5] 
[Insert Table 3.6] 
 
Tea Party Support and Civic Engagement  
 The results of this chapter have demonstrated that support for the Tea Party can be 
explained by adherence to politically extreme views. Moreover, the views expressed by 
Tea Party supporters are substantially different from Republicans who do not support the 
Tea party. Thus, an ideological battle appears to be occurring within the Republican Party 
between the more moderate non-Tea Party supporting elements and the ideologically 
extreme elements who support the Tea Party. The degree to which one side may have an 
advantage in shaping the policies pursued by the Republican Party can be determined by 
examining the levels of political activism undertaken by each group. 
 Table 3.7 displays several measures of political activism among Tea Party 
supporters, Republican non-Tea Party supporters, as well as the American public at large, 
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collected in October of 2010. The results indicate that by all measures of political 
activism, Tea Party supporters are more politically active. For instance, Tea Party 
supporters are twice as likely as Republican non-Tea Party supporters to have attended a 
political meeting or event, donated money to a campaign, worn a campaign button or 
displayed a campaign sign, or contacted a government official in the past 12 months. 
 Moreover, Tea Party supporters show a higher level of voter registration, three 
times the level of interest in government and politics, and are twice as likely to strongly 
believe that they can have an impact on government. Thus, not only are Tea Party 
supporters more active than their Republican Party counterparts, but they are also much 
more likely to believe that they can make a difference. These findings also suggest that 
the active elements of the Tea Party are not political novices.  Around one-fifth of Tea 
Party supporters state that this was the first time they were politically active. Although 
higher than Republican non-Tea Party supporters, this level of first time political activism 
is still smaller than the American electorate as a whole.60 
[Insert Table 3.7] 
  Chapter 4 of this dissertation will demonstrate that following the 2010 midterm 
elections support for the Tea Party declined among the American electorate. Reviewing 
the February 2012 EGSS data (presented in Table 3.8), the impact of this decline on 
political activism can be determined. Although the Tea Party saw a drop in activism from 
October 2010, in terms of those who had worn a campaign sticker or gave money to a 
political cause, the levels of activism displayed by Tea Party supporters were still twice 
as high as those of Republican non-Tea Party supporters. Moreover, Tea Party supporters 
                                                
60 These findings cast doubts on claims that the emergence of the Tea Party led to an “inrush into political activity” of 
“previously uninvolved citizens” (Barone & McCutcheon, 2011, p.4). 
117 
 
still exhibited higher rates of voter registration. Furthermore, Tea Party supporters also 
stated with a higher degree of likelihood that they would be involved in political activities 
such as giving money, distributing political information, or attending a meeting.  Overall, 
although levels of activism have dropped between 2010 and 2012, supporters of the Tea 
Party still exhibited higher levels of political activism than Republican non-Tea Party 
supporters.  
[Insert Table 3.8] 
 Another component of political activism is the degree to which supporters can 
hold their public officials accountable. Accountability often hinges on correct political 
knowledge about government and politics. The work of Skocpol and Williamson (2012) 
found that Tea Party supporters exhibited high levels of political knowledge. These 
findings are further supported through an examination of correct answers to political 
knowledge questions posed in 2010 and 2012 shown in Table 3.9 and Table 3.10. By all 
measures of political knowledge, Tea Party supporters are more knowledgeable than the 
American public, as well as non-Tea Party supporting Republicans, about political 
subjects. These findings suggest that not only are Tea Party supporters more active than 
Republican non-Tea Party supporters they are also more politically knowledgeable.   
 Levels of Political knowledge and activism exhibit the most important differences 
between Tea Party supporters and ordinary Republicans because these factors speak 
directly to the possible electoral impacts of Tea Party supporters. Furthermore, they also 
suggest that Tea Party supporters will have a substantial impact on the policies pursued 
by the Republican Party as well as the candidates nominated in Republican primaries. 
Given that Tea Party supporters exhibit higher levels of activism than their Republican 
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Party counterparts, it appears that the Tea Party wing of the Republican Party will have a 
substantial advantage in influencing the direction of the policies pursued by the 
Republican Party.  
[Insert Table 3.9] 
[Insert Table 3.10] 
Conclusions 
 Support for the Tea Party is explained by adherence to conservative traditional 
moral values, high levels of racial resentment, dislike of President Obama, and negative 
views of immigrants. Support can also be traced to feelings of emotional stress 
characterized by high levels of anger or fear concerning the current state of affairs in the 
country. Furthermore, the Tea Party also draws support from a subset of individuals with 
libertarian views concerning the role of government. Although that support appears to be 
present when discussed more broadly and abstractly, and less when couched in terms of 
national security. Taken as a whole, all of these factors account for Tea Party support 
even after controlling for Republican Party identification and conservative ideology. 
 An examination of public opinion data reveals that the Tea Party embodies full-
throttled support for all of the GOP’s major policy platform and grievances. Tea Party 
supporters express lower levels of support for compromise than non-Tea Party 
Republicans and harbor higher levels of opposition to much of the legislation that has 
been passed since President Obama took office. These findings are of added importance 
given that Tea Party supporters view the Democratic Party as well as President Obama in 
ideologically extreme terms and the extent to which supporters are politically 
knowledgeable, engaged, and active.  
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 The Tea Party has arguably been the most important and influential political 
development in recent history. Although support for the Tea Party has declined in recent 
years, it still receives a substantial amount of support from the American public. Whether 
the Tea Party will continue to endure over the following years remains unclear. However, 
given the high level of activism among Tea Party supporters, it can be said with a fair 
amount of certainty that public officials will continue to be cognoscente of their demands.    
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of Tea Party, Non- Tea Party Republicans, and U.S Electorate 
 
Characteristics Tea Party 
Supporters 
Republican* 
Non-Tea  
American 
Electorate 
Demographic Profile    
Age 45 and over 64% 51% 53% 
Gender: Male 61% 47% 48% 
Race: White 82% 85% 73% 
Married 65% 69% 54% 
Education: University graduate 31% 38% 31% 
Income: $75,000  and above 38% 38% 31% 
Church attendance: Weekly 53% 44% 40% 
Holy books word of God 46% 38% 32% 
Partisanship    
Ideology: Conservative  84% 67% 41% 
Republican Party identification  80% - 38% 
View of Republican Party: Like a great deal or moderate amount 54% 46% 30% 
View of Democratic Party: Dislike a great deal or moderate amount 70% 36% 25% 
View of President Obama: Dislike a great deal or moderate amount 78% 46% 32% 
President Obama probably/definitely born in another country 44% 36% 27% 
Views on Legislative Issues    
Stimulus: Oppose 86% 66% 51% 
Healthcare reform: Oppose 80% 60% 43% 
Cap and Trade: Oppose 72% 35% 32% 
Allow gays to serve openly in military: Oppose 67% 44% 39% 
Federal funding for stem cell research: Oppose 64% 42% 37% 
Financial Reform: Oppose 49% 25% 23% 
State Children’s Health Insurance Program: Oppose 48% 26% 22% 
Raise taxes on incomes over 250k: Oppose 56% 28% 22% 
Federal Intelligence and Security Act: Oppose 15% 20% 27% 
Views Related to Economy    
Believe the economy has gotten better since previous year 3% 10% 14% 
President Bush extremely/ very responsible for the economic recession 24% 27% 52% 
President Obama extremely/very  responsible for economic recession 68% 44% 33% 
Wall street bankers extremely/very responsible for economic recession 62% 61% 69% 
Views Toward Minority and Disadvantaged Groups    
Believe immigrants are a burden on U.S. 81% 72% 64% 
If blacks would try harder they would be just as well of as whites: Agree 67% 43% 43% 
Believe discrimination against women is no longer a problem: Agree 38% 39% 23% 
Emotional Stress: Feelings About the Way Things are Going in U.S.    
Worried:  Extremely or very 70% 49% 48% 
Outraged: Extremely or very 66% 36% 25% 
Angry: Extremely or very 65% 31% 34% 
Afraid: Extremely or very 47% 31% 31% 
Tea Party Supporter - - 22% 
Percent of Republican Party identifiers who support the Tea Party - 46% - 
 
Source: American National Elections Study Evaluations of Government and Society Survey, October 8-19, 2010, U.S. Citizens 
18 and over. The cell number indicates the percentage of the Tea Party, Republican Identifiers, and overall respondents who hold 
those characteristics or attitudes listed in the first column. 
*Republicans who do not support the Tea Party. 
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Table 3.2: Characteristics of Tea Party, Non- Tea Party Republicans, and U.S Electorate 
 
Characteristics Tea Party 
Supporters 
Republican*  
Non-Tea  
American 
Electorate 
Demographic Profile    
Age 45 and over 68% 47% 54% 
Gender: Male 57% 47% 48% 
Race: White 83% 88% 72% 
Married 75% 56% 56% 
Education: University graduate 36% 30% 30% 
Income: $75,000  and above 33% 37% 33% 
Church attendance: Weekly 44% 37% 38% 
Partisanship    
Ideology: Conservative  84% 52% 39% 
Republican Party identification  88% - 45% 
Political Attitudes    
Libertarianism: Government should generally be doing less 72% 42% 34% 
Libertarianism: Little or no government regulation of business good for 
society 
66% 45% 38% 
Favors government promoting “traditional values”  64% 49% 45% 
Favors basing American laws on Christian values 77% 51% 44% 
Requirement that religious institutions provide health insurance that includes 
free birth control: Oppose 
64% 33% 26% 
Compromise: Prefers a president who sticks to principles no matter what 48% 41% 35% 
Compromise: Prefers a representative who sticks to principles no matter what 51% 40% 33% 
Views Related to Economy    
Believe the economy has gotten better since previous year 12% 24% 37% 
President Obama to blame for poor economy: A great deal or a lot 77% 40% 34% 
President Bush to blame for poor economy: A great deal or a lot 30% 26% 49% 
Wall Street Bankers to blame for poor economy: A great deal or a lot 60% 66% 70% 
Consumers who borrowed to blame for poor economy: A great deal or a lot 69% 62% 59% 
Views Toward Minority and Disadvantaged Groups    
If blacks would try harder they would be just as well of as whites: Agree 58% 43% 37% 
Believe discrimination against women is no longer a problem in U.S.: Agree 34% 32% 28% 
Support making all unauthorized immigrants felons and deporting them 41% 32% 30% 
A lot less likely to vote for a candidate for president who was Muslim 54% 47% 37% 
Would be a lot less likely to vote for a candidate for president who was gay 43% 31% 25% 
Media Consumption    
TV: Watch Fox News, at least once a month 59% 37% 33% 
Talk Radio: Listen to Glenn Beck program  17% 5% 4% 
Used Facebook to learn about Pres. Election: Moderately to a great deal 13% 5% 8% 
Tea Party Support - - 17% 
Percent of Republican Party identifiers who support the Tea Party - 34% - 
 
Source: American National Elections Study Evaluations of Government and Society Survey, February 18-23, 2012, U.S. Citizens 
18 and over. The cell number indicates the percentage of the Tea Party, Republican Identifiers, and overall respondents who hold 
those characteristics or attitudes listed in the first column. 
 *Republicans who do not support the Tea Party. 
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Table 3.3: Predictors of Tea Party Support 
 
  Change in Predicted Probabilities from Minimum to Maximum1 
Oppose Tea Party  Support Tea Party 
Independent Variables Coefficient (SE) 
Average 
Change2  
Great 
Deal 
Moderate 
Amount 
A 
Little Neither 
A 
Little 
Moderate 
Amount 
Great 
Deal 
Conservative Ideology 1.26*** 
(.16) .12 -.14 -.09 -.03 -.15 +.05 +.19 +.17 
Party Identification 0.17 *** 
(.05) .03 -.05 -.04 -.01 -.01 +.02 +.05 +.03 
View of Obama 0.24*** 
(.06) .04 -.07 -.05 -.02 -.01 +.03 +.07 +.05 
Racial Resentment 0.22* 
(.10) .03 -.05 -.03 -.01 +.01 +.01 +.04 +.03 
Traditional Values 0.61*** 
(.13) .05 -.07 -.05 -.02 -.02 +.03 +.08 +.05 
View of Immigrants 0.45** 
(.17) .01 -.02 -.02 -.01 +.003 +.01 +.02 +.01 
Emotional Stress 0.16* 
(.08) .02 -.03 -.02 -.01 +.0001 +.01 +.03 +.02 
Civil Liberties  -0.50** 
(.16) .01 +.03 +.02 +.01 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.01 
Age -0.05 
(.10) - - - - - - - - 
Gender 0.04 
(.15) - - - - - - - - 
Number of Cases 1141 - - - - - - - - 
Pseudo R2 .25 - - - - - - - - 
 
Source: American National Elections Study Evaluations of Government and Society Survey, October 8-19, 2010. 
Dependent Variables are Tea Party support measured from 1 to 7. Higher vales indicate more support for Tea Party. 
1: Change in the predicted probabilities, moving from the minimum value to the maximum value, for each level of opinion 
concerning the Tea Party and holding all other factors constant at their means. 
2: Absolute value of the average change in the predicted probabilities, moving from the minimum value to the maximum value, 
across all levels of opinion and holding all other factors constant at their means. 
Cell entries are ordinal logit coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). 
Post stratified weight used for analysis. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 3.4: Predictors of Tea Party Support 
 
  Change in Predicted Probabilities from Minimum to Maximum1 
Oppose Tea Party  Support Tea Party 
Independent Variables Coefficient 
(SE) 
Average 
Change2 
Great 
Deal 
Moderate 
Amount 
A 
Little 
Neither  A 
Little 
Moderate 
Amount 
Great 
Deal 
Conservative Ideology 0.29*** 
(.08) .07 -.14 -.06 -.03 +.11 +.03 +.06 +.04 
Party Identification 0.20*** 
(.06) .04 -.09 -.04 -.02 +.06 +.02 +.04 +.03 
View of Obama -0.02*** 
(.004) .06 .13 .06 .02 -.09 -.02 -.05 -.04 
Racial Resentment 0.45*** 
(.10) .07 -.16 -.07 -.03 +.14 +.02 +.05 +.04 
Traditional Values 0.78*** 
(.14) .09 -.21 -.09 -.03 +.15 +.04 +.08 +.06 
Immigration 0.11 
(.12) - - - - - - - - 
Role of Government 0.38*** 
(.11) .05 -.11 -.05 -.02 +.08 +.02 +.05 +.03 
Age -0.07 
(.06) - - - - - - - - 
Gender -0.06 
(.15) - - - - - - - - 
Number of Cases 1230 - - - - - - - - 
Pseudo R2 .25 - - - - - - - - 
 
Source: American National Elections Study Evaluations of Government and Society Survey, February 18-23, 2012. 
Dependent Variables are Tea Party support measured from 1 to 7. Higher vales indicate more support for Tea Party. 
1: Change in the predicted probabilities, moving from the minimum value to the maximum value, for each level of opinion 
concerning the Tea Party and holding all other factors constant at their means. 
2: Absolute value of the average change in the predicted probabilities, moving from the minimum value to the maximum value, 
across all levels of opinion and holding all other factors constant at their means. 
Cell entries are ordinal coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). 
Post stratified weight used for analysis. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 3.5: Ideological Placement of Democrats and Obama by Group, October 2010 
 
 Very 
liberal 
Somewhat 
liberal 
A little 
liberal Neither 
A little 
conservative 
Somewhat 
conservative 
Very 
Conservative 
Tea Party supporters view of 
each group        
Democrats 59% 28% 6% 3% 3% >1% 2% 
Barack Obama 78% 11% 4% 5% 1% >1% 1% 
Republican non-Tea Party 
supporters view of each group        
Democrats 37% 28% 14% 13% 4% 3% 2% 
Barack Obama 48% 20% 10% 14% 1% 5% 2% 
 
Source: American National Elections Study Evaluations of Government and Society Survey, October 8-19, 2010. 
Cell number indicates the percentage of the Tea Party, Republican Identifiers, and overall respondents who hold those 
characteristics or attitudes listed in the first column. 
Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
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Table 3.6: Ideological Placement of Democrats and Obama by Group, February 2012 
 
 Very 
liberal 
Somewhat 
liberal 
Closer to 
liberals Neither 
Closer to  
conservatives 
Somewhat 
conservative 
Very 
Conservative 
Tea Party view of each group        
Democrats 58% 23% 10% 7% 2% >1% >1% 
Barack Obama 82% 6% 4% 6% 2% >1% >1% 
Republican non-Tea Party* 
view of each group        
Democrats 25% 26% 17% 24% 7% 1% 1% 
Barack Obama 33% 15% 18% 25% 6% 2% 1% 
 
Source: American National Elections Study Evaluations of Government and Society Survey, February 18-23, 2012. 
Cell number indicates the percentage of the Tea Party, Republican Identifiers, and overall respondents who hold those 
characteristics or attitudes listed in the first column. Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
*Republicans who do not support the Tea Party. 
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Table 3.7: Political Activities by Group, October 2010 
 
Political Activities Tea Party  
Supporters 
Republican Non-
Tea Party 
Supporters* 
American 
Electorate 
Past 12 months: Attended a political speech, 
march, rally, or demonstration  25% 10% 12% 
Past 12 months: Phoned, emailed, written 
to, or visited a government official  42% 20% 24% 
Past 12 months: Wore a campaign button, 
put campaign sticker on car, or displayed a 
sign  
26% 11% 15% 
Past 12 months: Given money to candidate, 
political party, or group  22% 10% 11% 
Past 12 months: Volunteered or worked for 
a presidential campaign 
 
4% 1% 3% 
Past 12 months: Volunteered or worked for 
another political  candidate, issue, or cause 
 
7% 3% 4% 
Was this the first time being involved in a 
campaign? (If respondent indicated they had 
volunteered or worked for campaign or gave 
money in past 12 months)  
26% 21% 31% 
Currently registered to vote 95% 90% 86% 
Extremely or very interested in information 
about what’s going on in government and 
politics 
73% 29% 40% 
Believe a great or a lot that people like 
themselves can affect what government 
goes 
36% 16% 21% 
 
Source: American National Elections Study Evaluations of Government and Society Survey, October 8-19, 2010. 
Note: Republicans who do not support the Tea Party accounted for 54% of the Republicans sampled. 
Cell number indicates the percentage of the Tea Party, Republican Identifiers, and overall respondents who hold those 
characteristics or attitudes listed in the first column. 
*Republicans who do not support the Tea Party. 
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Table 3.8: Political Activities by Group, February 2012 
 
Political Activities Tea Party 
Supporters 
Republican Non-
Tea Party 
Supporters* 
American 
Electorate 
Past 12 months: Worn a campaign button, 
put campaign sticker on car, or displayed a 
sign  
17% 6% 11% 
Past 12 months: Given money to candidate, 
political party, or group  14% 9% 12% 
Currently registered to vote 95% 78% 85%  
In the future, how likely are you to attend a 
meeting to talk about political or  
social concerns?(Extremely or very likely) 
 
18% 7% 9% 
In the future, how likely are you to give 
money to an organization concerned with  
a political or social issue? (Extremely or 
very likely) 
 
12% 7% 8% 
In the future, how likely are you to 
distribute information or advertisements  
supporting a political or social interest 
group? (Extremely or very likely) 
 
13% 3% 6% 
 
Source: American National Elections Study Evaluations of Government and Society Survey, February 18-23, 2012. 
Note: Questions concerning attending a speech or contacting a public official were not included in the February 2012 wave. 
Cell number indicates the percentage of the Tea Party, Republican Identifiers, and overall respondents who hold those 
characteristics or attitudes listed in the first column. 
*Republicans who do not support the Tea Party. 
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Table 3.9: Levels of Political Knowledge by Group, October 2010 
 
Political Knowledge Question Tea Party 
Supporters 
Republican 
Non-Tea Party 
Supporters* 
American 
Electorate 
Correctly identify party holding majority in 
U.S. House of Representatives  87% 73% 68% 
Correctly identify party holding majority in 
U.S. Senate 88% 73% 67% 
Correctly identify office held by Nancy Pelosi 90% 83% 80% 
 
Source: American National Elections Study Evaluations of Government and Society Survey, October 8-19, 2010. 
Cell number indicates the percentage of the Tea Party, Republican Identifiers, and overall respondents who hold answered each 
question. Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
*Republicans who do not support the Tea Party.  
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Table 3.10: Levels of Political Knowledge by Group, February 2012 
 
Political Knowledge Question Tea Party 
Supporters 
Republican 
Non-Tea Party 
Supporters* 
American 
Electorate 
Correctly identify Chief Justice of the U.S. 
Supreme Court 80% 69% 71% 
Correctly identify Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom 53% 45% 46% 
Correctly identify Speaker of the House of 
Representatives 85% 73% 75% 
Correctly identify the area where the U.S. 
Federal government spends the least amount 
money (Options: foreign aid, Medicare, 
National Defense, Social Security)  
50% 36% 38% 
 
Source: American National Elections Study Evaluations of Government and Society Survey, February 18-23, 2012. 
Cell number indicates the percentage of the Tea Party, Republican Identifiers, and overall respondents who correctly answered 
each question. Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
*Republicans who do not support the Tea Party. 
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Table 3.11: Variable Coding EGSS Wave 1  
 
Tea Party Support Support for Tea Party 
Range 1 to 7 
 
1=  Oppose a great deal 
2=  Oppose a moderate amount 
3=  Oppose a little 
4=  Neither support nor oppose 
5=  Support a little 
6=  Support a moderate amount 
7=  Support a great deal 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
Direction: Higher values indicate more support for Tea Party. 
 
EGSS1 variable name: dertea 
 
Conservative Ideology  Conservative Ideology Scale  
 
Average of respondent ideology and opinions on six pieces of legislation (⍺=.84). 
 
Part 1 of Scale, Respondent self-identified ideology: “When it comes to politics, 
how would you describe each person or group – as (liberal, conservative, or 
neither liberal nor conservative / conservative, liberal, or neither conservative nor 
liberal)?” 
  
1=  Very liberal 
2=  Somewhat liberal 
3=  A little liberal 
4=  Neither liberal nor conservative 
5=  A little conservative 
6=  Somewhat conservative 
7=  Very Conservative 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
EGSS variable: c1_v1a 
 
 
Part 2 of Scale: Opinions on legislation: Average of responses to six pieces of 
legislation each coded with higher values indicating support. Respondents were 
asked “Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For 
each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in 
principle.” 
 
1. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act: “Authorizes $787 billion in federal 
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spending to stimulate economic growth in the US.” 
 
2. State Children’s Health Insurance Program: “Program insures children in low 
income households Act would renew the program through 2014 and include 4 
million additional children.” 
 
3. American Clean Energy and Security Act: Imposes a cap on carbon emissions 
and allows companies to trade allowances for carbon emissions. Funds research 
on renewable energy.” 
 
4. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: “Requires all Americans to have 
health insurance. Allows people to keep current provider. Sets up health 
insurance exchange for those without coverage. Increases taxes on investment 
income for families making more than $250,000.” 
 
5. Restoring American Financial Stability Act: “Protects consumers against 
abusive lending. Creates a Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.  Regulates 
high risk investments known as derivatives.  
Allows government to shut down failing financial institutions.” 
 
Above legislation coded: 0 support, 1 oppose 
 
6. Taxes: “Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose raising federal 
income taxes for people who make more than $250,000 per year? Do you 
[favor/oppose] that (a great deal, moderately, or a little / a little, moderately, or a 
great deal)?” 
 
1=  Favor a great deal 
2=  Favor moderately 
3=  Favor a little 
4=  Neither favor nor oppose 
5=  Oppose a little 
6=  Oppose moderately 
7=  Oppose a great deal 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha of Conservative Ideology Scale: (⍺=.84) 
 
Direction: Coded so that higher values indicate more conservative ideology. 
 
EGSS variable name, legislation: c1_l1, cl1_l2 c1_l3, c1_l4, c1_l6, dertaxes 
 
Party Identification Party identification, 7 point scale 
 
0=  Strong Democrat 
1=  Not very strong Democrat 
2=  Independent Democrat 
3=  Independent-Independent 
4=  Independent Republican 
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5=  Not very strong Republican 
6=  Strong Republican 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
Direction: Higher values indicate more conservative party identification. 
 
EGSS variable name: der08c1 
 
Racial Resentment Racial Resentment 
 
Average of four questions measuring level of racial resentment (⍺=.83). 
 
 “Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree 
somewhat, or disagree strongly with this statement?” 
 
 1. “Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and 
worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.” 
(Agree)* 
 
2. “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make 
it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.” (Disagree)* 
 
 3. “Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.” 
(Disagree)* 
 
4. “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would 
only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.”(Agree)* 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
Coded so that higher values indicate more racial resentment.  
 
Cronbach’s Alpha of Racial Resentment Scale: (⍺=.83) 
 
EGSS variable names: c1_zh1, c1_zh2, c1_zh3, c1_zh4 
 
*Answers that determine level of for racial resentment based on Valentino and 
Sears (2005). 
Emotional Stress Emotional Stress Scale 
 
Average of four questions related to emotional stress (⍺=.89). 
 
“Generally speaking, how do you feel about the way things are going in the 
country these days?” Extremely, Very, Moderately, A little, Not at all.” 
 
1. How angry? 
2. How afraid? 
3. How worried? 
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4. How outraged? 
 
1= Not at all 
2= A little 
3= Moderately 
4= Very 
5= Extremely 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
Direction: Coded so that higher values indicate higher degree of emotional stress. 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha of Emotional Stress Scale: (⍺=.89) 
 
EGSS variable name: c1_g1, c1_g2, c1_g5, c1_g6 
Traditional 
Values 
Traditional Values Scale 
 
Traditional Values Scale: Average of responses to questions concerning church 
attendance, interpretation of religious texts, opinions concerning federal funding 
for stem cell research, and opinions on gays in the military (⍺=.70). 
 
1. Church attendance: “How often do you attend religious services?” 
 
1=  Never 
2=  Once a year or less 
3=  A few times a year 
4=  Once or twice a month 
5=  Once a week 
6=  More than once a week 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
Direction: Coded so that higher values indicate more church attendance. 
 
EGSS variable name: c1_pp072 
 
2. Religion; scriptural word of God: 
 
 “Which of these statements comes closest to your feelings about the 
(Bible/Torah/Holy Scripture)?  
 
2= The (Bible/Torah/Holy Scripture) is the actual word of God and is to be taken 
literally, word for word.  
 
1= The (Bible/Torah/Holy Scripture) is the word of God but not everything in it 
should be taken literally, word for word.”  
 
0= The (Bible/Torah/Holy Scripture) is a book written by people and is not the 
word of God.” 
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Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
Direction: Coded so that higher values indicate more literal interpretation of 
Bible/Torah/Holy Scripture. 
 
 
3. Stem Cell Research: “Congress considered many important bills over the past 
two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the 
legislation in principle. Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act: Allow federal 
funding of embryonic stem cell research.” 
 
0=  support 
1=  oppose 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
Direction: Coded so that high value indicates opposition to federal funding of 
stem cell research. 
 
EGSS variable name: c1_l9 
 
4. Gays serving openly in the military: “Congress considered many important 
bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you 
support or oppose the legislation in principle. End Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell:  Would 
allow gays to serve openly in the armed services” 
 
0=  support 
1=  oppose 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
Direction: Coded so that high value indicates opposition to gays serving openly 
in the military. 
 
EGSS variable name: c1_l7 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha for Traditional Values Scale: (⍺=.70) 
 
Direction of scale: Coded so that higher values indicate more support for 
traditional moral worldview. 
 
Civil Liberties Support for civil liberties 
 
Support or opposition to warrantless wiretaps. 
 
“Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of 
the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. 
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Federal Intelligence and Security Act” “Allow U.S. spy agencies to eavesdrop on 
overseas terrorist suspects without first getting a court order.” 
 
0=  support 
1=  oppose 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
Direction: Codes so that high value indicates less support for civil liberties. 
 
EGSS variable names: c1_l8 
 
View of Obama Measure of opinion of President Obama 
 
Opinion of President Obama: “How much do you like or dislike each group or 
person? Barack Obama” 
 
1=  Like a great deal 
2=  Like a moderate amount 
3=   Like a little 
4=  Neither like nor dislike 
5=  Dislike a little 
6=  Dislike a moderate amount 
7=  Dislike a great deal 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
EGSS variable name: c1_k1c 
 
View of Immigrants View of immigrants in the country. 
 
View of impact of immigrants in country: “Which of these two statements comes 
closer to your own views?” 
 
0= “Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard work and 
talents.” 
1= “Immigrants today are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, 
housing, and health care.” 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
Direction: Coded so that high value indicates negative opinions toward 
immigrants in the country. 
 
EGSS variable name: c1_zd3 
Age Age of respondent 
 
Four categories of age: 
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1=  18-29 
2=  30-44 
3=  45-59 
4=  60+ 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
EGSS variable name: c1_ppagect4 
Gender Gender of respondent 
 
0=  female 
1=  male 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
Direction: Coded so that high value indicates male respondent. 
 
EGSS variable name: c1_ppgender 
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Table 3.12: Variable Coding EGSS Wave 4  
 
Tea Party Support Support for Tea Party 
Range 1 to 7 
 
1=  Oppose a great deal 
2=  Oppose a moderate amount 
3=  Oppose a little 
4=  Neither support nor oppose 
5=  Support a little 
6=  Support a moderate amount 
7=  Support a great deal 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
Direction: Recoded so that higher values indicate more support for Tea Party. 
 
EGSS1 variable name: C4_Q1, C4_Q2_SU, C4_Q2_OP 
 
Ideology Respondent Ideology  
 
Self-reported respondent ideology: “When it comes to politics, would you 
describe yourself, and these groups, as liberal, conservative, or neither liberal nor 
conservative?” 
 
1=  Very liberal 
2=  Somewhat liberal 
3=  Closer to liberals 
4=  Neither liberal nor conservative 
5=  Closer to conservatives 
6=  Somewhat conservative 
7=  Very Conservative 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
EGSS variable name, ideology: C4_P1 
 
Party Identification Party identification  
 
Political party affiliation:  
 
0=  Strong Democrat 
1=  Strong Democrat 
2=  Not Strong Democrat 
3=  Leans Democrat 
4=  Undecided/Independent/Other 
5=  Leans Republican 
6=  Not strong Republican 
138 
 
7= Strong Republican 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
Direction: Recoded so that high values indicate more identification with the 
Republican Party. 
 
EGSS variable name: C4_PAR_1. 
 
Racial Resentment Racial Resentment Scale 
 
Average of four questions measuring level of racial resentment (⍺=.83). 
 
“Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree 
somewhat, or disagree strongly with this statement?” 
 
 1. “Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and 
worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.” 
(Agree)* 
 
2. “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it 
difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.” (Disagree)* 
 
 3. “Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.” 
(Disagree)* 
 
 4. “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would 
only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.”(Agree)* 
 
Direction: Coded so that higher values indicate more racial resentment. 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha for Racial Resentment Scale: (⍺=.83) 
 
EGSS variable name: C4_ZA1, C4_ZA2 C4_ZA3 C4_ZA4 
 
*Answers that determine level of for racial resentment based on Valentino and 
Sears (2005). 
Views of President Obama View of President Obama 
 
Views toward President Obama were assessed through answers to a feeling 
thermometer question.  The question was posed in the following manner. 
 
“We'd like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and other 
people who are in the news these days. We'll show the name of a person and we'd 
like you to rate that person using something we call the feeling thermometer.  
Ratings between 5 0 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and 
warm toward the person. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that 
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you don't feel favorable toward the person and that you don't care too much for 
that person. You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel 
particularly warm or cold toward the person. How would you rate Barack 
Obama?” 
 
Variable ranged from 0 to 100. 
 
Direction: Coded so that lower values indicate higher unfavorable views of 
President Obama. 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
EGSS variable name: C4_C2 
 
Immigration Views on Immigration Scale 
 
Average of four questions related to opinions on immigrants and immigration 
(⍺=.70). 
 
Question 1: “When people from other countries legally move to the United States 
to live and work, is this generally good for the U.S., generally bad for the U.S., or 
neither good nor bad?” 
 
1=  Extremely good 
2=  Moderately good  
3=  A little good 
4=  Neither good nor bad 
5=  A little bad 
6=  Moderately bad 
7=  Extremely bad 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
EGSS variable name: C4_T1 
 
Question 2: “Should the number of people who are allowed to legally move to the 
United States to live and work be increased, decreased, or kept the same as it is 
now?” 
 
1=   Increased a lot 
2=   Increased a moderate amount 
3=   Increased a little 
4=   Kept the same 
5=   Decreased a little 
6=   Decreased a moderate amount 
7=   Decreased a lot 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
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EGSS variable name: C4_T2 
 
Question 3: “Which comes closest to your view about what government policy 
should be toward unauthorized immigrants now living in the United States? 
Should the government” 
 
1=Allow unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United States and eventually 
qualify for U.S. citizenship, without penalties. 
 
2=Allow unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United States and eventually 
qualify for U.S. citizenship, but only if they meet certain requirements like paying 
back taxes and fines, learning English, and passing background checks. 
 
3=Have a guest worker program that allows unauthorized immigrants to remain in 
the United States in order to work, but only for a limited amount of time. 
 
4=Make all unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back to their home 
country. 
 
Direction: Coded so that higher values indicate more opposition to immigration. 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
EGSS variable name: C4_T3 
 
Question 4:  “There is a proposal to allow people who were illegally brought into 
the U.S. as children to become permanent U.S. residents under some 
circumstances. Specifically, citizens of other countries who illegally entered the 
U.S. before age 16, who have lived in the U.S. 5 years or longer, and who 
graduated high school would be allowed to stay in the U.S. as permanent residents 
if they attend college or serve in the military.”  
 
“Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose this proposal? Do you 
[favor/oppose] that (a great deal, moderately, or a little / a little, moderately, or a 
great deal)?” 
 
Following variables were recoded into a variable measuring degree of support or 
opposition: C4_T5, C4_T6_FA, C4_T6_OP 
 
1=  Favor, A great deal 
2=  Favor, Moderately 
3=  Favor, A little 
4=  Neither favor nor oppose 
5=  Oppose, A little 
6=  Oppose, Moderately 
7=  Oppose, A great deal 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
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Cronbach’s Alpha for Views on Immigration Scale: (⍺=.70) 
 
Direction: Higher values more opposition/negative view of 
immigrants/immigration. 
 
Traditional Moral Values Traditional Moral Values Scale 
 
Average of responses to four questions related to the government promoting 
traditional values, basing American laws on Christian values, support religious 
institutions covering birth control in insurance plans, and respondent church 
attendance (⍺=.70). 
 
1. Government promoting traditional values: “Do you favor, oppose, or neither 
favor nor oppose the government promoting “traditional values”?” 
 
1=  Oppose a great deal 
2=  Oppose a moderate amount 
3=  Oppose a little 
4=  Neither favor nor oppose 
5=  Favor a little  
6=  Favor a moderate amount 
7=  Favor a great deal 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
Direction: Coded so that higher vales indicate more support for government 
promoting traditional values. 
 
EGSS variable name: C4_ZL2 
 
2.  Basing American law on Christian Values: “Do you favor, oppose, or neither 
favor nor oppose basing American laws on Christian values?” 
 
1=  Oppose strongly 
2=  Oppose a moderate amount 
3=  Oppose a little 
4=  Neither favor nor oppose 
5=  Favor a little 
6=  Favor a moderate amount 
7=  Favor strongly 
 
Direction: Coded so that higher vales indicate more support for basing American 
law on Christian values. 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
EGSS variable name: C4_ZM2 
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3. Views on insurance covering birth control: “Do you favor, oppose, or neither 
favor nor oppose requiring religious schools and charities to provide their 
employees with health insurance that includes free birth control?” 
 
1=  Favor a great deal 
2=  Favor a moderate amount 
3=  Favor a little 
4=  Neither favor nor oppose 
5=  Oppose a little 
6=  Oppose a moderate amount 
7=  Oppose a great deal 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
EGSS variable name: C4_ZQ1 
 
4. Church attendance: “How often do you attend religious services?” 
 
1=  Never 
2=  Once a year or less 
3=  A few times a year 
4=  Once or twice a month 
5=  Once a week 
6=  More than once a week 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
Direction: Coded so that higher values indicate more church attendance. 
 
EGSS variable name: C4_P_130 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha for Traditional Moral Values Scale: (⍺=.70) 
 
Role of Government/ 
Libertarianism 
Role of Government Scale 
 
Average of two questions asking respondents about size of government and 
government regulation (⍺=.52) 
 
Question 1:  “Should the government generally be doing more, doing less, or 
doing the same number of things it is doing now?” 
 
1=  A lot more 
2=  A moderate amount more 
3=  A little more 
4=  The same number of things 
5=  A little less 
6=  A moderate amount less 
7=  A lot less 
 
143 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
EGSS variable name: C4_ZL1 
 
Question 2: “How much government regulation of business is good for society? A 
great deal, a lot, a moderate amount, a little, or none at all?” 
 
1=  A great deal 
2=  A lot 
3=  A moderate amount 
4=  A little 
5=  None at all 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
EGSS variable name: C4_ZL3 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha for  Role of Government Scale: (⍺=.52) 
 
Direction: Coded so that higher values indicates more support for less 
government.  
Age Age of respondent 
 
Four categories of age: 
 
1= 18-29 
2= 30-44 
3=45-59 
4=60+ 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
EGSS variable name: C4_PPA_2 
Gender Gender of respondent 
 
0=female 
1=male 
 
Note: Responses of no answer or not asked (unit non-response, terminated) were 
coded as missing. 
 
Direction: Coded so that high value indicates male respondent. 
 
EGSS variable name: C4_PPGEN 
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Chapter 4: Declining public support for the Tea Party  
 How has support for the Tea Party changed over time? Understandings changes in 
support for the Tea Party permits inferences to be made about its future ramifications and 
the extent to which supporters represent an enduring force in American politics. Poll 
questions concerning the Tea Party have been asked periodically since early 2010, 
providing an opportunity to examine changes in support over the course of time. While 
there is no shortage of polls concerning the Tea Party, surveys often differ in their 
method of administration. As such, this chapter will provide a unique contribution to our 
understanding of support for the Tea Party by examining changes in opinion controlling 
for differences in survey design. 
 This chapter examines support for the Tea Party from early 2010, when polls 
concerning the Tea Party were consistency asked, through the end of 2011 when support 
for the Tea Party had declined substantially. Two types of questions are used to plot Tea 
Party opinions over time. These questions pertain to support for, and favorability of, the 
Tea Party. The results of this chapter will demonstrate that Tea Party support, judged by 
four distinct measures, has declined over time reaching a peak level of support around 
November of 2010.  
 As alluded to earlier, this chapter also pays specific attention to the influence that 
question wording, or question response options, can have on public opinions of the Tea 
Party. Depending on the options given to respondents, support or favorability towards the 
Tea Party can vary significantly. The implications of these results for the Tea Party, and 
the measurement of public opinion, are also explored. 
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 This chapter will proceed as follows. It will begin with a discussion of the debates 
surrounding survey administration. This is followed by an examination of the 
methodology utilized to examine support for the Tea Party over time. The chapter will 
close with a presentation of the empirical findings as well as detailed discussion of their 
implications. 
Controversies in Survey Administration 
 A serious debate among public opinion scholars continues to rage regarding the 
appropriate manner in which to organize survey questions. Although in this analysis the 
reliance is on survey questions constructed by various polling organizations and many 
media outlets (and did not have the luxury of creating original survey questions61), it is 
worth examining some of the debates related to measuring public opinion. Public opinion 
scholars have long documented the many factors that can influence survey results as it is 
important that we do not examine these results in a vacuum (Bishop, 2011, p. 349).  With 
this notion in mind, this analysis will briefly discuss some of the literature pertaining to 
survey research. Specifically, the literature related to question wording and branching, 
survey administration, sampling, and polling house effects. This brief discussion will set 
the stage for a discussion of how some of these factors were controlled in this analysis of 
survey data pertaining to the Tea Party.   
The “Right” Way to Ask (or word) a Question 
 As will be made clear in the methodology section of this chapter, the aggregation 
and analysis of polling data is not an easy endeavor. Several questions ultimately arise 
pertaining to the appropriate manner in which to control for the various ways that 
                                                
61 One small exception is the inclusion of a Tea Party question submitted to the 2010-2012 American National Election 
Studies EGSS discussed in the previous chapter. However, the EGSS questions were not used in the analysis conducted 
in this chapter. 
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questions are worded as well as the response options that are offered to respondents. In 
terms of this analysis, it is particularly problematic as these factors (of question wording 
and response options) can and often do vary from polling organization to polling 
organization. The literature on this subject is vast and a complete history of it will not be 
recounted here. Instead, the focus remains on literature that is of direct relevance to this 
analysis (For a more detailed discussion of some of the controversies related to survey 
design, see Bishop, 2011). 
 A primary dilemma faced by public opinion scholars is the decision whether to 
include a “don’t know” or no opinion category for respondents. A common thread of 
scholarship suggests that questions should include this option, given the influence of 
nonattitudes on survey responses (Converse 1964, 1970 as cited in Bishop, 2011, p.351). 
The logic behind this strain of thought is that if someone does not have an opinion one 
way or another, it would be proper to allow them to express this lack of opinion by 
offering the option of don’t know, or no opinion, so as to not bias the results (Converse 
1964, 1970 as cited in Bishop, 2011, p.351).  
 However, this type of reasoning can be problematic. Some have shown that giving 
respondents the option of don’t know, or a don’t know question filter, increases the 
likelihood of this type of response (Schuman & Press, 1996, p. 143). This is the case 
when comparisons are made between questions that do not offer the “don’t know” option, 
to questions that do (Schuman & Presser, 1996, p. 123). Still yet, some scholars have 
found that by omitting don’t know responses, similar conclusions regarding an issue are 
often found, regardless of whether respondents voluntarily indicate don’t know or are 
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given the option of don’t know (Schuman & Presser, 1981, chap. 4 as cited in Bishop, 
2011, p.352).  
 Complicating the matter more, the work of Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber 
(1983) found that including the don’t know option, compared to not including it, 
produced significantly different survey responses (p.543). This finding is arrived at when 
comparisons were made to survey responses given when a don’t know filter was used and 
when one was not (A “don’t know filter” is the option, within the question wording, that 
indicates to a respondent that he or she can choose don’t know as an answer to the 
question). Overall, the work of Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber (1983) suggests that a 
don’t know filter can have a substantial influence on more complicated questions (such as 
positions on arms shipments to Turkey) as well as those questions regarding issues in 
which respondents are less familiar (p.538). However, they also find that including a 
don’t know or no opinion filter has little impact on the results of questions pertaining to 
less complex issues such as affirmative action for blacks in education and employment 
(p.535). 
 The work of Krosnick, Holbrook, Berent, Carson, Hanemann, Kopp, Mitchel, 
Presser, Ruud, Smith, Moody, Green, and Conaway (2002) suggests that including the 
option of a no opinion category may lead to a distortion in the true opinions among 
respondents. Specifically, Krosnick et al. (2002) find that many individuals who indicate 
that they have no opinion on a subject do indeed have opinions. However, they give a no 
opinion response based on the notion of satisficing. The notion of satisficing in public 
opinion surveys was developed by Krosnick (1991) and is premised on the idea that 
individuals are often lazy in how they answer survey responses. Rather than expending 
148 
 
the necessary cognitive effort needed to answer a question, some respondents instead 
choose the option of “don’t know” as it provides an easy escape from having to put 
forward the needed energy to answer the question as accurately as possible (Krosnick , 
1991, as cited in Krosnick et al., 2002, p. 375).  In fact, later work by Krosnick et al. 
(2002) advises against the use of a don’t know option in survey responses, in light of 
more precise measures (p.399).  
 These scholars make this argument in large part due to the finding that people 
who indicated that they had no opinion on a matter, when given this option, could have 
given a substantive answer had they chosen to. In fact, it is argued that these individuals 
were able to give answers with the same reliability and validity as those who advocated a 
position, when not given the option of no opinion (Krosnick et al., 2002, p. 400). Thus, 
offering a don’t know or no opinion category encouraged satisficing. Interestingly, these 
scholars also found that satisficing was significantly related to education. Specifically, 
lower levels of formal education were significantly related with higher levels of no-
opinion responses (p.389)  
 In contrast, the work of Bishop, Tuchfarber, and Oldendick (1986) provides 
evidence supporting the inclusion of don’t know or no opinion options in survey 
questions. Specifically, the authors administered surveys comprised of questions about 
three fictional pieces of legislation, posed in three different forms. These questions forms 
included one which offered respondents the opinion of stating that he or she had not 
thought enough about the issue, another form which did not offer a had not thought 
enough about the issue option, and a third form which also omitted the option of have not 
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thought enough about the issue while also having the interviewer probe the respondent to 
provide an answer if one was not given.  
 The authors found that the first question (which offered a no opinion or don’t 
know option) form provided the lowest percentage of opinions on the issue as many 
respondents neglected to provide an opinion. Comparatively speaking, questions two and 
three resulted in a substantially higher number of respondents providing an opinion with 
question three producing the highest response rates. In terms of the factors related to 
response rates, the authors found that individuals with a higher educational background 
were more likely to indicate that they had no opinion on the fictitious issues (Bishop, 
Tuchfarber, & Oldendick, 1986).  
 Overall, the work of Bishop, Tuchfarber, and Oldendick (1986) suggests that 
including a  response option indicating that the respondent has not heard enough about 
the issue (or in other words a don’t know option), dramatically reduced the number of 
individuals expressing opinions. Thus, no opinion or don’t know filters could have a vital 
role in providing an outlet for individuals whose actual feelings on the issue are not 
provided. 
 Whether to include a don’t know or no opinion option, or allowing respondents to 
volunteer this response, remains a serious debate among scholars. This debate will not be 
settled here, but it should be noted that some arguments in the debate will be revisited in 
light of the findings presented later in this chapter. For now, it can be hypothesized that 
the decision to include a don’t know option, or not, in the survey questions included in 
this analysis is expected to have a relatively modest impact on reliably measuring public 
opinions of the Tea Party for the following reasons.  
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 First, evidence suggests that there are no significant differences between 
questions that offer a don’t know option and those that do not (Poe, Seeman, 
McLaughlin, Mehl, & Dietz, 1988). Second, significant differences between questions 
that offer a don’t know filter are more likely to occur among questions that are more 
obscure and complex in nature (Bishop, Oldendick, & Tuchfarber, 1983, p. 535). In the 
context of the Tea Party, it is not believed to be a complex issue difficult to understand by 
the public. Thirdly, the findings of Krosnick et al. (2002) concerning satisficing suggest 
that this practice is significantly related to question placement on the survey, education, 
motivation of the respondent, and anonymity in reporting their answers (p.396). These 
factors are difficult if not impossible to control for given the large number of surveys 
included in this analysis, negating a direct test of this theory. Even more, there still 
remains considerable debate regarding the conclusions of the satisficing theory that 
makes conclusive notions of its warranty debatable (see Bishop, 2011, p. 353 for critique 
of satisficing theory).  
 The influence of don’t know, or no opinion, options should be noted, but it is not 
expected to be a stumbling block to a valid examination of Tea Party opinions over time. 
This discussion will now proceed to a related dilemma examined in the public opinion 
literature on survey design. This dilemma relates to the decision whether to include a 
middle response in survey questions. 
Including a Middle Response to Survey Questions 
 The middle option in survey items allows a respondent to choose the middle 
ground between two competing responses to a question. It is best described as the 
“neutral position or mid-point on a scale” that gives respondents the freedom to not take a 
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side on the issue at hand (Bishop, 2011, p.353). The same debates found regarding the 
inclusion of a no opinion or don’t know option are also found in discussions related to the 
inclusion of a middle option in survey responses. The decision to include a middle 
response in survey questions can have important ramifications on respondent opinions. A 
case-in-point is the work of Bishop (1987) that found that including a middle option can 
dramatically shift public opinions towards specific issues. Specifically, when respondents 
were asked about their opinions regarding increasing social security benefits, without a 
middle option, of neither increasing nor decreasing spending, a majority of respondents 
favored an increase in spending on benefits. However, when respondents were given the 
middle option of keeping spending at their current levels, in the preface of the question, 
the percentage of respondents favoring an increase decreased significantly (Bishop, 1987, 
p.223). This suggests that offering a middle option will more reliably measure opinions 
of individuals whose preferred option is not available or those ambivalent towards the 
issue at a hand (Bishop, 1987, p.229).  
 Still yet, the practice of including a middle option is largely discouraged, in light 
of alternate measures that can sift out true ambivalence from those who may be leaning 
towards an issue (Converse & Presser, 1986, as cited in Bishop, 2011, p.354). 
Furthermore, even if included, it is argued that including a middle category draws 
proportionally from both sides of an issue negating its proposed influence (Schuman & 
Presser, 1981, chap.6 as cited in Bishop, 2011, p.354).  
 Given the debate concerning this issue, this analysis will control for whether 
questions include a middle option or not. Doing so is both practical and easily achieved. 
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This chapter will now move to a discussion of another dilemma faced by survey 
designers, the decision to structure survey questions in a branching format. 
Branching and Survey Responses 
 Question wording is a vital component of survey design that often requires the use 
of multiple steps in measuring public opinion. The process of question branching consists 
of two steps, where the first step establishes the direction of the respondent’s opinion and 
the second steps involves a follow up question measuring the strength of the opinion 
(Krosnick & Berent, 1993, p. 943). This process has demonstrated a high degree of 
reliability in measuring public opinion as the following literature demonstrates.  
 The work of Krosnick and Berent (1993) concludes that branching measures 
provide a more reliable indication of public opinion than nonbranching measures (p.941). 
Moreover, Malhotra, Krosnick, and Thomas (2009) provide evidence that branching the 
endpoints of a question significantly increases the reliability and validity of that measure. 
Specifically, branching the endpoint of a question into two or three alternatives increased 
the validity of the opinions measured, with three options producing the most substantial 
increase in validity. In light of these findings, this analysis will also control for the 
influence of branching on survey responses. Based on the work of Krosnick and Berent, 
(1993) questions that include branching should provide a more reliable measure of Tea 
Party opinions as compared to their non-branching counterparts. 
 The final issue of survey design examined in this analysis will be those related to 
survey housing effects. It is relatively common knowledge that polling organizations 
employ different methods to measure public opinion. As a result, polling organizations 
often find different levels of public support concerning the same issue because of 
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differences in the manner that each survey organization collects its data (Erikson & 
Tedin, 2011). A discussion of problems related to survey housing effects follows. 
Survey House Effects 
 House effects are defined by Erikson and Tedin (2011) as “variations in survey 
results due to idiosyncratic ways in which survey organizations conduct their polling” 
(p.47). These idiosyncratic methods can vary in terms of how polling organizations 
handle call backs to respondents who may have initially declined to participate, measures 
of likely voters as well as many other factors (Erikson & Tedin, 2011, p.47). Thus, this 
analysis will take into account the various polling house effects to ensure a more reliable 
measure of public support for the Tea Party.  Now that a discussion of the traditional 
obstacles to accurately measuring public opinion has been outlined, this chapter will now 
turn to a direct examination of the methodology employed to examine the Tea Party.  
The Many Ways to Measure Opinions of the Tea Party  
 The history of the Tea Party is one that stretches over four years (as of this 
writing). Since its inception in late 2008, early 2009, the American public has been 
consistently polled regarding its opinions of the Tea Party. However, it is important to 
note that public opinion polls did not begin to mention the Tea Party until late 2009 and 
early 2010. An aggregation of these polls, reflecting Tea Party support over time and 
controlling for various survey effects, has yet to be compiled. Thus, surveys asking 
questions related to the Tea Party were collected and aggregated to gain a complete 
picture of Tea Party support over time.  
 A variety of Tea Party questions were asked over the years, ranging from 
positivity, to knowledge of, to support, allowing for many angles from which to gauge 
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opinions of the Tea Party. Although it would be enlightening to consider all the variations 
in the questions related to the Tea Party, for the sake of brevity, this analysis focused on 
the types of questions deemed to be the clearest indicators of Tea Party support. These 
questions were those concerning support or opposition, and favorable or unfavorable 
opinions, towards the Tea Party. Moreover, an ideal examination of Tea Party support 
over time would extend through the day of this writing. However, at some point the 
collection process had to end and the analysis had to begin. As such, this analysis of Tea 
Party support covers public opinion from the beginning of 2010 though the end of 2011. 
These were arguably the peak years of Tea Party support and more recent polling data 
indicates that support has not rebounded from the decline observed in this analysis 
(Gallup, 2013). 
Measuring Tea Party Support: Favorability and Support Briefly 
 The two types of questions used in this analysis dealt with issues of support and 
favorability. For those interested in a more extensive discussion of the methodological 
issues and decisions related to question wording, and surveys selected for this analysis, 
skip to the methodology section below. For now, a brief thumbnail sketch of the 
approaches is provided.    
 The Tea Party support questions were largely posed in the following format. For 
instance, a September 2010 NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll asked respondents, “do 
you consider yourself a supporter of the Tea Party Movement”? Some questions were 
also asked about gradations of Tea Party support, probing respondents regarding the 
intensity of their support. For instance, a September 2011 ABC News/Washington Post 
poll asked, “what is your view of the Tea Party movement—would you say you support it 
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strongly, support it somewhat, oppose it somewhat, or oppose it strongly”? For the 
questions of support that gave options for intensity of support, the percentage indicating 
strongly support was examined as a separate variable.    
 Concerning the favorability questions, they were commonly asked in the 
following manner. For instance, a September 2010 CBS News/New York Times poll 
asked respondents, “is your opinion of the Tea Party movement favorable, not favorable, 
undecided, or haven’t heard enough about the Tea Party movement yet to have an 
opinion?” Again, gradations of the favorability questions were also asked in some polls. 
As an example, an August 2010 Associated Press/GfK Roper Public Affairs & Corporate 
Communications poll used the branching format and asked respondents, “do you have a 
favorable, unfavorable, or neither favorable nor unfavorable opinion of the Tea Party 
movement? (If favorable, ask:) is that very favorable or somewhat favorable? (If 
unfavorable, ask:) Is that very unfavorable or somewhat unfavorable”?62 Moreover, for 
survey items that gave respondents options for intensity of favorability towards the Tea 
Party, the percentage indicating very favorable or strongly favorable, were also included 
as a separate variable measuring the intensity of opinion.    
Methodology: Creating the Four Aggregate Measures of Tea Party Opinions 
 The data presented in the trend lines of this chapter were compiled in the 
following manner. First, data were collected from nearly every available survey asking 
respondents about the Tea Party. The goal was to depict opinions of the Tea Party based 
on an aggregation of polls from a multitude of sources. This approach provides a more 
reliable measure of public support for the Tea Party than relying on just one survey 
                                                
62  It should be noted that branching type questions consisted of only a minority of the questions asked. Only 19 of the 
84 favorability type questions employed branching. In terms of the support questions, only 29 out of 172 employed 
branching. 
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organization. The majority of the polling data were collected from the Roper Center for 
Public Policy’s polling database and supplemented through other sources.63 The Roper 
database has been described by some prominent public opinion scholars as the “the most 
comprehensive and up-to-date method for find finding particular opinion items” (Erikson 
& Tedin, 2011, p. 16), and served as an invaluable source of Tea Party polling 
information.  
 Overall, the data breakdown was as follows. Data were collected from 18 
different polling organizations for the favorability questions dating from January 2010 to 
November 2011. The total number of favorability polls collected was 84 with 43 
representing simple favorability questions and 41 consisting of favorability questions 
measuring the intensity of the response. For the support questions, data were collected 
from 15 different polling organizations dating from February 2010 to December 2011. 
The total number of support questions collected was 172. Among these 172, 89 were 
simple support or oppose questions and 83 measured the intensity of support for the Tea 
Party (see the appendix for a complete list of polling organizations).  
 For the simple support questions (those asking whether the respondent supports or 
opposes the Tea Party, without measuring the intensity in support), three categories were 
created. These categories included support, oppose, and no opinion.  If the respondent 
was given the option of neither support nor oppose, the neither category was combined 
with the opposition category.  It is understood that this approach may over represent the 
percentage of opposition to the Tea Party.  Nevertheless, given that the primary focus of 
                                                
63Data were also collected from the Polling the Nations polling database, along with other primary sources of polling 
information For instance, the Economist provides an extensive archive of polls pertaining to the Tea Party that was 
used to verify the results reported in other sources (Economist/YouGov polls, 2013). 
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this analysis relies on measuring support or favorability percentages, it is not believed to 
present a problem.  
 If a respondent indicated don’t know, no opinion, refused, haven’t heard enough, 
undecided, or can’t say, these values were combined with the third category of no 
opinion. This approach, to treat these types of responses as no opinion, was the same in 
all four measures of Tea Party opinions. For the intensity of support questions, the 
responses were treated in the same way as the simple support questions. However, for 
these types of questions the variable that was plotted was the percentage of respondents 
indicating they strongly supported the Tea Party (see below for details). 
 The simple favorability questions (asking respondents for either a favorable or an 
unfavorable opinion of the Tea Party) were treated in a similar vein as the simple support 
questions. Three categories were created consisting of favorable, unfavorable, and no 
opinion. Responses to these questions that were undecided, don’t know, haven’t heard of, 
or refused were all combined into the no opinion category. This same approach to the no 
opinion category was also used for the intensity of favorability questions. However, like 
the gradations in support question, the percentage of individuals indicating strongly or 
very favorable was used to plot intensity in support over time (see below for details). 
Control Variables 
 Understanding the complex nature of public opinion, and the careful steps that 
must be taken in analyzing it, several control variables were included in this analysis. 
Any standard public opinion textbook will note the importance that the survey sample, 
methodology or administration, question wording and branching, the option of a middle 
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category, and survey house effects can have on survey results (Erikson & Tedin, 2011, p. 
54). Thus, this analysis controlled for these important survey characteristics.  
 First, a variable was constructed for each poll to indicate whether the poll used a 
sample of registered or likely voters, a national population, or other limited type samples. 
From this variable, three separate dummy variables were created. For instance, dummy 
variables were created to signify whether the sample consisted of registered voters or 
not.64 An additional dummy variable was created to address limited samples or those 
surveys that included unique populations such as samples of adults over 50.  This limited 
samples dummy variable controlled for whether each particular poll included a sample of 
likely and registered voters or other limited samples such as the ones mentioned above 
among others.65  
 These dummy variables were coded in this manner for the following reasons. 
First, it was assumed that Tea party support might differ depending on whether the poll 
included only registered voters or a national population. Higher support for the Tea Party 
was expected to be found among registered voters, given that registered voters are more 
likely to be white (as compared to Hispanic) and wealthier than the average citizen (Pew 
Research Center, 2006). Moreover, as Chapter 3 demonstrated, a large majority of Tea 
Party supporters, much larger than the public at large, indicate that they are registered to 
vote. Secondly, a dummy variable was used to control for limited samples such as polls 
pertaining to respondents who were aware of the Tea Party.  Higher support for the Tea 
Party was expected among individuals who had indicated that they were aware of the Tea 
Party.  
                                                
64 Two polls consisted of a sample of Republican voters, these were left out of the  regression models.  
65 Other samples included those taken from the Economist/YouGov polls, which asked support for the Tea Party only 
among respondents aware of the Tea Party (2013). 
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 Furthermore, as mentioned previously, data were also collected pertaining to how 
the survey was conducted, specifically whether it was administered via telephone or over 
the internet.  There remains considerable debate regarding the accuracy and effectiveness 
of internet polling for a variety of reasons. For instance, a 2010 study found that a little 
over 1 in 5 Americans do not use the internet, raising issues of representativeness in 
sampling (Pew Research Center, 2010 as cited in Erikson & Tedin, 2011, p.39). 
Moreover, internet polling that relies on a recurring panel of respondents may produce 
respondents that are different from the American public (see Dillman, 2008 as cited in 
Erikson & Tedin, 2011, p.39). As such, a dummy variable was created to indicate 
whether the survey was conducted via telephone, or not, to test for possible mode effects. 
 Third, the manner in which the question was asked was also taken into account. 
As many scholars of public opinion are aware, “it should be no surprise that in survey 
research, as in everyday life, the answers received are often dependent on the questions 
asked” (Erikson & Tedin , 2011, p.40).  To control for the influence of question wording, 
questions were either coded as being simple support or favorable (i.e. no options for 
intensity) or as measuring intensity in support or favorability. Furthermore, as the work 
of Krosnick and Berent (1993) has demonstrated, branching survey questions produces 
more reliable measures of public opinion. Thus, an additional dummy variable was 
created that indicated whether branching was used in the question wording. In total, 48 
out of the 256 questions collected for this analysis incorporated some form of 
branching.66 
 In terms of this analysis, higher support and favorability for the Tea Party is 
expected when the level of intensity is measured, given that more response options 
                                                
66 None of the simple support questions included branching and only one simple favorability question used branching. 
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increases the likelihood that an option closest to the actual opinion of a respondent will 
be present. In other words, fewer respondents will choose the middle or neutral category 
in expressing an opinion about the Tea Party because it is more likely that their true 
opinion is offered as an option. 
 Lastly, organizational house effects and the option of a middle category were also 
controlled for. House effects were controlled for by examining the individual effect each 
organization had on predicted support or opposition. Whether a question included a 
middle response was also considered though the creation of a dummy variable indicating 
the inclusion of a middle category in the question. Less support is expected for the Tea 
Party when a middle option is included as it is expected to elicit responses from tacit 
supporters. Overall, 72 questions, out of a total number of 256 examined in this chapter, 
included a specific middle category.  
  The Case for Four Measures of Tea Party Opinions 
 The two variations in question wording, along with the inclusion of intensity of 
favorability and support asked by some polling firms, presented a unique challenge for 
this analysis. Both questions asked similar, yet somewhat different, types of questions 
pertaining to opinions of the Tea Party. To combine all of the questions into one 
category, labeling it simply as support, would ignore the problems associated with how 
the questions were asked and how this might influence responses. To control for this 
possibility, each type of question was analyzed separately. In other words, four trend 
lines concerning views of the Tea Party were aggregated and plotted. This approach 
offers many benefits. 
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 First, it enabled an analysis of four independent, and varying, measures of 
opinions of the Tea Party. This permitted a diverse approach to understanding opinions of 
the Tea Party without relying on one sole manner of asking opinion questions, while also 
taking into consideration the influence that the intensity of support or favorability might 
exhibit on overall opinion trends. Second, it permitted a direct examination of the impact 
of question wording on perceived opinions of the Tea Party. Third, if these four different 
approaches in question wording point to a similar trend in Tea Party support then 
additional confidence can be placed in the accuracy of the conclusions. Overall, an 
analysis of opinions of Tea Party support in this multipronged approach ensures that the 
most objective and accurate depiction of opinions concerning the Tea Party is found. 
Empirical Findings 
 As of now, a case has been made that examining opinions of the Tea Party from 
four different angles is the most appropriate course of action. Still yet, some might 
contend that combining the questions pertaining to support or opposition and the 
questions of support and opposition including gradation, and vice versa for the 
favorability questions, into either support/opposition or favorable/unfavorable would be 
the best course of action to accurately gauge opinions of the Tea Party. After all, both 
favorability and support questions are asking the same question, just permitting more 
leeway in the responses. 
  Fortunately, this measurement decision can be tested statistically. If it is shown 
statistically, that question wording has a significant influence on opinion measures, or the 
variation in opinions regarding favorability or support, then the approach utilized in this 
analysis would be further supported. Table 4.1 presents the results of a two-sample t test. 
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The t test determines whether there is a statistically significant difference in responses 
between the two different types of support questions. As mentioned previously, the two 
types of questions included were those that simply asked about support or opposition to 
the Tea Party and those questions that asked about intensity of support, or opposition, 
towards the Tea Party.  
 Examining Table 4.1, the results indicate that there is a statistically significant 
difference between responses to the two different questions. Substantively, there is an 8 
percent average difference in support for the Tea Party, between the two different types 
of questions. Moreover, the questions that gave respondents more options in indicating 
support for the Tea Party (e.g. strongly, somewhat strongly) resulted in higher 
percentages of support for the Tea Party. Thus if a pollster was interested in portraying a 
higher degree of support for the Tea Party, it would be to their benefit to ask a question 
regarding support with the many options of intensity in support (and report support for 
the Tea Party as a summation of all responses indicating support).  Overall, the results of 
this test indicate that the manner in which the question was asked resulted in a significant 
difference in the average public support rate found for the Tea Party. 
[Insert Table 4.1] 
 In terms of the favorability questions, similar results are found for the two 
different types of favorability questions. As seen in Table 4.2, there is an average 
difference of 5 percentage points between the two different types of questions. Again, 
like the support questions, the question that offers respondents more options in how to 
respond to the question produces higher levels of favorability towards the Tea Party 
(Note: all of the favorable opinions for the intensity in favorability are combined into one 
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category indicating favorability). Specifically, asking the favorability question that allows 
for opinions regarding intensity of support results in an average favorability rating that is 
5 percentage points higher, than what is found by asking the public the simple 
favorability question. Interestingly, Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that Tea Party support, or 
favorability, was fairly low at around 32 percent, on average, for 2010 and 2011. 
[Insert Table 4.2] 
 Altogether, these findings are important given that news reports sometimes 
present the findings of polls, that ask intensity of opinion whether it be support or 
favorability, and lump together the differing categories presenting a narrative of either 
support or favorability. This can present a somewhat misleading indication of public 
opinion, given that, as the above-mentioned results suggest, question wording, or the 
options to questions given to respondents, can produce substantially different degrees of 
support or favorability. 
 To further accent how survey items that are seemingly asking the same question 
can produce substantially different results, a two-sample t test was also used to examine 
if the average responses to don’t  know, or opposition or unfavorable opinions, toward 
the Tea Party differed significantly by question type (see Table 4.3 and Table 4.4). All of 
the two-sample t tests produced statistically significant results.67  
[Insert Table 4.3] 
[Insert Table 4.4] 
                                                
67The only exception being the no opinions for the support questions. It is probable that the lack of statistically 
significant results can be traced to how responses to these questions were aggregated. For the simple support questions, 
most responses that could be given were support, oppose, depends, or not sure or a slightly different variation. 
Moreover, for the intensity questions there were a variety of different responses with one of them often being neither 
support nor oppose the Tea Party as well as a don’t know option. These neither responses were combined with the 
opposition category. If the neither category for intensity support questions, was combined with the no opinion category, 
it would have substantially increased the mean averages for the don’t know responses. Thus, it could have been 
reasonable to assume, that if the two categories (don’t know and neither) were combined then the results to the 
questions would have been significantly different. 
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 Once more, these results indicate substantial differences in the average responses 
to survey questions regarding the Tea Party depending on the type of question and 
response options given. For instance, Table 4.4 provides an indication of how substantial 
the differences were in the don’t know responses provided depending on the question 
asked. Specifically, there was a 15 percentage point difference in the no opinions 
responses between the two favorable type questions. The results indicate that, on average, 
35 percent of the public had no opinion of the Tea Party when asked the simple favorable 
question. However, when the favorable question was asked that measured the intensity of 
opinion, 20 percent of the public, on average, indicated that they had no opinion of the 
Tea Party.  
 These results are expected in light of previous literature that has found that the 
more options given to a respondent the more likely he or she is to reliably identify their 
true opinion, as it is more likely that their true opinion is represented in one of the 
response options (Malhotra, Krosnick, & Thomas, 2009). As mentioned previously, the 
work of Krosnick and Berent (1993) has shown that a more reliable measure of public 
opinion is found when branching questions are utilized. Specifically, Krosnick and 
Berent (1993) found that once a preliminary direction in opinion is found, branching the 
endpoints of the public’s positions results in a more valid measure.  
 In terms of the polls available for this analysis, the vast majority did not utilize a 
branching format. For instance, of the 256 polling items collected only 48 used branching 
questions. Moreover, the only types of questions that utilized branching were those that 
measured the intensity of the public’s opinion. Although relatively small in number, it is 
still important that these types of questions are accounted for, specifically, given the 
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evidence supporting their superior validity in measuring public opinion (Krosnick & 
Berent, 1993). Thus, a two-sample t test was used to determine if there was a significant 
difference between those intensity questions that included branching and those that did 
not.68 As expected, a significant difference was found between questions that included 
branching and those that did not. 69  
 Table 4.5 presents the results of the t test showing that branching questions 
yielded lower levels of support on average. Support for the Tea Party was three 
percentage points higher on average for questions that did not include branching as 
compared to those that did. Overall, these findings suggest that branching has a 
significant effect on measures of public opinions of the Tea Party and that it remains an 
important variable to consider when analyzing public opinion data.   
[Insert Table 4.5] 
 
Measuring Public Opinion over Time: Support for the Tea Party 
 The first approach used to analyze opinions of the Tea Party over time relies on 
simple questions of support for the Tea Party. In other words, questions that generally 
ask, do you support or oppose the Tea Party? Figure 4.1 displays the results of the Tea 
Party simple support question, with the first poll occurring in February of 2010 and the 
last poll in mid-November of 2011. This figure plots support for the Tea Party by days 
and includes all simple support polls excluding those that sampled only Republican 
voters. The results indicate that support for the Tea Party peaked around the midterm 
elections in November 2010 and has remained on a steady decline through the end of 
                                                
68 As a reminder, the process of question branching consists of two steps where the first step establishes the direction of 
the respondent’s opinion and the second steps involves a follow up question measuring the strength of the opinion 
(Krosnick & Berent, 1993, p. 943). 
69 A significant difference was not found for the favorability questions, most likely given the small sample size. Only 
41 observations total.  
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2011. Although the decline is only a couple of percentage points, the trend does show 
support has eroded.  
[Insert Figure 4.1] 
 To further account for Tea Party support over time, a second measure of support 
was plotted. As mentioned earlier, depending on the responses offered to the respondent, 
support for the Tea Party differs dramatically (as much as 8 percentage points depending 
on the question type). Moreover, combining all of the responses for the intensity of 
support questions into either support or oppose contributes significantly to the different 
average support results, as documented in the two-sample t tests tables. It is reasonable to 
assume that combining the support categories together will not accurately reflect support 
for the Tea Party over time. Specifically, since respondents may be indicating to pollsters 
a decline in support by moving from strongly support to somewhat support in their 
responses. Certainly a decline in support, but something that would not be reflected in a 
support category that combined all of the intensity of support responses into one measure 
of support. Thus, a separate variable was created to reflect only survey responses of 
strong support for the Tea Party.  
 This strongly support data was then plotted over time, to determine if the intensity 
in support for the Tea Party has indeed declined over time. Figure 4.2 presents the results 
of this alternate measure. Examining Figure 4.2, support for the Tea Party, as measured 
by strong intensity in support, has been on the decline since its average high of around 20 
percent strongly supporting the Tea Party in early 2010, leveling off at around 16 percent 
of the public strongly supporting in December of 2011.  
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 Taken together, these two figures present a marked decline, or at least, a leveling 
off in support for the Tea Party from 2010 through the 2011. Although useful, these 
trends should not be considered in a vacuum. As noted earlier, measuring public opinion 
can be a tricky endeavor and results should be carefully considered taking into account 
the many different approaches to the survey process. Specifically, Figure 4.1 and 4.2 did 
not take into account the various factors related to survey methodology that can influence 
survey response.  
[Insert Figure 4.2] 
Predicted Support 
 To account for differences in survey methodology the following factors were 
controlled for in predicting support for the Tea Party. These factors include 
organizational house effects, the type of sample (and whether the sample consisted of 
registered voters or national adults70), type of survey methodology (whether the survey 
was conducted via internet or telephone), the inclusion of a neither or middle category, 
and the use of question branching (for the intensity in support questions). Thus, predicted 
support for the Tea Party was obtained by estimating a regression model to see if support 
or favorability changed over time when controlling for all of the survey effects.71 
 Figure 4.3 plots the predicted support for the Tea Party using the simple support 
question. This figure shows a steady rise in support for the Tea Party beginning in 
February 2010 (averaging 25 percent support) through November of that year where it 
levels off at around 28 percent average support. Beginning in the months shortly after 
                                                
70 It should be noted that other factors were controlled for, but were not shown to be influential in predicting Tea Party 
support and, thus, are not reflected in Figures 4.3 or 4.4. Specifically, regressions were run that incorporated a limited 
samples dummy variable. This limited samples dummy variable controlled for whether each particular poll included a 
sample of likely and registered voters or other limited samples of adults over 50 or samples that excluded respondents 
not aware of the Tea Party.   
71 The results from each regression model utilized in this chapter can be found in the appendix at the end of the chapter. 
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November 2010, support for the Tea Party starts a steady decline to about 23 percent in 
December of 2011.   
[Insert Figure 4.3] 
 Figure 4.4 plots the predicted share of the public strongly supporting the Tea 
Party controlling for the same factors utilized in Figure 4.3 (however, the dummy 
measure for the neither category was excluded in Figure 4.4 as it did not improve the 
model fit). However, Figure 4.4 utilizes the variable measuring strongly support 
responses and takes into account the influence of question branching. This figure 
indicates that those expressing a high level of support for the Tea Party has declined since 
early 2010 where is stood at around 20 percent. The decline in the high intensity of 
support continues until around March of 2011 where it levels out at around 13 percent.  
 The figure also appears to show that share of the public strongly supporting the 
Tea Party may be on the rise towards the end of 2011. However, the confidence interval 
for the predicted support widens towards the end of the trend line indicating greater 
uncertainty in the predicted support. This is due to the limited amount of polls utilized in 
this model that took place in the late months of 2011. Thus, the intensity in support for 
the Tea Party for the majority of 2011 is best described as flat. Overall, Figure 4.4 
suggests that the high intensity levels of support for the Tea Party has been on a steady 
decline since polls regarding the Tea Party have been conducted through the end of 2011.  
[Insert Figure 4.4] 
Measuring Public Opinion over Time: Favorable Opinions of the Tea Party 
 The results of the questions pertaining to public support for the Tea Party indicate 
that support has been declining. To further investigate these findings, survey items 
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pertaining to favorable opinions of the Tea Party were also plotted. Figure 4.5 displays 
public opinion of the Tea Party focusing on the simple favorability question (the question 
asking respondents whether they had a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the Tea Party 
without measuring the intensity of opinion). Figure 4.5 plots favorable opinions by the 
day, with the first poll beginning in January of 2010 and the latest occurring in November 
of 2011, showing a trend in Tea Party favorability that has been on the decline since its 
peak at around 31 percent in November of 2010.  
[Insert Figure 4.5] 
 Even more striking are the results presented in Figure 4.6 which plots very or 
strongly favorable opinions of the Tea Party, from the intensity of favorability question 
responses. This figure indicates that the percentage of the American public with a very 
favorable opinion of the Tea Party has been on a steady decline since the summer of 
2010. Still yet, we cannot be too confident of these trends unless we account for the 
various factors shown to influence public opinion responses. In other words, will these 
results hold up when polling house effects, the survey methodology, question branching, 
and the sample have all been controlled for? 
[Insert Figure 4.6] 
Predicted Favorability  
 Figure 4.7 plots the predicted share of the public with a favorable opinion of the 
Tea Party, using the simple favorable question, and controlling for the above-mentioned 
factors. The results present a picture of Tea Party favorability that has remained stable at 
around 27 percent, although showing signs of decline. Although the decline is around one 
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percentage point, it is consistent with all of the previous models that show a decline in 
Tea Party support. 
[Insert Figure 4.7] 
 As mentioned previously, questions utilizing more options for respondents to 
choose from have been shown to produce public opinion results with greater validity. 
Thus, the findings of Figure 4.8, which takes into account the intensity of public’s 
opinion (plotting the percentage of respondents with a strong or very favorable opinion of 
the Tea Party) controlling for polling house effects, survey mode, sample, and question 
branching should be a more reliable indicator of trends in Tea Party favorability.  
 The plotted data in Figure 4.8 shows that the predicted share of the public with a 
strongly favorable opinion of the Tea Party has declined dramatically. The average 
percentage of respondents with a very favorable opinion of the Tea Party peaked at 
around 21 percent in February of 2010. Following this month, the percentage of 
respondents indicating a very favorable opinion of the Tea Party has declined to around 
13 percent in October of 2011. Overall, holding all other variables constant, the results of 
Figure 4.3, 4.4, 4.7, and 4.8 provides strong evidence that Tea Party support as well as 
favorability has been on a steady and steep decline, with the decline being particularly 
strong among the most ardent supporters.  
[Insert Figure 4.8] 
 Measuring Public Opinion over Time: Is the Public More Aware of the Tea Party?  
 So far, the results of this chapter have provided substantial evidence that the 
public’s opinion of the Tea Party has been on the decline. This is true whether opinions 
are measured through favorability or support questions. It can be assumed that as time 
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progresses the percentage of the American public indicating a don’t know opinion of the 
Tea Party should also decline. Reasons for this decline include factors such as increased 
media attention driven by the media’s curiosity concerning Tea Party supporters, the 
public’s support or opposition to the Tea Party, and political events associated with the 
Tea Party such as the 2011 debate over raising the federal debt ceiling. Moreover, 
previous studies have shown that don’t know opinions are more likely to be given 
concerning complex issues that respondents are less familiar with (Bishop, Oldendick, & 
Tuchfarber, 1983). Thus, as time progresses the public is expected to become more 
familiar with the Tea party, decreasing the expected instances of don’t know opinions. 
Furthermore, although not inherently complex on its face, as time progresses the public’s 
knowledge of the Tea Party is expected to increase, decreasing the uncertainty regarding 
what the Tea Party stands for, leading to a decrease in the preponderance of don’t know 
responses. 
 As we now know, public opinions of the Tea Party have been increasingly 
negative, or at least less favorable. It could also be that declines in the level of support are 
related to an increased awareness of the Tea Party by the American public. In other 
words, when the Tea Party initially emerged its support could be attributed to its 
amorphous or ambiguous nature. As the Tea Party has been increasingly defined by 
issues, controversies, and associations with political leaders this perception may have 
eroded.  One way to get at this is to measure the extent to which the public indicates an 
overall awareness of the Tea Party.  
 As mentioned previously, the no opinion categories used in this analysis are an 
aggregation of the followings responses, don’t knows, never heard of, refused, undecided, 
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can’t say, and no opinion. Although this aggregation is far from a perfect measure of the 
public’s awareness of the Tea Party, it does give a sense of some attributes of the public’s 
opinion. For instance, the measure can serve as a useful proxy concerning how opinions 
of the Tea Party have changed, whether it is through the development of a once 
nonexistent opinion, an increased awareness or interest in the Tea Party, or a shift in the 
polarization of public opinion from indifference to direct support or opposition.   
 To test whether awareness of the Tea Party has increased over time, the predicted 
share (obtained through same regression method used to predict support and favorability) 
of the public with no opinion (or a don’t know opinion) of the Tea Party was plotted. 
Like the previous measures of support and favorability, these opinions were examined 
incorporating the four different types of questions pertaining to the Tea Party. 
Furthermore, such factors as survey mode (internet or telephone), the type of sample 
(whether the respondents where registered voters or the national population over 18, 
excluding samples of only Republicans), survey house effects, the use of branching (only 
for the intensity of support and favorability questions), and the inclusion of a middle 
category in the question were also controlled for. The results of each of these models will 
be discussed as follows. 
 Figure 4.9 displays the predicted no opinion responses concerning the Tea Party 
utilizing the simple support question responses. As expected, the percentage of the public 
expressing no opinion of the Tea Party has been on the decline since polling began in 
February of 2010 leveling off at around 8 percent in June of 2011.  
[Figure 4.9] 
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 Plotting the predicted no opinion responses of the public using the questions that 
measure the intensity of support, displayed in Figure 4.10, produces a similar trend 
displayed in Figure 4.9.  The figure indicates that percentage of the public expressing no 
opinion of the Tea Party has been on a fairly steady decline since polls began. Figure 
4.10, indicates that the percentage of don’t know responses levels off at around 10 
percent in the summer of 2011.   
 In terms of the regression results used in Figure 4.10, it should also be noted that 
the dummy variable for the inclusion of a middle category resulted in a statistically 
significant drop in the percentage of individuals indicating a no opinion response 
concerning of the Tea Party.72 Substantively, the inclusion of the neither category in the 
question resulted in a 10-percentage point drop, on average, in no opinion (or don’t 
know) responses. The influence of this middle options on the percentage of no opinion or 
don’t knows in light of the findings of Bishop (1987), suggests that the decision to select 
the middle alternative can be attributed to ambivalence towards the other options (p.229). 
Thus, it reasonable to assume that a lower percentage of no opinion responses would be 
predicted if more questions offered a middle option.  The inclusion of a neither option, or 
a middle category, may allow for a more accurate depiction of awareness of the Tea Party 
when compared to responses where this option is not made available.  
[Figure 4.10] 
 To further examine the public awareness of the Tea Party, Figure 4.11 plots the 
predicted share of the public with no opinion of the Tea Party using the simple 
favorability question. This figure shows a steady decline in the average no opinion 
                                                
72 The middle option control variable was not significant for the regression models used in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.11 
and was excluded from the regression used in Figure 4.12 because of collinearity. The regression results are presented 
in Table 4.11 of the appendix at the end of the chapter. 
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responses beginning in January of 2010, where it peaked at around 53 percent through 
November of 2011 where it declined to around 29 percent. 
[Figure 4.11] 
  An additional examination of the percentage of the public indicating no opinion 
of the Tea Party is plotted in Figure 4.12 which presents the predicted share of the public 
indicating no opinion of the Tea Party, incorporating the intensity in favorability 
opinions. This figure shows a decline in the percentage of no opinion responses 
beginning at its peak of 19 percent in February of 2010, declining to around 15 percent in 
June of 2011.  
[Figure 4.12] 
 Overall Figures 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12, after controlling for a variety of 
different factors shown to influence public opinion responses, indicate that percentage of 
respondents indicating that they have no opinion of the Tea Party has steady declined 
since polls began. To summarize, familiarity tends to breed contempt when it comes to 
public support for the Tea Party. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 This chapter has examined public support for the Tea Party, taking advantage of 
consistent polling regarding the Tea Party over the years. In doing so, this analysis has 
incorporated over 250 survey items taken from more than 20 different polling 
organizations. Drawing from this extensive aggregation of polling data, four important 
findings have been yielded. These findings are worth revisiting.  
 First, the findings of this chapter support the hypothesis proposed in Chapter 1. 
Specifically, Chapter 1 began with the hypothesis that:  
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 Hypothesis 7: Support for the Tea Party will decline from 2010 to 2011. 
This chapter has shown that after controlling for the manner in which questions are 
worded, substantial evidence is found for a decline in support for the Tea Party. Whether 
measured by simple support or simple favorable opinions, or in the intensity of support or 
favorability, the Tea Party has seen its image in the eyes of the American public decline. 
Moreover, this decline has been most precipitous among those expressing very strong 
support or very favorable evaluations, indicating a substantial drop in the Tea Party base. 
Given the attention paid to the various factors known to influence survey responses, these 
findings cannot be ignored.  
 The decline in Tea Party support observed in this chapter may be the result of 
political and economic changes. For instance, one explanation could be that over time the 
number of political independents and Democrats expressing support for the Tea Party 
declined. Specifically, as the Tea Party became increasingly associated with Republican 
politicians, such as former Governor of Alaska Sarah Palin, support among non-
Republican identifiers declined. Another explanation could be that as the economy 
improved from 2010 through 2011 those who sympathized with the Tea Party because of 
economic concerns began to relinquish their support. While these theories are not tested 
in this chapter, they do lend themselves to further examination in future research. 
 Second, the results from this analysis also make it clear that the number of 
individuals who indicate that they don’t know or have no opinion of the Tea Party has 
declined. Such decline is expected, given increased media attention, but it also shows that 
the American public has become increasingly aware of the Tea Party. Given that public 
support and favorability has also been on the decline, it is not too far of a leap to infer 
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that as the public has become more aware of the Tea Party, it has expressed less support 
for it. As such, the public has begun to identify the Tea Party with particular events, 
issues, and candidates. The result of this is that the enigmatic appeal of the Tea Party that 
initially attracted broader support has now largely vanished.  
 The findings of a decline in support for the Tea Party also expose a potential 
danger for the Republican Party. If the Republican Party becomes increasingly linked to 
support for the Tea Party, then the GOP may also see its image decline among the 
American public. This presents a conundrum as the Tea Party represents a major 
component of the GOP’s activist base (as Chapter 3 demonstrated). At the same time, the 
Tea Party also poses a significant danger for the Republican Party as support for the Tea 
Party has peaked and, through the progression of time, steadily eroded. 
 Third, this analysis has shown that the manner in which questions are asked plays 
a significant role in the degree of support for the Tea Party. Depending on the options 
given to a respondent, the levels of support or favorability can vary dramatically. On 
average, asking respondents whether they support the Tea Party and allowing for an 
option that indicates the intensity of that support yields an additional 8 percentage points 
in support for the Tea Party, as compared to those survey questions that simply give 
respondents the option of support or oppose. Moreover, the same effect is found for the 
favorability questions. Simply asking respondents whether they have a favorable or 
unfavorable opinion of the Tea Party, without allowing an option for intensity of 
favorability, generates favorability ratings that are 5 percentage points lower for the Tea 
Party on average.  
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 Aside from the different types of questions that measure intensity of support and 
those that measure a direction of support, this analysis has also taken notice of the 
significant influence that question branching can have on public opinions. Reexamining 
Table 4.5, it is apparent that question designs that include a branching format produce 
significantly different responses than those that do not. In fact, questions that did not 
include branching resulted in a significantly higher level of support (around 3 percentage 
points) than those that did not.  
 In should also be noted that the vast majority of polling organizations did not use 
branching questions to measure Tea Party support (as evidence by polls gathered in this 
analysis). Given that studies have shown that branching questions increase the validity of 
public opinion measures (Krosnick & Berent, 1993), it is likely that the predicted support 
for the Tea Party reported in this analysis would have been lower had all organizations 
utilized a form of question branching.   
 What these findings suggest is that measuring support or favorability for a 
particular group, issue, party, or politician can be a tricky proposition. Questions that 
seemingly set out to measure the same type of opinions can generate substantially 
different results. Special care should not only be taken in how questions are asked, but 
how the results are reported. When surveyors ask about the intensity of support and 
report the results as either support or opposition, they are ignoring the influence that 
question options can have on public opinion. In summary, if one finding is to be taken 
from this chapter, it is that branching and question wording matter. 
 Finally, what this chapter has shown is that the intensity in support, or 
favorability, towards the Tea Party has gradually subsided. Whether measured by 
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strongly support or strongly favorable, the intensity of support for the Tea Party has been 
declining. The ramifications for Tea Party supporters, organizers, and leaders are 
potentially troubling. Specifically, given that some scholars have suggested that the 
excitement generated by the Tea Party contributed to increased turnout in the 2010 
midterm elections (Carson & Pettigrew, 2011; Jacobson, 2011a, 2011b), it is interesting 
to note that the decline in support or favorability has occurred even among the most 
intense supporters. This finding holds true even after controlling for numerous factors 
providing significant evidence that Tea Party support, and the intensity of that support, 
has been on the decline.73 If mobilizing supporters to turnout and support the Tea Party’s 
core issues is vital to its continued influence and relevancy, doing so may be substantially 
more difficult than what has been seen in times past. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
73 The findings of a decline in support among the most ardent Tea Party supporters, is also consistent with news reports 
and research on the decline of local Tea Party groups. Specifically, these reports indicate that the number of local Tea 
Party groups, across the country, has declined from 2010 to 2012  (Arrillaga, 2012). 
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Table 4.1: Two-Sample t test of Question Wording and Percent Supporting the Tea 
Party74Data collected from 2011 Tea Party support dataset 
 
 
Group    Observations  Mean  Std. Error       Std.Dev 
 
 
Simple Support Question  89  26.29  .57  5.40 
 
Intensity Support Question  83  34.31  .48  4.27 
 
Combined    172  30.16  .48  6.31 
 
Difference      -8.02  .75 
 
 
t = -10.66                   p<.001* 
*Two-tailed test of significance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
74 For the intensity support and the intensity favorable questions, the strongly support or very favorable and the 
somewhat support or somewhat favorable categories were combined into either support or favorable to get a measure of 
overall support/favorability for the two-sample t tests. 
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Table 4.2: Two-Sample t test of Question Wording and Percent with a Favorable 
Opinion of the Tea Party.  Data collected from 2011 Tea Party favorability dataset 
 
 
Group    Observations  Mean  Std. Error      Std.Dev 
 
 
Simple Favorable Question  43  30.93  1.07  6.99  
 
Intensity Favorable Question  41  35.90  .66  4.24 
  
Combined    84  33.36  .69  6.30 
    
Difference      -4.97  1.27   
      
 
t = -3.92                   p<.001* 
*Two-tailed test of significance 
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Table 4.3: Two-Sample t test of Question Wording and Percent Indicating Unfavorable 
Responses. Data collected from 2011 Tea Party support dataset 
 
 
Group    Observations  Mean  Std. Error       Std.Dev 
 
 
Simple Favorable Question  43  35.02  1.62  10.62  
 
Intensity Favorable Question  41  44.37  1.45  9.28 
  
Combined    84  39.58  1.20  10.98 
    
Difference      -9.34  2.18   
      
 
t = -4.29                   p<.001* 
*Two-tailed test of significance 
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Table 4.4: Two-Sample t test of Question Wording and Percent with No Opinion of the 
Tea Party Favorability Questions. Data collected from 2011 Tea Party support dataset 
 
 
Group    Observations  Mean  Std. Error       Std.Dev 
 
 
Simple Favorable Question  43  34.56  2.38  15.58  
 
Intensity Favorable Question  4075  19.53  1.22  7.10  
 
Combined    83  27.31  1.57  14.33 
   
Difference      15.03  2.69   
      
 
t = 5.59          p<.001 
**Two-tailed test of significance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
75 One case was excluded because it asked only respondents who were aware of the Tea Party and did not give a don’t 
know option. 
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Table 4.5: Two-Sample t test of the influence of Branching on Percent Supporting the 
Tea Party.76 Data collected from 2011 Tea Party support dataset 
 
 
Group    Observations     Mean  Std. Error       Std.Dev 
 
 
Intensity Question   54  35.24  .55  4.06  
No Branching          
 
Intensity Question    29  32.59  .78  4.18 
With Branching           
 
Combined    83  34.31  .47  4.27 
           
Difference      2.65  .94   
             
 
t = 2.81         p<.05** 
**Two-tailed test of significance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
76 Note: This table is only comparing questions that measure the intensity of support for the Tea Party. 
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Figure 4.1: Support for Tea Party over Time using the Simple Support Question 
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Figure 4.2: Support for Tea Party over Time using the Strongly Support Response 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 1 1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 2 
2 
2 
2 
2 2 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5
5 
5 
7 
7 
8 8 
8 8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
9 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
13 
13 
13 13 
13 
14 
17 
5 
10 
15 
2
0 
2
5 
Jan. 2010 July 2010 Jan. 2011 July 2011 Jan.2012 
 
Strongly Support Predicted Strongly Support 
 
186 
 
Figure 4.3: Predicted Support for the Tea Party using the Simple Support Question 
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Figure 4.4: Predicted Share of the Public Strongly Supporting the Tea Party 
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Figure 4.5: Favorable Opinions of the Tea Party using the Simple Favorability Question 
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Figure 4.6: Favorable Opinions of Tea Party using Very/Strongly Favorable Response  
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Figure 4.7: Predicted Share of the Public with a Favorable Opinion of the Tea Party 
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Figure 4.8: Predicted Share of the Public with a Strongly Favorable Opinion of Tea Party 
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Figure 4.9: Predicted Share of the Public with No Opinion of the Tea Party using the 
Simple Support Question 
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Figure 4.10: Predicted Share of the Public with No Opinion of the Tea Party using the 
Strongly Support Question 
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Figure 4.11: Predicted Share of the Public with No Opinion of the Tea Party using the 
Simple Favorability Question 
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Figure 4.12: Predicted Share of the Public with No Opinion of the Tea Party using the 
Strongly Favorable Question 
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Appendix 
Survey Organizations 
 
Support Dataset 
 
1 Marist Institute for Public Opinion 
2 ABC News/ Washington Post 
3 American Lung Association 
4 Associated Press/ GfK 
5 Bloomberg 
6 CBS News/New York Times Poll 
7 CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll 
8 Democracy Corps 
9 Democracy Corps 2 (Created because had another poll on same day) 
10 Economist/ YouGov  
11 Gallup Poll  
12 Gallup Poll 2 (Created because had another poll on same day) 
13 Harris Poll 
14 Harvard University 
15 NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll 
16 Newsweek   
17 Princeton Survey Research Associates International 
 
Favorability Dataset 
 
1 ABC News/Washington Post 
2 Associated Press/Gfk 
3 Bloomberg 
4 CBS News/New York Times 
5 CNN/Opinion Research Corporation 
6 Economist/YouGov 
7 Fox News/Opinion Dynamics 
8 Gallup 
9 George Washington University 
10 News Models National Brand 
11 Pew Research Center for the People/ the Press 
12 Politico/George Washington University 
13 Princeton Survey Research Associates 
14 Quinnipiac University 
15 Rasmussen 
16 Resurgent Republic 
17 Time/Abt SRBI 
18 Washington Post 
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Table 4.6: Predicted Support for the Tea Party using Simple Support Question 
  
Polling Organizations    
  
Associated Press/ GfK 0.208 
 (3.04) 
CBS News/New York Times Poll -5.695 
 (2.93) 
CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll -3.978 
 (3.62) 
Gallup Poll -2.087 
 (3.40) 
Gallup Poll 2 -4.764 
 (4.45) 
Harvard University -3.039 
 (3.87) 
NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll -1.584 
 (2.97) 
Newsweek -9.575** 
 (3.61) 
Princeton Survey Research Associates International -3.825 
(2.93) 
Day Variable 1.445*** 
 (0.42) 
Day Variable Squared -0.000*** 
 (0.00) 
Middle Category Dummy 0.910 
 (2.10) 
Registered Voter Dummy 0.525 
 (1.32) 
  
R-Square    0.511 
  
Number of Observations 87 
Note: Data are ordinary least squares coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.        
Note: Branching and Method dummies omitted because of collinearity. 
Note: Two cases were excluded because they samples only Republicans. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4.7: Predicted Strong Support for the Tea Party using Intensity of Support Question 
  
Polling Organizations   
  
ABC News/ Washington Post 3.368 
 (1.99) 
American Lung Association 11.441*** 
 (2.25) 
Associated Press/ GfK 1.483 
 (1.47) 
Bloomberg -1.803 
 (1.43) 
CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll -4.041 
 (2.46) 
Democracy Corps 12.086*** 
 (1.26) 
Democracy Corps 2 11.997*** 
 (2.25) 
Economist/ YouGov 10.283** 
 (3.80) 
Harris Poll 0.999 
 (2.00) 
Harvard University 4.419 
 (2.90) 
Princeton Survey Research Associates International 2.450 
 (2.62) 
Day Variable -0.962** 
 (0.31) 
Day Variable Squared 0.000** 
 (0.00) 
Middle Category Dummy -2.766 
 (2.32) 
Branching Dummy -1.443 
 (1.82) 
Registered Voter Dummy -1.804 
 (1.20) 
R-Square          0.869 
Number of Observations         83 
Note: Data are ordinary least squares coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.        
Note: Method Dummy omitted because of collinearity. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4.8: Predicted Favorability for the Tea Party using Simple Favorability Question 
   
Polling Organizations   
          
CNN/Opinion Research Corporation 13.305*** 
 (1.11) 
Fox News/Opinion Dynamics 15.735*** 
 (2.12) 
Gallup 14.491*** 
 (1.51) 
News Models National Brand 24.555*** 
 (3.36) 
Quinnipiac University 12.027*** 
 (2.17) 
Rasmussen 22.495*** 
 (3.43) 
Registered Voter Dummy -2.414 
 (2.01) 
Day Variable 1.227** 
 (0.43) 
Day Variable Squared -0.000** 
 (0.00) 
Middle Category Dummy -0.802 
 (2.72) 
  
R-Square                          0.897 
Number of Observations                         43 
Note: Data are ordinary least squares coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.        
Note: Method and Branching Dummy omitted because of collinearity. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4.9: Predicted Strong/Very Favorable Opinion of the Tea Party using Intensity in 
Favorability Question 
   
Polling Organizations     
  
Associated Press/Gfk -2.221** 
 (0.79) 
Bloomberg -2.835** 
 (0.92) 
Economist/YouGov 2.696*** 
 (0.70) 
George Washington University 2.114 
 (1.95) 
Pew Research Center for the People/ the Press -10.411*** 
 (1.44) 
Politico/George Washington University 4.415* 
 (1.74) 
Princeton Survey Research Associates -3.051 
 (1.80) 
Resurgent Republic -0.332 
 (1.82) 
Time/Abt SRBI -5.959** 
 (2.03) 
Washington Post 1.464 
 (1.39) 
Registered Voter Dummy 2.591 
 (1.38) 
Day Variable -0.595 
 (0.38) 
Day Variable Squared 0.000 
 (0.00)     . 
  
R-Square                         0.934 
  
Number of Observations                     41 
Note: Data are ordinary least squares coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.        
Note: Method, Branching, and Middle Category Dummies omitted because of collinearity. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4.10: Predicted No Opinion of the Tea Party using Simple Support Question 
 
Polling Organizations   
          
Associated Press/ GfK -8.610 
 (4.75) 
CBS News/New York Times Poll 1.018 
 (4.58) 
CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll -8.649 
 (5.76) 
Gallup Poll -5.289 
 (5.44) 
Gallup Poll 2 -0.310 
 (7.11) 
Harvard University 4.861 
 (6.16) 
NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll -1.872 
 (4.61) 
Newsweek 10.644 
 (5.60) 
Princeton Survey Research Associates International -3.289 
 (4.58) 
Logarithm of Date -256.319*** 
 (59.90) 
Middle Category Dummy -0.912 
 (3.31) 
                .  
Registered Voter Dummy 0.894 
 (2.11) 
  
R-Square                    0.593 
  
Number of Observations                  87 
Note: Data are ordinary least squares coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.   
Note: Method and Branching dummies omitted because of collinearity. 
Note: Gallup Poll 2 created because organization had another poll on same day.      
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
202 
 
Table 4.11: Predicted No Opinion of the Tea Party using Intensity in Support Question 
  
Polling Organizations    
  
ABC News/ Washington Post 4.343 
 (3.59) 
American Lung Association -0.931 
 (4.07) 
Associated Press/ GfK -2.218 
 (2.67) 
Bloomberg 0.171 
 (2.61) 
CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll 35.552*** 
 (4.04) 
Democracy Corps -1.216 
 (2.31) 
Democracy Corps 2 -3.690 
 (4.09) 
Economist/ YouGov 15.831* 
 (6.90) 
Harris Poll 13.159*** 
 (3.54) 
Harvard University 9.013 
 (5.29) 
Princeton Survey Research Associates International 14.379** 
 (4.70) 
Logarithm of Date -137.195** 
 (48.74) 
Middle Category Dummy -10.584* 
 (4.24) 
Branching 1.129 
 (3.31) 
Registered Voters Dummy 2.348 
 (2.16) 
R-Square                             0.822 
Number of Observations                            83 
Note: Data are ordinary least squares coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.   
Note: Method dummy omitted because of collinearity     
Note: Democracy Corps 2 created because organization had another poll on same day. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4.12: Predicted No Opinion of the Tea Party using Simple Favorability Question 
  
Polling Organizations   
        .  
CNN/Opinion Research Corporation -27.372*** 
 (2.47) 
Fox News/Opinion Dynamics -25.870*** 
 (4.72) 
Gallup -33.505*** 
 (3.35) 
News Models National Brand -40.716*** 
 (7.48) 
Quinnipiac University -16.158** 
 (4.78) 
Rasmussen -28.717*** 
 (7.44) 
Registered Voters Dummy -2.028 
 (4.46) 
Logarithm of Date -552.377*** 
 (85.29) 
Middle Category Dummy 1.154 
 (6.06) 
  
R-Square                    0.893 
Number of Observations                      43 
Note: Data are ordinary least squares coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.   
Note: Method and Branching dummy omitted because of collinearity         
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4.13: Predicted No Opinion of the Tea Party using Intensity in Favorability Question 
  
Polling Organizations    
        .  
Associated Press/Gfk -10.055*** 
 (1.98) 
Bloomberg 8.412** 
 (2.34) 
Economist/YouGov 5.576** 
 (1.77) 
George Washington University 17.623** 
 (4.86) 
Pew Research Center for the People/ the Press -1.624 
 (3.56) 
Politico/George Washington University 12.536** 
 (4.41) 
Princeton Survey Research Associates 9.825* 
 (4.09) 
Resurgent Republic 14.400** 
 (4.47) 
Time/Abt SRBI 30.746*** 
 (4.25) 
Washington Post 0.231 
 (3.50) 
Registered Voters Dummy -7.147* 
 (3.45) 
Logarithm of Date -347.908** 
 (106.11) 
  
R-Square                       0.871 
Number of Observations                       40 
Note: Data are ordinary least squares coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
Note: Method, Middle Category, and Branching dummy omitted because of collinearity     
Nope: One observations was not included because it do not offer a don’t know option.      
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Chapter 5: Implications of the Tea Party for American politics 
 What does mass support for the Tea Party mean for American politics? The 
preceding chapters have demonstrated that Tea Party supporters represent an active and 
ideologically conservative element of the Republican Party base. As such, the emergence 
of the Tea Party has been an important development for the Republican Party helping to 
catapult the GOP back into the majority of the U.S. House of Representatives in 2010 
(Jacobson, 2011a, 2011b).  In one sense, the Tea Party has helped to revitalize and 
rebrand a Republican Party whose image had been damaged by the unpopular policies 
pursued by the George W. Bush Administration; contributing to large GOP loses in the 
2006 and 2008 national elections.77 
 On the other hand, this dissertation has exposed some potential weaknesses of Tea 
Party support. For instance, Chapter 4 demonstrated that support for the Tea Party has 
peaked and steadily declined since the fall of 2010. Furthermore, as the public has 
become increasingly aware of the Tea Party, it has expressed lower levels of support; 
suggesting that a large rebound in support is unlikely. In addition, Chapter 3 found that 
Tea Party supporters differ from third party supporters and do not represent a new 
constituency that can be folded into the GOP to increase its base of supporters (see 
Chapter 2). The previous chapters have also demonstrated that Tea Party supporters are 
more ideologically conservative than other Republicans and harbor conservative views on 
many issues that place them at significant odds with the American electorate as a whole. 
In short, while the Tea Party has energized the Republican Party base, it also presents a 
problem for the GOP, as it attempts to expand its base of support. 
                                                
77  In the lead up to the 2010 midterm elections, Nate Silver noted that “In some ways, the Tea Party represents an end-
around for Republicans -– it may help to facilitate large electoral gains for them in November in spite of a party brand 
which is badly damaged” (Silver, 2010). 
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   The findings of this dissertation indicate that Tea Party supporters represent a 
double-edged sword for the GOP as they are both a source of strength and potential 
weakness. This chapter will explore these themes in greater detail, while also revisiting 
some of the main findings of the preceding chapters. This chapter will proceed as 
follows. It will begin with a discussion of the main findings of each chapter as the 
hypotheses posed in Chapter 1 are revisited in the order of their appearance. As the 
findings of each chapter are discussed, specific attention is paid to their implications for 
American politics. Finally, this chapter will close with a discussion of the current state of 
the Tea Party and its future prospects as an enduring political force. 
Chapter 2 and 3 Reviews and Key Findings 
 Chapter 2 explored the relationship between Tea Party and third party supporters. 
Specifically, it examined the following hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis 1: Tea Party support is predicted by Republican Party identification  
   and conservative ideology. 
 
 Hypothesis 2: Tea Party support is not predicted by dissatisfaction with both  
   parties.  
 
The findings of Chapter 2 support the assertions presented in Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2, as Tea Party support was predicted by both Republican Party identification 
and conservative ideology and not by dissatisfaction with both parties. Chapter 2 found 
that Tea Party supporters are ideologically conservative Republicans, while third party 
supporters were shown to be political independents that express higher levels of 
dissatisfaction with the major parties. These findings contrast with claims that Tea Party 
supporters are “avowedly nonpartisan” (Rasmussen & Schoen, 2010, p.8). In addition, 
the findings of Chapter 2 suggest that Tea Party supporters are unlike past third party 
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supporters and represent a constituency already within the Republican Party. In short, the 
Republican Party cannot count on the Tea Party to expand its party base.  
 Chapter 3 examined the attitudinal predictors of Tea Party support. A major 
contribution of Chapter 3 was to control for many of the competing explanations of Tea 
Party support, while also assessing the relative size of their impact on Tea Party support. 
The goal of this chapter was to sort through common characterizations of the Tea Party to 
uncover the core motivations of supporters. In doing so, the following hypotheses were 
tested: 
 Hypothesis 3:  Tea Party support is predicted by racial resentment. 
 
 Hypothesis 4: Tea Party support is predicted by traditional moral values. 
 
 Hypothesis 5: Tea Party support is predicted by libertarian traditional free- 
   market conservative viewpoints. 
 
 Hypothesis 6: Tea Party support is predicted by feelings of fear and anger  
   concerning the state of the country. 
 
The evidence presented in Chapter 3 supports each hypothesis as Tea Party support is 
predicted by racial resentment, traditional moral values, and libertarian traditional free-
market conservative viewpoints. Specifically, higher levels of racial resentment, support 
for traditional moral values, and adherence to libertarian traditional free-market 
conservative viewpoints motivate support for the Tea Party. In addition, a unique 
contribution of this chapter was to examine the emotional component of Tea Party 
support finding evidence that supporters are motivated by feelings of fear and anger 
concerning the state of the country. 
 While the findings related to racial resentment are consistent with previous 
research (Abramowitz, 2012), they also confirm claims that Tea Party supporters are 
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motivated by social conservatism (Brody, 2012), libertarian world views (Perrin, Tepper, 
Caren, & Morris, 2011), as well as fear and anger (Skocpol & Williamson, 2012).  There 
is also evidence that Tea Party supporters are motivated by negative feelings towards 
immigrants (see Table 3.3) consistent with the work of Baretto, Cooper, Gonzalez, 
Parker, and Towler (2011), animosity towards President Obama, consistent with 
Abramowitz (2012), as well as conservative ideology and Republican Party 
identification, consistent with the work of Abramowitz (2012) as well as Deckman 
(2012), among others. 
 The findings of Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate that the primary motivator of Tea 
Party support is conservative ideology. This finding is echoed by the previous work of 
Skocpol and Williamson (2012) who contend that Tea Party supporters are “best 
understood as conservatives” (Skocpol & Williamson, 2012, p.32). Moreover, the 
findings of this dissertation are also consistent with characterizations of the Tea Party as 
the polarized component of the Republican Party base (Abramowitz, 2012).   
 Chapter 3 also found that Tea Party supporters embody full-throttled support for 
all of the GOP’s major policy platform and grievances. Evidence is presented that support 
or opposition to the Tea Party represents a dividing line between the moderate and 
extreme elements of the Republican Party. Tea Party supporters were consistently shown 
to express conservative viewpoints that placed them at odds with the American public as 
well as ordinary Republican Party identifiers. Chapters 2 and 3 also found that compared 
to other Republican Party identifiers who did not support the Tea Party, as well as the 
American electorate as a whole, Tea Party supporters were much more likely to view 
President Obama and the Democratic Party in ideologically extreme terms. Tea Party 
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supporters were also more likely to express negative opinions of the president and the 
Democratic Party. Again, these findings are consistent with the contention that Tea Party 
supporters represent the polarized component of the Republican Party base (Abramowitz, 
2012).  
 The findings of Chapters 2 and 3 also helped to dispel popular explanations of 
Tea Party support. For instance, despite the assertions made by Tea Party leaders Dick 
Armey and Matt Kibbe (2010), the Tea Party is more than a group of Americans 
primarily focused on fiscal conservatives and small government libertarians. While there 
is a certainly an segment of Tea Party supporters who support libertarian small 
government philosophies, the Tea Party is also motivated by social issues and traditional 
moral values.  These two viewpoints appear to clash as in Chapter 3 Tea Party supporters 
were shown to express contradictory opinions concerning the role of government.  
 For instance, in 2012, over 70 percent of Tea Party supporters were in favor of 
basing American laws on Christian values (Table 3.2) and less than one-fifth of 
supporters opposed the Federal Intelligence and Security Act which allows the 
government to eavesdrop on suspected terrorist suspects without first obtaining a court 
order (Table 3.1). At the same time, a majority of Tea Party supporters also state that the 
government should be doing less and believe that little to no government regulation of 
business is good for society (Table 3.2). Thus, Tea Party supporters express support for a 
unique form of libertarianism, and the role of government, that stresses opposition to 
business regulation, but support for government promotion of religion. 
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Chapter 4 Review and Key Findings 
 An additional goal of this dissertation was to observe changes in opinions 
concerning the Tea Party over time. To do so, Chapter 4 analyzed a collection of polling 
data sources centered on testing the following hypothesis regarding Tea Party support:  
 Hypothesis 7: Support for the Tea Party will decline from 2010 to 2011. 
Using a carefully constructed measure of Tea Party support, evidence was found that 
support for the Tea Party has declined from 2010 to 2011. Specifically, Tea Party support 
reached its high point of support in November of 2010 and has declined steadily ever 
since. In addition, Chapter 4 demonstrated that support for the Tea Party has also 
declined among its most ardent supporters. This finding is of added importance given that 
strong supporters are more than likely the individuals who are politically active. While 
Tea Party supporters remain more active than average Republicans, the decline in strong 
support suggests that Tea Party activism has diminished somewhat since 2010. Chapter 4 
also demonstrated that increased awareness of the Tea Party has also coincided with a 
decline in levels of support, suggesting that it will be difficult for the Tea Party to regain 
past levels of support as time progresses.  
 Another important finding of Chapter 4 relates to survey question wording and 
branching. Chapter 4 demonstrated that depending on the options given to a respondent, 
the levels of support or favorability towards the Tea Party varied dramatically. These 
findings suggest that measuring support or favorability for a particular group, issue, 
party, or politician must be done carefully. These findings also have implications for 
public opinion research that goes beyond an understanding of the Tea Party. Specifically, 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that branching and question wording can change survey 
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responses in sometimes unexpected ways and that careful attention must be paid to how 
survey questions and responses are worded. 
A Rift within the Republican Party 
 The emergence of the Tea Party has created a rift within the Republican Party 
between moderate members and ideological purists. This rift has been exposed by 
publicized battles between the Republican Party establishment and Tea Party supporters 
in nomination contests. It has also been revealed in the public criticisms of the Tea Party 
by GOP elites.  
  The 2010 midterm elections resulted in some of the largest gains that either party 
had made seen since the 1940s with the Republican Party gaining 63 seats in the United 
States House of Representatives (Barone & McCutcheon, 2011). These gains were made 
in large measure with the aid of Tea Party supporters who helped to mobilize the party 
base (Jacobson, 2011a, 2011b). However, in 2010 and 2012, the Tea Party also 
contributed to the nomination of candidates not supported by the Republican Party 
establishment who went on to lose key general election races in Delaware, Nevada, 
Indiana, Missouri, and Colorado which arguably cost the Republican Party majority 
control of the United States Senate in 2013 (Zelizer, 2012).78  In short, while the Tea 
Party had a positive impact on turnout in the 2010 midterm elections, it also had a 
negative impact on the Republican Parry’s ability to gain a majority in the U.S. Senate in 
2010 and 2012.  
                                                
78 Recent research supports the assertion that the Tea Party played an important role in the 2010 Republican primaries. 
Specifically, Karpowitz, Monson, Patterson, and Pope (2011) found that Republican candidates who proclaimed 
support for the Tea Party, or received the endorsement from a Tea Party group, increased their vote share by as much as 
20 percentage points in the 2010 Republican primaries (p.306). 
212 
 
 In 2010 and 2012, Tea Party supporters helped to defeat several ideologically 
moderate candidates, supported by the Republican establishment; in favor of more 
conservative Tea Party candidates.79 The clash between the Republican Party 
establishment and Tea Party supporters has exposed a rift within the Republican Party 
described by some columnists as a “civil war between establishment Republicans and Tea 
Party supporters” pitting interest groups sympathetic to the Republican Party 
establishment against Tea Party activists in a battle over the candidates nominated in 
Republican Party primaries (Blow, 2013).  
  For instance, former George W. Bush strategist Karl Rove and the political action 
committee that he helped to form, American Crossroads, were often at odds with Tea 
Party activists over the candidates nominated in Republican Party primaries (Lapidos, 
2013). This war within the Republican Party has also been noted by conservative news 
websites such as Breitbart.com, reflected in headlines such as “Rove Declares War on 
Tea Party” (Shapiro, 2013).  By 2013, the war within the Republican Party had escalated 
as The New York Times reported on the founding of the Conservative Victory Project, 
described as a “new group to recruit seasoned candidates and protect Senate incumbents 
from challenges by far-right conservatives and Tea Party enthusiasts” and “intended to 
counter other organizations that have helped defeat establishment Republican candidates 
over the last two election cycles” (Zeleny, 2013).  
 Overall, the emergence of the Tea Party has lead to a battle within the Republican 
Party that has played out in nomination contests across the country as Tea Party 
supporters have often opposed the nomination of moderate Republican candidates. 
                                                
79 For instance, in U.S. Senate Republican primary contests in 2010, Christine O’Donnell defeated moderate Mike 
Castle in Delaware, in Nevada Sharon Angle defeated Sue Lowden and Danny Tarkanian, and in Alaska Joe Miller 
defeated Lisa Murkowski (Silver, 2010). 
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Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated that Tea Party supporters hold opinions to the right of 
ordinary Republicans and that Tea Party supporters are much more politically active than 
average Republican voters. The Tea Party has likely pushed Republican legislators in 
Congress and the states to the right as GOP incumbents must be more concerned about a 
primary challenge from the right if they alienate Tea Party members. Thus, it is not 
surprising that the Tea Party has created a rift within the Republican Party as supporters 
attempt to move the GOP further to the right.      
Criticism of the Tea Party by Moderate Republican Elites 
 The divide within the Republican Party has also been made apparent by the 
remarks of party elites. In the summer of 2010, former speechwriter for George W. Bush 
David Frum penned a column warning the Republican Party about the dangers posed by 
the Tea Party entitling his column “The Tea Party is a Turn-Off for US Moderates” 
(Frum, 2010). In his column, Frum warned the Republican Party that a close association 
with the Tea Party ran the risk of alienating moderate voters.  
 In May of 2013, former Republican presidential nominee and Senate majority 
leader Bob Dole commented that the modern day GOP had reached a point that neither 
former President Ronald Reagan nor Richard Nixon would be welcomed in today’s 
Republican Party (Good, 2013). Dole’s comments were made in reference to the 
Republican Party’s recent ideological shift to the right, evidenced by the defeat of 
moderate Republicans in GOP nomination contests in 2010 and 2012 (Berman, 2013; 
Good, 2013).  
 Overall, these statements reflect growing tensions between moderate members of 
the Republican Party establishment and more ideologically conservative Tea Party 
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supporters. These developments have important ramifications for American politics as 
they signal a shift in the ideological direction of the Republican Party as moderate 
members of the GOP find it difficult to win their party’s nomination. 
The Tea Party, Public Policy, and Opposition to Compromise 
 The Tea Party has also influenced the policies pursued and votes cast by 
Republican lawmakers (Bailey, Mummolo, & Noel, 2012). Tea Party opposition to the 
Affordable Care Act has led the Republican controlled U.S. House to vote over 30 times 
to repeal the legislation (O’Keefe & Kane, 2013). These votes have occurred despite little 
possibility that these measures would pass the United States Senate or be signed into law 
by President Obama. Republican Speaker of the U.S. House John Boehner has had 
widely publicized differences with Tea Party members within the House (Johnson, 2013). 
These differences occasionally have led to the defeat of legislation in the House publicly 
supported by the speaker, as members of the House Tea Party Caucus would not lend 
their support (Terbush, 2013). The inability of the Republican Speaker of the House John 
Boehner to pass compromise legislation poses serious problems for meaningful policy 
reform in the United States. 
 The 2011 debate over whether to raise the nation’s debt ceiling magnifies the 
influence that the Tea Party has had on policy making in the United States. In the summer 
of 2011, Tea Party activists were instrumental in leading many Republican lawmakers to 
vote against a measure to raise the national debt ceiling.  The failure to raise the ceiling 
would have resulted in the federal government defaulting on its loan obligations (Bailey, 
Mummolo, & Noel, 2012). 
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  Although the national debt ceiling had been raised several times prior with little 
controversy, Tea Party supporters opposed an increase due to concerns over increased 
spending and borrowing (Balkin, 2012).  The president and Congress ultimately agreed to 
a compromise measure to raise the debt limit signed by the president on August 2, 2011. 
However, the United States saw its credit rating downgraded and a marked decline in the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average (Balkin, 2012).  Despite winning bi-partisan congressional 
approval, the compromise measure was opposed by Tea Party leader and founder of the 
House Tea Party Caucus Representative Michelle Bachmann as well as many other 
freshman Republicans associated with the Tea Party (Isenstadt, 2011).   
 The events of the summer of 2011 symbolize the implications of the Tea Party for 
American politics. Specifically, Tea Party supporters limit the ability of Republican 
elected leaders to compromise with the Democratic Party. Tea Party supporters within 
Congress have come to be characterized by their aversion to compromise (Arrillaga, 
2012) and many Republican elected officials face the threat of a primary challenge if they 
support compromise legislation that is opposed by the Tea Party (Altman, 2010; Kellman, 
2011).80 This is not surprising given that many grassroots Tea Party supporters also 
express opposition to compromise. 
 For instance, Table 5.1 presents EGSS survey data from February 2012 that asks 
respondents about their views on compromise. Specifically, respondents were asked if 
they preferred a U.S. President or a representative in the U.S. Congress “who 
compromises to get things done, or who sticks to his or her principles no matter what?”  
                                                
80  In 2011, long time Michigan Senator Carl Levin (D) voiced concerns over the current state of congressional 
policymaking and the inability of legislators to compromise. Levin blamed the Tea Party and its supporters within the 
U.S. Congress for inhibiting legislative compromise, noting that “compromise is fundamental to representative 
government, because that government exists to balance the varying needs and desires of a large and diverse nation,” 
Levin said. "If we can’t compromise, the system just won’t work” (Cwiek, 2011).  
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Compared to Republican non-Tea Party supporters, Tea Party supporters were more 
likely to state that they preferred a president as well as a congressional representative 
who stuck to their principles rather than compromised. Among Tea Party supporters, 51 
percent stated that they preferred a representative in the U.S. Congress who sticks to her 
principles no matter what, compared to 40 percent of Republican non-Tea Party 
supporters and 33 percent of the public.   
 Moreover, respondents were also asked a more abstract question about 
compromise. The survey question asked respondents if they would “prefer to live in a 
place where most people have the same opinions you have about politics or, in a place 
where people have lots of different opinions about politics, or do you have no preference 
at all?” Accenting their aversion to compromise, Tea Party supporters were twice as a 
likely as non-Tea Party supporters to state that they would prefer to live in a place where 
most people had the same opinions. At the grassroots level, Tea Party supporters value 
principle over compromise and uniformity of opinion over diversity in political 
viewpoints.  
  These findings highlight an important ramification for American democracy and 
the ability of government to pass legislation. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, Tea Party 
supporters are more politically active and knowledgeable than the American public as 
well as other Republicans. As such, Tea Party supporters are more likely to hold GOP 
legislators accountable for their actions. Given that Tea Party supporters are more likely 
than other Republicans and the public to oppose compromise from elected leaders, the 
Tea Party represents a powerful pressure on the Republican Party that will likely inhibit 
compromise and contribute to further legislative gridlock. 
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 [Insert Table 5.1] 
The Tea Party and Ideological Polarization 
 As mentioned previously, the findings of this dissertation are consistent with the 
work of Abramowitz (2012) who frames the Tea Party as a product of long-term trends in 
partisan polarization. The data presented in Chapters 2 and 3 indicates that Tea Party 
supporters hold political views that are inconsistent with the views of the American 
public as well as other Republicans. Thus, it is not surprising that the Tea Party has 
supported candidates in Republican primaries who express very conservative viewpoints 
on issues of public policy.  
 As a consequence of the pressure that the Tea Party has put on the Republican 
Party in primaries, and on matters of compromise and public policy, it is possible that the 
Tea Party has also contributed to an increase in the level of ideological polarization 
witnessed in the U.S. Congress. For instance, recent research suggests that the 112th 
Congress (served form 2011-2012), was the most ideologically polarized (the ideological 
distance between the two parties) in history (Matthews, 2013).81  Although the 
polarization levels of the 112th Congress are a continuation of recent trends, making it 
difficult to place recent changes solely on the Tea Party, it is logical to assume that the 
emergence of Tea Party will make a reversal of these trends unlikely.      
The Tea Party, the 2012 Elections, and Beyond  
 Compared to the 2010 midterm elections, the 2012 presidential election outcomes 
served as a reversal of fortunes for the Tea Party as the Tea Party Caucus lost one-sixth 
of its supporters within the U.S. Congress (Gonyea, 2012; Parker, 2013; Parkinson, 2012; 
                                                
81 Ideological polarization is measured using DW-NOMINATE scores developed by Keith Poole and Howard 
Rosenthal (Matthews, 2013). 
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Reich, 2012).  Furthermore, in 2012, the Tea Party image was also harmed by high 
profile loses in U.S. Senate contests in Missouri and Indiana where Tea Party candidates 
lost general election races in states very favorable to Republican candidates (Jaffe, 
2012).82  Moreover, Tea Party supporters had difficulty unifying behind a Republican 
candidate for president and many supporters expressed little enthusiasm over the 
nomination of former Governor of Massachusetts Mitt Romney (Kirby & Ekins, 2012;  
Murphy, 2012). 
 In 2013, the Tea Party also faced major setbacks as the founders of both the 
Senate (Senator Jim DeMint co-founder) and House (Representative Michelle 
Bachmann) Tea Party Caucuses announced that they would be leaving Congress 
(Pryzbyla & Wallbank, 2013).83 The Tea Party has also faced problems at the grassroots 
organizational level as powerful Tea Party interest group FreedomWorks, which was 
instrumental in helping to organize early Tea Party protests and funding Tea Party 
candidates in Republican primaries, was plagued by controversy in late 2012. The former 
head of FreedomWorks Dick Armey was reportedly forced out of the group and, under 
the terms of the deal to leave the organization, Armey was awarded $8 million dollars 
(Walshe, 2012).84   
 In May of 2013, the Tea Party was thrust back into the spotlight when allegations 
emerged that the Internal Revenue Service had been unfairly targeting Tea Party groups 
for government scrutiny. The media coverage of the events and the unfair nature of the 
                                                
82 Todd Akin in Missouri and Richard Mourdock in Indiana were damaged by controversial statements made 
concerning the issue of rape. 
83 However, it is likely the that the loss of Michelle Bachmann may serve as a benefit for the Tea Party’s image; given 
allegations that Bachmann engaged in illegal campaign activity during her 2012 run for the presidency. 
84 The turmoil at FreedomWorks is of added importance given that recent scholarly research has found that the 
endorsement of FreedomWorks was correlated with higher vote shares for Republican candidates in the 2010 U.S. 
House elections and Republican primaries (Karpowitz, Monson, Patterson, & Pope, 2011)   
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government activities helped to improve the image of the Tea Party as polls indicated that 
support for the Tea Party had risen (Parker, 2013). Nevertheless, it is unlikely that this 
will lead to a meaningful rebound in long–term support for the Tea Party. The IRS 
scandal is only one media story among many that will occur over the coming months, and 
if the scandal cannot be tied to the president, it will likely fade from the national 
consciousness (Parker, 2013). 
 These recent developments make foretelling the future impact of the Tea Party 
difficult. However, the Tea Party faces certain demographic realities that may constrain 
its future impact. For instance, the majority of Tea Party supporters are older than 45 and 
white (Table 3.1 and Table 3.2) representing a constituency of American voters on the 
decline in a country that is increasingly diverse. As such, if the Tea Party cannot find a 
way to reach out to minorities and young voters then its political impact will likely 
decline and eventually evaporate as time progresses.   
What does the Tea Party Mean for America?  
 The Tea Party represents the most important political development in political 
parties in recent history. Tea Party supporters embody full-throttled support for all of the 
GOP’s major policy platform and grievances. Supporters express lower levels of support 
for compromise than non-Tea Party Republicans and harbor higher levels of opposition to 
most of the Democratic Party supported legislation passed since 2009. Thus, Republican 
Party opposition to legislation supported by the Democratic Party and President Obama 
will likely continue to be felt in policy debates as the Tea Party puts pressure on the GOP 
to avoid any attempts to move public policy in an ideologically liberal direction.    
220 
 
 The findings of this dissertation also suggest that the Tea Party will continue to 
push the Republican Party away from compromise contributing to increased levels of 
legislative gridlock and partisan polarization. Tea Party supporters oppose the majority of 
the legislative agenda offered by the Democratic Party making substantive policy 
changes in the remainder of President Obama’s term unlikely.  Whatever its future, the 
Tea Party will continue to play a major role in determining the outcomes of Republican 
primaries shaping the ideological direction of the Republican Party, and influencing the 
trajectory of public policy in the country for several years to come.  
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Table 5.1: Tea Party Supporters and Views on Compromise 
 
View on Compromise Tea Party  
Supporters 
Republican Non-Tea 
Party Supporters* 
American Electorate 
Prefer a U.S. President who sticks to his or her 
principles no matter what.1 
 
48% 41% 35% 
Prefer a representative in the U.S. Congress 
who sticks to his or her principles no matter 
what. 2 
 
51% 40% 33% 
Prefer to live in a place where most people 
have the same opinions you have  
about politics.3 
30% 15% 18% 
 
Source: American National Elections Study Evaluations of Government and Society Survey, February 18-23, 2012 
Cell number indicates the percentage of the Tea Party, Republican Identifiers, and overall respondents who hold those 
characteristics or attitudes listed in the first column. 
1 Original question format: “Would you prefer a U.S. President who compromises to get things done, or who sticks to his or her 
principles no matter what?” 
2 Original question format: “Would you prefer a representative in the U.S. Congress who compromises to get things done, or who 
sticks to his or her principles no matter what?”  
3 Original question format: “Would you prefer to live in a place where most people have the same opinions you have  
about politics, or in a place where people have lots of different opinions about politics, or  do you have no preference at all?”  
*Republicans who do not support the Tea Party. 
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